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ABSTRACT 
 
Unions are one of the most important institutions in labor markets, and are capable of 
affecting workers (wages) and employers (performance). Despite the relevance unions have had 
worldwide, most of the literature has concentrated on the economic effects of unions in the U.S. 
and other developed countries, with few studies concentrating on what unions do in developing 
countries.  
Because developing countries have contrasting differences compared to developed 
countries, in terms of economic development, legal settings and institutions, it is possible that 
conclusions reached in the broader literature might not be appropriate in the framework of 
developing countries. This dissertation aims to fill this gap in the literature studying the 
economic effects of unions on wages and performance in selected developing countries in Latin 
America: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay.  
The first essay focuses on the impact of unions on wages distribution in Bolivia and 
Chile, using the novel Recentered Influence Function decomposition. Although both countries 
have considerably different levels of economic development and institutions, the estimations 
indicate unions have similar effects increasing wages and reducing wage inequality at the top of 
the distribution. These results are similar to those found replicating the methodology using U.S. 
data. The results suggest that the common economic and political forces that govern the role of 
unions as collective bargaining units transcend other contextual differences in these countries. 
The second essay analyzes the impact of unions on economic performance of 
establishments in the manufacturing sector in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Panama and 
Uruguay.  Using an augmented Cobb Douglas production function, the essay finds that unions 
 x 
 
have a positive, but small, effect on productivity, with the exception of Argentina.  Analyses on 
alternative measures of performance show that, for most cases, the positive productivity effects 
barely offset the higher union compensation; that unions show no relationship with sales growth; 
and that unionized establishments usually reduce investment in capital and R&D. While no 
single narrative can explain all observed effects across countries, the results provide a step 
forward to understand the role of unions on economic performance in developing countries. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Labor unions are one of the most important institutions that affect the labor market, 
capable of affecting worker outcomes (e.g., wages) and employer outcomes (e.g., productivity 
and other performance measures) (Freeman & Medoff, 1984).  Unions are worker associations or 
organizations whose main goal is to improve the well-being of their members, which translates 
into higher wages, improved working conditions, and better employment protection.  Unions are 
able to achieve these objectives through monopolistic bargaining rights, defined by law, which 
allow them to negotiate collective bargaining contracts for covered establishments. As the 
empirical literature indicates, through a combination of their role as monopolistic agents, their 
use of collective contracts and their intervention in the internal labor markets of the 
establishments, unions are able to raise wages of their members (Fuchs, Krueger, & Poterba, 
1998; Jarrell & Stanley, 1990; Lewis, 1963, 1986), while also reducing wage dispersion among 
their workers (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Freeman, 1980, 1982; Card ,1996,2001). 
Unions also affect establishment performance. As workers’ bargaining agent, unions may 
not only increase wages, but also create distortions in the production process, reduce managerial 
discretion, limit the adoption of new technologies, and affect establishments’ investment and 
productivity. On the other hand, unions can potentially increase productivity by improving 
communication within establishment, lowering some labor related costs, and possibly lead 
management to adopt more effective personnel policies and methods of production, reducing so 
called “X-inefficiencies” (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). While most of the literature agrees that 
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unions have mostly negative effects on establishments’ profitability and investment 
(Doucouliagos & Laroche, 2009, 2013; Hirsch, 1992), there is far less consensus on the effects 
unions have on productivity, with surveys or meta analyses tending to conclude that net effects 
on productivity, while variable, are on average near zero or slightly positive, but insufficient to 
offset higher compensation costs (Aidt & Tzannatos, 2002; Doucouliagos & Laroche, 2003; 
Hirsch, 2004). 
The role of unions in labor markets has received plenty of attention by labor economists. 
There is a large literature that has studied the impacts of unions on wages and establishment 
performance for the U.S. and other developed economies, which arguably have similar economic 
and institutional settings. The literature, however, is limited regarding the role of unions in the 
framework of developing countries. Because developing countries are often characterized as 
having high levels of poverty, high inequality, weak institutions, high levels of corruption, large 
informal sectors, unstable business environments and less competitive markets, it is possible that 
effects typically associated with unions in the larger literature might not be applicable for 
developing economies.  
As Freeman (2010) indicates, while some of the emerging studies in developing countries 
have found results similar to the broader literature, others have shown results that are difficult to 
reconcile with the broader union literature. Though some of the differences can be explain by 
unions’ weakness and inability to fulfill their role as collective bargaining units, it is also 
possible that these differences can be explained by the economic and institutional characteristics 
of developing countries. However, because these studies differ not only with respect to the 
countries being analyzed, but also in their data and methodological strategies, the differences in 
results might not provide an accurate picture of differences in union effects. This dissertation 
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aims to expand the literature on unions in developing countries, providing new empirical 
evidence on the effects of unions on wage distributions (worker outcomes) and establishment 
performance (business outcomes), using standardized survey data for developing countries in 
Latin America.  
The first essay of this dissertation focuses on the impact unions have throughout the wage 
distribution for two neighboring countries: Bolivia and Chile. These countries have contrasting 
characteristics in terms of the legal framework, poverty, income inequality, informality and 
economic development, with Chile being at a higher level of development than Bolivia.  Using 
individual level data from the 2000 to 2009, the novel Recentered Influence Function 
Decomposition proposed in Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007) is used to determine the impact 
unions have on wage premiums and inequality. Despite the fact that both countries have different 
economic and institutional settings, the results presented here indicate that unions have similar 
effects on the wage distribution, with an observed wage gap between 0.11 and 0.14 log points 
and a reduction of within wage inequality between 8 to 20%. These effects are comparable to 
those seen for the U.S., using similar data and methods. The results suggest that a combination of 
union governance and political economy, coupled with product and labor market forces, result in 
similar union-wage impacts that transcend other economic differences.
1
 
The second essay focuses on the impact of unions from the employer perspective, 
studying the effects on performance at the establishment level across six Latin American 
countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay.  These countries are 
characterized as having historically strong unionized sectors that have had important roles on the 
development of their political and economic systems, and present a mixture of settings with 
different legal backgrounds and levels of economic development.  Using standardized data from 
                                                 
1
 A shortened version of this essay is also available at Rios-Avila and Hirsch (forthcoming). 
 4 
 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys for 2006, this essay analyzes the effect unions have on 
performance with emphasis on productivity per worker.  Although the data set provides rich 
information regarding establishments’ characteristics, production cost structure and investment 
climate, there is substantial nonresponse on items of sensitive nature (e.g., investment).  In order 
to overcome this limitation and improve the completeness and reliability of the data, a multiple 
imputation approach is used prior to estimation of the models.   
Using an augmented Cobb Douglas production function, and multiple controls for 
establishment characteristics, the results indicate that unions have positive, but mostly small and 
not significant, effects on productivity, with the exceptions of Argentina, where establishment 
union coverage and productivity have a strong negative relationship, and Bolivia, where the data 
show no relationship with productivity.  The analysis on profitability reveals that the boosts in 
productivity are not large enough to offset higher union production costs, with profitability more 
likely to be lower in unionized establishments.  The results also indicate that unionization is not 
correlated with sales growth, and, with exceptions, are mostly negatively related to measures of 
investment and innovation.  As with the evidence on wages, results from Latin America on 
unions and performance align reasonably well with evidence found for the U.S. and other 
developed economies.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
UNIONS, WAGE GAPS AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: CASE STUDIES FROM LATIN AMERICA 
 
Introduction 
Most of the empirical literature on union wage effects in developed countries agrees on 
two results.  First, unions increase wages of union members, creating a wage differential with 
otherwise similar nonunion workers (referred to throughout as the union “gap”) (Fuchs, Krueger, 
& Poterba, 1998; Jarrell & Stanley, 1990; Lewis, 1963, 1986).  Second, unions reduce wage 
dispersion among their members, both within and across unionized establishments as compared 
to their nonunionized counterparts (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Freeman, 1980, 1982; Card 1996, 
2001). 
The union wage literature traditionally explains these effects by emphasizing the role 
unions play as monopoly bargaining agents.  In this role, unions are capable of creating a wage 
gap by generating a monopoly rent, if they have enough coverage of the work force.  The 
literature also emphasizes the collective voice/institutional response face of unions, as they 
redirect their monopoly power into improving communication and reducing transaction costs in 
the internal labor markets (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Kaufman, 2004).  Unions are also known 
to affect wage distributions through the use of collective bargaining, adoption of formalized 
labor contracts and homogenization of the unionized labor force, which tend to standardize 
wages and reduce wage dispersion in the workplace (Freeman, 1980; Lewis, 1963). 
Even though the literature on unions is large, most of it has focused on the U.S. and other 
developed economies, which arguably possess strong institutions, similar economic 
 6 
 
environments, and roughly equivalent levels of economic wealth.  If these aspects affect the role 
and strength unions have on the labor market, it raises the possibility that some of the 
conclusions typically found in the literature might not apply to other type of economies.  Because 
developing countries are typically characterized by high levels of poverty, high inequality, weak 
institutional backgrounds, and large informal sectors and less competitive markets, it is possible 
that effects previously seen in the literature might not be applicable for these economies.  
Although some of the emerging literature on unions in developing countries has found 
results similar to the broader literature (Freeman, 2010), some findings differ from those in 
developed countries.  For instance, some of this literature finds union wage premiums that are 
much lower or higher than those found in developed countries, while others indicate that unions 
increase wage inequality among union workers (Arbache, 1999; Cassoni, Labadie, & Fachola, 
2005; Schultz & Mwabu, 1998).  While some of the observed differences in this literature can be 
explained by the weakness of unions in developing countries,
2
 it is also possible that the wage 
effects are driven by other intrinsic characteristics of developing countries.  Because these 
studies differ not only on nature of the countries analyzed, but also in their methodological 
strategies, differences in results across studies might not provide an accurate picture of the 
differences in union economic effects across countries. 
This paper aims to provide new evidence on the impact that unions have on wage gaps 
and inequality using data for two neighboring countries in Latin America that are at different 
stages of economic development: Bolivia and Chile.  These two countries, both characterized as 
having historically strong union organizations (Alexander & Parker, 2005; Ulloa, 2003), 
currently have similar rates of unionization in their formal labor markets (13%-14%).  At the 
                                                 
2
 Freeman (2010) suggests the unions in developing countries are relatively weak compared to traditional unions 
because historically they have been primary involved in political activity rather than focusing on their role in 
collective bargain. 
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same time, they have contrasting characteristics in terms of the legal framework, poverty, income 
inequality, informality and economic development, with Chile being at a higher level of 
development than Bolivia.  In this framework, this paper will provide some evidence on whether 
these differences affect the economic effects unions have on wages. 
To analyze the effect of unions on the wage distribution, the novel Recentered Influence 
Function (RIF) decomposition introduced in Firpo, Fortin and Lemiux (2007) is applied to 
identify the overall and detailed decomposition of the raw union gaps, both in terms of wage and 
inequality gaps.  Union wage gaps are identified at the mean and along the distribution 
(quantiles), while the effects on wage inequality are identified using the variance and 
interquantile union gaps. 
The results indicate that despite the differences in economic settings, unions have similar 
impacts on the wage distributions in both countries, with magnitudes comparable to those found 
in the literature for developed countries.  Controlling for worker and job characteristics, the 
estimations indicate average union wage gaps between 0.114 and 0.143 log points.  The results 
also indicate that unions in both countries have a relatively homogenous impact across the wage 
distribution, except for decreases in the wage gaps in the upper tails of the distribution.  In terms 
of wage inequality, unions have the potential to reduce log wage variance among union workers 
by up to 20%, while a more modest decrease is observed using the 90-10 interquantile difference 
(7%-8%).  The results also indicate that most of the wage compression is located at the top of the 
distribution.  Based on the detailed decomposition, unions appear to affect the overall wage 
structure similarly in both countries, with the exception being the effect on gender wage gaps.  A 
replication of the methodology using U.S. data for 2007-2008 reveals that the pattern of union 
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effects found for Bolivia and Chile are broadly comparable to the pattern in the U.S., with the 
main difference being a higher average union wage gap (0.189) in the U.S. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.  Section 1 presents a brief review of the 
literature on the effects of unions on wage distributions.  Section 2 provides a description of the 
background, characteristics and legal framework of Bolivia and Chile.  Section 3 describes data 
sources.  Section 4 describes the methodological strategy, identifying its advantages and 
limitations.  Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes. 
 
1. How do unions affect wages? 
By definition, unions are associations of employees whose main goal is to improve the 
well-being of their members.  Their nature is defined by law, which provides them with 
monopoly bargain rights within covered establishments, allows them to organize and represent 
their members, and gives them the ability to negotiate collective contracts on their behalf that in 
turn affect the level and distribution of wages and benefits. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) describe two approaches that are commonly used to explain 
how unions affect wages in the labor market.  The traditional microeconomic view is to consider 
unions as maximizing monopolistic agents that use the rights granted by law to obtain market 
power controlling the supply of labor, in the extreme doing so through the use of strikes or strike 
threats.  They use this market power to raise wages and benefits for their members above 
competitive levels, extracting rents from employers (owners), with a likely tradeoff between 
wages and employment (membership).  Lower profits in the long run may make firms 
unsustainable in competitive markets.  Hence, unions are unlikely to maintain both above-
competitive wages and employment in the long run absent either offsetting positive productivity 
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effects or if they operate in industries with heterogeneity in their (non-labor) cost structure 
(Hirsch, 2008).  Such companies can survive in less competitive environments in which higher 
costs can be passed through to consumers. 
In contrast to unions’ monopoly face, their collective voice/institutional response 
(CV/IR) face emphasizes the role of unions as agents capable of improving communication 
between workers and employers and mitigating market imperfections and frictions at the 
establishment level, possibly providing higher wages associated with gains in technical and/or 
economic efficiency.  In Freeman and Medoff’s view, unions can benefit the workplace by 
providing “voice” to workers that can enhance the communication of workers’ demands to 
employers, improving working conditions and contractual arrangements.  At the same time, 
unions are able to monitor and enforce explicit (and to a lesser extent implicit) contracts between 
their members and employers, which can benefit employers as well as workers.  And unions may 
help reduce potential costs associated with opportunistic behavior caused by incomplete 
contracts (Kaufman, 2004). 
There is a strong consensus in the empirical literature that union wage gaps fall in the 
range of 10%-20% (Fuchs, Krueger, & Poterba, 1998; Jarrell & Stanley, 1990; Lewis, 1963, 
1986).  There are, however, discrepancies in the interpretation of such gaps in the presence of 
selection bias, omitted variables, and data quality issues. Freeman and Medoff (1984) and Hirsch 
and Addison (1986) report that cross-sectional estimates of union wage gaps tend to be higher 
(15%-25%) than longitudinal estimates (10%-16%).  Lower longitudinal estimates, however, are 
also explained by the attenuation bias cause by measurement error with respect to changes in 
union status (Freeman, 1984).  Hirsch (2004a) and Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) also show that 
the inclusion of imputed earners substantially understates the estimations of union wage gaps 
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because union status is not a match criterion used to assign donor earnings to earnings non-
respondents.  Studies that tried to correct for selection following Heckman-Lee type of models 
(Duncan & Leigh, 1980; Hirsch & Berger, 1984; Lee, 1978; Robinson, 1989), have been 
criticized in the literature due to the volatility of their estimations and arbitrary exclusion 
restrictions (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Lewis, 1986) and their reliance on a single selection 
correction term that fails to account for two-sided selection (Card 1986). 
Unions also affect wage dispersion, in at least three ways (Freeman, 1980; Lewis, 1963). 
First, even if unions increase wages by the same proportion (say 15%) throughout the 
distribution, with no effect on wage inequality among union members, this can increase or 
decrease economy-wide wage dispersion depending on where union workers are located in the 
overall wage distribution. If union workers tend to have lower (higher) than average wages, their 
wages would be pushed toward (away from) the mean, effectively reducing (increasing) overall 
wage dispersion.  
Second, according to the standardization hypothesis of Freeman (1980), unions should be 
able to standardize wages within and across firms and establishments by reducing management 
discretion over compensation and by reducing returns (flatter β’s) from observed characteristics 
such as education, experience or tenure. This might cause wage profiles to be flatter, with low-
skill workers (high-skill) obtaining the highest (lowest) wage gaps, compressing wages toward 
the mean.  
Finally, unions might affect wage dispersion by attracting a more homogenous set of 
workers. Higher homogeneity in the union worker pool can be expected because unions form in 
specific types of occupations and industries that require certain kinds of workers. Selection on 
unmeasured characteristics could also occur because workers with the highest skill level are less 
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likely to seek union jobs due to low union premiums, but also because employers will try to 
avoid workers with low skill sets (Abowd & Farber, 1982; Card, 1996; Hirsch, 1982; Hirsch & 
Schumacher, 1998). In both cases, the union workforce would be relatively homogenous in 
measured and unmeasured characteristics, leading to lower wage dispersion among union 
workers, even absent substantial effects on average wages. 
The empirical literature on unions and wage inequality is in general agreement that 
unions reduce wage inequality, not only within the union sector, but also across the whole labor 
market. Freeman (1980, 1982), introducing a two-sector framework to analyze the impact on 
wage dispersion, finds that unions compress wage differentials across different demographics 
and skill levels generating a large and negative effect on within wage inequality, which is large 
enough to offset the increasing between sector dispersion effect. These results are consistent, 
albeit smaller, after controlling for individual fixed effects (Freeman, 1984). Subsequent 
literature (Card, 1996, 2001; Card, Lemieux, & Riddell, 2004; Hirsch, 1982; Hirsch & 
Schumacher, 1998) have also found that unions reduce wage inequality, mainly compressing 
wages from top to bottom, indicating that the long-run decline in private sector union density 
might be one of the main factors explaining the increasing wage inequality observed across time. 
Nevertheless, studies such as Lemieux (1998) and Card (1996) emphasize that controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity reduces the equality enhancing effects of unions. 
Unions in developing countries 
The literature on the economic effects of unions in developing countries is limited.  As 
Freeman (2010) states, one of the reasons for the sparse literature is the limited availability of 
adequate information.  He also emphasizes that unions in developing countries are often “weak” 
because they are typically more involved with political activities than collective bargaining. 
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Although some results found among studies in developing countries fall within the standards of 
the literature, there are others that show rather different conclusions, as discussed below.
3
  
Shultz and Mwabu (1998), analyzing survey data for South Africa in 1993, use a quantile 
regression approach to estimate the heterogeneity in union wage gaps.  The authors report that 
African union workers could earn between 145% to 19% more than comparable nonunion 
workers, whereas for white workers the wage gaps were much lower, from 21% to -24%.  Vallee 
and Thomas (1996) (Ghana), Terrel and Svejnar (1989) (Senegal) and Verner (1999) (Zimbawe), 
all report negative union wage gaps which, according to Freeman (2010), could be explained 
because these might not be standard unions but, rather, political worker fronts that are suffering 
from political pressures.  Although reporting positive union wage gaps, studies such as Cassoni, 
et al. (2005) for Urugu, et alay, Arbache and Carneiro (1999) for Brazil and Lee and Na (2004) 
for Korea show relatively low union wage gaps, below 10%, that could be attributed to the 
weakness of the unions.  These sets of results are suspicious since the reported wage gaps seem 
to be either too large to allow for unions to be sustainable, or too small to gather worker’s 
support needed to maintain their existence as a collective bargaining unit. 
As for unions and inequality, most of the literature in developing countries finds that 
unions reduce wage dispersion.  Arbache (1999), however, who analyzes wage dispersion in 
Brazil for the early 1990s, finds that unionism, specifically in manufacturing, is positively 
correlated with higher wage dispersion.  The author argues that it could be related to unmeasured 
heterogeneity across union workers in different sectors.  
In general, although some findings for developing countries (not summarized here) are 
similar to those found in the U.S. literature, others show important differences that could be 
related to inherent characteristics of their economies.  Unfortunately, the evidence is insufficient 
                                                 
3
 For a more comprehensive review of the literature refer to Freeman (2010) 
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to determine if the variation across studies is a consequence of institutional and economic 
differences between countries or a consequence of different strategies used across studies.  
This paper will contribute to the literature in two respects.  First, it will provide new 
evidence on two aspects of the effects of unions on wages, namely union wage gap and wage 
distribution effects, for two developing countries, Bolivia and Chile.  To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no formal analysis that has been done for this topic in Bolivia, while only 
one other study exists for Chile (Landerretche, Lillo, & Puentes, 2011).  Second, it will provide 
evidence whether institutional and economic differences have an important role on how unions 
affect wage distributions.  This will be done by controlling for the same methodology and type of 
information in both countries, in order to reduce the effect that methodological differences could 
have on the estimation of union effects. 
 
2. Unions in Bolivia and Chile: Background 
Bolivia and Chile are neighboring countries located in South America.  Both having been 
Spanish colonies, they share much in common in their history and heritage, yet they have 
followed different paths of economic development (Barrientos Quiroga, 2010).  These countries 
inherited from their colonial past an extractive and agricultural economy, which marked the early 
development of their economies and their labor organizations.  They both suffered periods of 
dictatorship and debt crises that affected their economic development from the 1970s through the 
early 1990s, during which unions, acting outside the law, played a crucial role representing, 
organizing and defending the working class against the dictatorship (Alexander & Parker, 2005; 
Ulloa, 2003).  Union participation in political activities, however, may have weakened their 
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capacity to fulfill their role as workers’ collective bargain agent in the labor market (Freeman, 
2010). 
After the debt crisis in the 1980s, both countries tried to promote the development of their 
economies following policies of industrialization, increased labor flexibility, reduction of the 
public sector and promotion of open market economies (Edwards, 1989).  Chile was relatively 
successful in supporting a stronger industrial sector and creating well-functioning institutions 
that facilitated transition to a largely free market economy. Bolivia, in contrast, was less 
successful in establishing an environment supporting the transition to a free market economy and 
in creating an industrialized economy.  These differences had an important impact on their 
economic growth and development.  After more than 20 years of the debt crisis, Chile become 
one of the largest economies in the region, with a GDP per capita in 2009 of $6,077 (in U.S. 
dollars), which is almost six times the GDP per capita in Bolivia ($1,203), according to the 
World Development indicators (2011). With respect to poverty, while only 15% of the 
population in Chile is below the poverty line, more than 60% of the population in Bolivia is 
under that condition. 
The differences that marked their economic success also had a profound impact on role 
unions have on their respective labor markets, on their ability respond to the changing economic 
settings and their capacity to engage and negotiate as collective bargaining units. In the 
following subsections a brief summary on the history of unions in each country is presented, 
followed up by a review of the legal background. In the final section, some hypotheses of the 
possible effects that the differences in the economic and institutional settings have on the role of 
unions are discussed. 
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2.1. Union history in Bolivia and Chile 
Bolivia 
According to Hudson and Hanratty (1991) and Carriere, Haworth and Roddick (1989), 
unions in Bolivia can be considered one of the most powerful and politically active set of unions 
in Latin America.  Most of its power came from organized labor in the mining sector, the largest 
sector in the economy.  Its figure of power is represented by the Central Obrera Boliviana 
(COB), which is a union confederation that centralizes and organizes the collective demands of 
unions in the country.  Originally founded in 1952, it was created as a subordinate group of the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolutionario (MNR) to help organized the mining sector.  Due to the 
growing power of the COB as labor unions’ representative and coordinator, it became an 
autonomous institution that became the main opposition to the Bolivian state (Hudson & 
Hanratty, 1991; Mansilla, 1993), even when unions were forced to operate as clandestine 
institutions during the period of dictatorship (1971-1981).  
The power held by labor unions, represented by the COB, reached its maximum during 
1982-1985, a period marked not only by one of the worst economic crises to affect Bolivia, but 
also by large numbers of strikes, stoppages and diminished productivity.  This period also 
marked the downfall of unions, which slowly lost public support as the economy deteriorated.  
By the end of 1985, a new economic model was followed, stopping the crisis, promoting the 
restructuration of the economy and the decentralization of the mining sector, deeply affecting the 
already weakened COB.  Subsequent attempts from the government to restructure and 
decentralize the health care and education sector were successfully stopped by the intervention of 
the COB and other organized labor sectors.  Despite their diminished power, organized labor 
remained a considerable political force in the creation of economic policies in the country.  Still, 
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little is known about its role as a relatively decentralized bargaining agent at the workplace level 
throughout the Bolivian labor market.  Following the entrance of a socialist/populist party to the 
government in 2006, a more active participation of unions in the economy was expected but, to 
date, their effects have not yet been observed.  
Chile 
The Chilean labor movement is one of the oldest in Latin America, being perhaps the first 
to organize nationwide and to obtain legal concessions from the State (Carrière, et al., 1989; 
Ulloa, 2003).  Its growing power in the economy generated a process of selected repression from 
the government, which opted to create parallel organizations to support their policies.  By 1936, 
the Confederacion de Trabajadores Chilenos (CTCH) would be created to organize and represent 
labor unions in the country, becoming a key ally for the government party until 1946, and years 
later it would be replaced by the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT).  Although their primarily 
function was to support the political party in power, both the CTU and CTCH would constantly 
negotiate for better social protection, wages and working conditions.  
The military coup of 1973 marked the restructuring of labor unions.  Seeing the 
weaknesses of previous union-government alliances, the rights of association were eliminated 
and their leaders persecuted, leaving little if any space for the formation of new labor 
organizations.  The Plan Laboral dictated in 1979 became one of the most important steps in the 
transformation of labor organizations and unions in Chile, reestablishing the rights of association 
and reintroducing bargaining rights, forbidding industry-wide bargaining, but allowing the 
formation of unions by firms, establishments, and among independent and transitory workers.  
These policies stimulated the creation of new types of unions focusing collective bargaining at a 
more decentralized level.  At the same time, the military imposed a number of political and 
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economic changes ordering the opening of the economy to foreign trade, constraining public 
expenditures, and generating incentives to promote productivity and investment.  This adaptation 
of the new economic model, market driven, seemed promising until the crisis in the 1980s.  A 
decade later, when Chile was able to return to democracy in 1990, a new representation for 
organized labor was created, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), which constitutes the 
main representative and organization of the unions through today, playing an important role in 
organizing claims against the state.  After the 1990s, nonetheless, the cannon of union structure 
changed, which resulted in a decline of affiliation to labor unions and the creation of a larger 
number of unions smaller in size, following a more decentralized bargaining system.  
2.2. Legal framework 
As of today, Bolivia and Chile have both ratified the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) conventions 87 (freedom of association and protection of right to organize) and 98 (right 
to organize and collectively bargain).  The first convention guarantees all workers the right to 
form unions of their own choice and for employers to form employers’ organizations, while the 
second provides the right of unions to negotiate work conditions in behalf of workers, protecting 
them against acts of anti-union discrimination.  
Although both countries have ratified these standard conventions,
4
 there are differences 
in the extent to which these standards are guaranteed in both countries.  According to the OECD 
(1996) report, although there are some restrictions to the formation of unions, it is relatively easy 
to establish independent union organizations in Chile.  They do not have noticeable restrictions 
on strikes and have an adequate enforcement and protection system for anti-union discrimination 
and collective bargaining.  In Bolivia, the restrictions on association and union formation are 
relatively more significant, with political interference more widespread.  Legal strikes are highly 
                                                 
4
 Bolivia ratified these conventions in 1965 (c87) and 1973 (c98), while Chile ratified them much later in 1999.  
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constrained (requiring 75% support) and general and solidary strikes are considered illegal, and 
even though discrimination against unions is prohibited, protection is considered inadequate and 
slow, mostly due to deficiencies related to enforcement (Ronconi, 2012).  
According to the Labor Law in Bolivia, collective contracts constitute an agreement 
between an employer(s) and a union(s) in order to determine general work conditions.  These 
contracts are binding for any current or future union member hired in the workplace, but are not 
mandatory for nonunion workers in the workplace.  To be recognized, however, these contracts 
must be negotiated by unions that are recognized and approved by the Ministerio de Trabajo 
(Department of Labor).  In Chile, collective bargaining and contracts are also recognized, but 
they can be negotiated by a group of workers regardless of their affiliation.  Nonunion workers 
can benefit from union collective contracts only after complying with the costs of affiliation to 
that union.  Collective bargaining, however, is prohibited in public institutions where more than 
50% of the budget is financed by the state.  Union contracts can include negotiated agreements 
on working conditions, as long as they do not limit employers’ abilities to organize, direct and 
manage the establishment or firm.  
The Bolivian law recognizes the rights of association to unions in different levels: 
workers or employers in the same firm, or in the same profession or occupation, or within 
different firms or occupations that are similar or interconnected.  Public officials are not allowed 
to organize into unions, regardless of their condition.  A union can be formed with at least 20 
workers in case of professional or craft-based unions, or at least 50% of the workers in the case 
of unions within establishments or firms.  As mentioned previously, for a union to be recognized, 
they must submit a request to and be approved by the Department of Labor, which has final 
authority as to whether or not a union is legally recognized.  Unions are allowed to form 
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federations or confederations in benefit of their common interests, with legal recognition 
contingent on approval by the Department of Labor. 
In Chile, the Law recognizes that all workers in the private sector and public firms have 
the right of free association in unions.  To be recognized, these unions do not need any previous 
authorization, as long as they follow the statements dictated by law.  Unions, as institutions, are 
also free to affiliate or disaffiliate to federations or confederations, either national or 
international.  The law defines and recognizes four types of unions: Single-establishment unions, 
multiple-establishment unions, unions for independent workers, and unions for temporary 
workers.  Single-establishment unions require a minimum of 8 workers to establish a union.  In 
case of larger establishments (50 or more workers), multi-establishment unions, and unions for 
independent and eventual workers, at least 25 workers are required for the formation of unions. 
2.3. Legal, economic and institutional settings and their effect on unions 
In the previous subsections, a brief summary of the historical and legal background has 
been provided to describe the environment under which unions developed in both countries, and 
the effects that these settings could have on their roles in the labor market.  Overall three broad 
conclusions can be reached.  First, due to their historical and legal background, the bargaining 
system in Chile became highly decentralized (O'Connell, 1999), while a mixed bargaining 
system seemed to prevail in Bolivia, with bargaining allowed at different levels (unions, 
federations and confederations).  A according to O'Connell (1999), more decentralized 
bargaining systems can improve productivity by internalizing tradeoffs between higher wages 
and changes in work rules and/or increased effort.
5
  Due to lower coordination, however, 
decentralized systems can increase wage inequality compared to more centralized systems. 
                                                 
5
 Vergara (1998) describes that in many instances unions negotiate wage increases and benefits linked to specific 
productivity targets. 
 20 
 
Nevertheless, extreme decentralization, or fragmentation as described in Anner (2008) and 
Caraway (2006), can potentially reduce bargaining power, creating smaller unions with little 
leverage for negotiation. Second, the legal structure in Bolivia provides unions with monopolistic 
power to engage in collective bargaining, which could have enhance their bargaining leverage.  
In comparison, unions in Chile might be relatively weaker because nonunion organizations can 
also negotiate collective contracts.  And third, because restrictions and state intervention on the 
formation of unions are relatively stronger in Bolivia compared to Chile, a stronger and more 
wide-spread presence of unions in Chile than in Bolivia is expected, due to a lower cost of 
forming a union.  
There are other factors that can further describe the strength unions have in their labor 
markets.  As suggested by Dessy and Pallage (2003), the combination of relatively high levels of 
inequality, Bolivia with a Gini index for family income of 0.56 in 2008 and Chile 0.52 in 2009 
(World Development Indicators 2011), and high levels of poverty (especially in Bolivia) have 
pushed the economic structure of these countries toward substantial dependence on sizable 
informal sectors. Gasparini and Tornaroli (2009) estimate that about 65.5% of the workforce in 
Bolivia was informal in 2002, compared to 37.5% in Chile in 2003.
6
  As Anner (2008) describes, 
workers in the informal sector are difficult to organize because they do not have traditional 
employment relationships, and when they do, they are typically employed in small 
establishments that cannot unionize.
7
  In this sense, larger informal sectors, as observed in 
Bolivia, are likely to be associated with less leverage for unions.  
                                                 
6
 In their study, a worker is defined as informal if (s)he is an unskilled, self-employed, salaried worker in a small 
private firm or a zero-income worker. 
7
 This does not imply that unions in the informal sector do not exist.  In fact, there are labor organizations in the 
informal sector, but their role in the labor market is different from traditional labor unions. 
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Other labor market institutions can also affect the strength and density of unions in the 
labor market.  Checchi and Lucifora (2002) argue that economic settings that recognize and 
protect the rights of associations, and enable unions to offer benefits and services that the market 
does not provide, can create an environment for stronger and more widespread unions.  Chile, for 
instance, offers unemployment insurance that reduces the potential benefits of job stability 
offered by unions, in contrast to Bolivia where no unemployment insurance is offered.  The 
larger informal sector in Bolivia provides a partial substitute for unemployment insurance, also 
reducing the strength of their unions.  
In terms of protection, both countries have ratified the ILO conventions on freedom of 
association.  Chile, however, seems to be in a better position than Bolivia in terms of the 
perception and protection of workers’ rights of association, suggesting the existence of stronger 
unions.  For instance, according to the information reported in Ronconi (2012), during the 2000s, 
Chile had about twelve times more inspectors per worker than did Bolivia.  In addition, 
according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2011), Chile ranked in the 74
th
 and 87
th
 
percentiles in terms of voice accountability and the rule of law in 2009, much better performance 
than seen in Bolivia who ranked in the 47
th
 and 13
th
 percentiles.
8
  
Overall, most of the economic, legal and institutional settings seem to indicate that 
unions in Chile should be stronger and more widespread than in Bolivia, which might also 
translate into higher earnings (union wage premiums).  Still, some characteristics favor Bolivian 
unions.  Ultimately, whether or not different economic and institutional settings affect the impact 
unions have on wages is an empirical question that this paper will aim to answer. 
                                                 
8
 Voice and accountability reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and free media. Rule of law 
reflects perceptions on confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
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3. Data and summary statistics 
This paper uses two principal sources of information. For Bolivia, Household Surveys for 
the years 2002 through 2009 are used.
9
 These surveys are collected annually by the National 
Institute of Statistics, where the samples are drawn based on the information from the Census 
2001.
10
  For Chile, the data used comes from the Social Protection Surveys for the years 2002, 
2004, 2006 and 2009.
11
  These surveys were created to obtain a panel that collects detailed data 
on job characteristics and job history information for one person in each household, who is 
followed across years.
12
  These surveys are also nationally-representative. 
For both countries, the surveys are pooled across years to provide more information for 
the analysis.  Because the surveys from Bolivia are not completely independent from year to 
year, and the ones from Chile have a panel component, pooling information together creates a 
downward bias on the standard error estimates, but should not bias coefficient estimates (see 
Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  To provide a representative sample of the labor force that can 
potentially be unionized, the sample is restricted as follows. The analysis includes employed 
adults in the private sector (i.e., public administration is excluded), between 21 and 65 years old, 
whose occupation can be classified as salaried and hourly workers. It excludes jobs classified as 
self-employed, family workers and employers, as well as workers in the agricultural sector. 
                                                 
9
 These surveys were collected through the Program for the Improvement of Surveys and the Measurement of Living 
Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean (MECOVI in Spanish) with the cooperation of the World Bank until 
2004. Since 2005 it has been independently carried out by the national statistical office (INE). This initiative 
promotes the collection of adequate and high quality information about the living conditions of people in the region. 
The 2002 survey is better known as Encuesta de Mejoramiento de Condiciones de Vida 2002. The 2003-2004 is the 
Encuesta Continua de Hogares. And since 2005, they are denominated Encuestas de Hogares. All surveys can be 
access from the following website: http://www.ine.gob.bo/enchogares/enchogares.aspx. 
10
 Due to the survey design, same areas, and in some cases households, are interviewed more than one year, 
generating an underlying correlation across years. 
11
 These surveys were collected to obtain information of the labor market and the social protection system in Chile 
using longitudinal information. They were collected by the Universidad de Chile, and kindly provided by the 
Subsecretaría de Previsión Social in Chile.  
12
 The survey for 2002 was originally structured to represent workers that were once affiliated to the pension system. 
Starting with the 2004 survey, they included a sample representing the labor force outside of the pension system.  
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Workers in the army and extraterritorial organizations are also excluded from the analysis. The 
final samples contain 9,614 and 17,182 individuals for Bolivia and Chile, respectively.  
For the dependent variable, average wages per hour, measured by monthly labor earnings 
divided by average hours worked in a month, is used.  Wages are measured in local currency and 
are adjusted by inflation using year 2009 as the base year.  This measurement corresponds to 
self-reported earnings of the primary job only, and includes tips, commissions and overtime, but 
do not include other services or compensation such as health insurance.  Based on the 
methodological description of the surveys, the rates of item nonresponse are negligible and 
should not affect the estimates (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2004).  Following Freeman (1981) and 
Olson (2002), ignoring non-wage compensation such as health insurance might understate 
estimates on the impact of unions on total compensation, but because this information is not 
available in the surveys, this paper will only consider direct effects on labor earnings.  
In both surveys individuals self-report if they are members of unions or other labor 
organizations, information that is used to classify workers by union status.  Although this 
measure of membership does not necessary imply coverage by collective contracts, in absence of 
an alternative measure, the assumption is that they are covered.  As mentioned in Hirsch (2004a), 
self-identification could attenuate estimates due to measurement error, but, with the available 
information, it is not possible to assess the severity of the bias.
13
 
  
                                                 
13
 As stated in Freeman (1984), measurement error bias is of particular interest in case of longitudinal studies, with 
less severe consequences for cross sectional ones.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
  Bolivia Chile 
  Union Non union Diff Union Non union Diff 
Ln Wages/h 1.96 1.69 0.27 7.41 7.18 0.24 
 
(0.83) (0.81)  [10.81] (0.59) (0.63)  [17.93] 
Hrs week 52.12 50.26 1.86 46.78 46.15 0.63 
 
(20.01) (18.17)  [3.08] (10.55) (10.93)  [2.70] 
Sex 0.84 0.71 0.12 0.71 0.63 0.07 
 
(0.37) (0.45)  [10.80] (0.46) (0.48)  [6.94] 
Indigenous 0.25 0.19 0.06 
   
 
(0.43) (0.39) [4.59] 
   Yrs. Schooling 11.01 10.67 0.35 12.00 11.63 0.38 
 
(4.59) (4.50)  [2.48] (2.78) (3.15)  [6.02] 
Kids 0-6yr  0.81 0.77 0.04 0.43 0.46 -0.02 
 
(0.92) (0.92)  [1.37] (0.66) (0.68) -[1.6] 
Kids 7-17yr 1.17 1.10 0.07 0.83 0.73 0.09 
 
(1.32) (1.25)  [1.79] (0.95) (0.91)  [4.41] 
Married 0.78 0.65 0.14 0.62 0.54 0.08 
 
(0.41) (0.48)  [10.72] (0.48) (0.50)  [7.35] 
Head Household 0.74 0.56 0.18 0.63 0.54 0.09 
  (0.44) (0.50)  [12.98] (0.48) (0.50)  [8.19] 
N 1456 8158 9614 2473 14709 17182 
Year Union Density Union Density 
Average  12.9%   13.8%  
2002 
 
14.7%  
 
10.9%  
2004 
 
11.1%  
 
13.1%  
2005 
 
12.2%  
  
 
2006 
 
12.7%  
 
14.3%  
2007 
 
16.4%  
  
 
2008 
 
12.3%  
  
 
2009  11.5%   16.3%  
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. T-statistics are shown in brackets. Statistics shown 
in this table are calculated using the corresponding sample weights. Detailed information on 
unionization rates and market structure with respect to industry and occupation can be found 
in the appendix, Table A1. 
Table 1 presents weighted sample means of the main explanatory variables using union 
classification for both countries.  Bolivia and Chile show similar union density averages of 
12.9% and 13.8%, respectively.  Chile has experienced increasing unionization over time, while 
in Bolivia union density appears stable, although estimates vary from year-to-year due perhaps to 
modest sample sizes and survey sample frame differences in 2002 and 2007.  In Bolivia and 
Chile, union workers receive a higher wage per hour, showing raw wage gaps of 0.272 and 0.236 
log points for Bolivia and Chile respectively.  On average, union workers work longer hours than 
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their counterparts, particularly in Bolivia.
14
  In both countries, men constitute a larger share of 
the union workforce, even though in Chile women have higher labor force participation than in 
Bolivia.  Union workers in both countries are slightly more educated and have about 2 more 
years of experience than their nonunion counterparts.  Union workers are more likely to be 
married and to be head of households. Almost all differences are statistically significant at 
standard confidence levels. 
 
4. Empirical strategy: Estimating the union wage and inequality gap 
In an ideal world, the appropriate way to estimate the impact of unions on union and 
nonunion wage distributions would be observing wages in absence of unions in the economy, 
and compare them with those in the presence of unions.  In the terminology of Lewis (1986), this 
corresponds to so-called wage “gains.”  Because wages absent the presence of unions in the 
economy cannot be observed, the literature has focused on union “gaps” rather than union gains, 
which analyzes the observable union-nonunion differentials (conditional on covariates), 
acknowledging that nonunion as well as union wages may be affected by unions’ presence.15  As 
in much of the literature, this paper will follow this strategy estimating wage gaps but not wage 
gains.  This also implies that the results cannot be extended beyond the framework of the 
analysis since they do not correspond to a general equilibrium solution.  
Since the purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare the impact of unions on the 
wage distribution, four measurements are used.  To estimate the impact on relative union-
nonunion wages, the mean wage gap and quantile wage gaps are used.  On the other hand, to 
                                                 
14
 Although there is a concern that if union workers work for longer hours than their counterparts, one might 
spuriously obtain a lower union wage gaps, once we compare union and nonunion workers with similar 
characteristics (see Table 2), there is no statistical difference in terms of their hours worked. 
15
 It is typically argued that unions may affect non-union wages due to threat effects or spillover effects, the former 
increasing and the latter decreasing non-union wages. 
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estimate the impact of unions on wage dispersion (inequality), measures of the variance and 
interquantile gap in log wages are estimated.  The first measure has a long history and can be 
compared to union gap measures elsewhere in the literature.  The second measure is used to 
explore whether union effects are heterogeneous by examining the impact of unions across the 
wage distribution.  The third measure, the variance of log wages, is the principal statistic used in 
the literature and will provide a single summary measure of the overall impact of unions on wage 
inequality.  Finally, the interquantile gaps will provide a more informative identification of 
where in the wage distribution unions have their largest effects.  It will also provide an 
alternative to the variance, whose magnitude can be sensitive to values in the tails of the wage 
distribution.
16
  
To evaluate and decompose the union gaps across the proposed statistics, the 
methodology proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007) is applied.  This methodology, a 
generalization of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, provides two advantages over the standard 
methodology.  First, it provides a semi-parametric estimate of the wage gaps for statistics beyond 
the mean, and second it allows controlling for observed differences in the distribution of 
characteristics that can be associated to the union’s workforce.  
This methodology involves two phases.  The first involves the identification of an 
appropriate counterfactual that is used to compare union and nonunion wage distributions, 
assuming all other characteristics are kept constant.  This counterfactual can be used to perform 
an overall decomposition of the union gap into portions explained by measured differences in 
worker, job, and location characteristics (a “composition” effect) and by differences in the 
coefficients (“returns”) on the observables (a “wage structure” effect).  The second uses the 
                                                 
16
 Household data in general is less informative regarding information in and near the tails of the wage distribution 
because of possible measurement error, extremely low or high values, as well as top or bottom coding sometimes 
used by statistical agencies or by researchers.  
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novel RIF (Recentered Influence Function) regression to obtain a linear approximation of the 
individual contributions of the observed variables on the composition and wage structure effects.  
The methodology, as well as its advantages and disadvantages, are described below.
17
 
4.1. Overall decomposition: Reweighting procedure 
Define    as the function that determines (log) wages        for each individual   in 
sector k, where   indicates the union       and nonunion status       of individual   . 
Assume this function depends on observed        and unobserved characteristics        such that: 
       (         )           (1) 
Define          as a function that describes the distributional statistic of interest, i.e. 
mean or variance, of a vector    that contains the wages of all workers in sector     Also define 
    (  (       )) as the counterfactual distributional statistic of the set of wages union 
workers would earn under the wage structure prevalent in the nonunion sector.  Then the overall 
union gap can be defined and decomposed as: 
                                 (2) 
Where    is the raw difference in wages measured in terms of the statistic  .      is the 
fraction of the overall gap that can be explained by differences in the wage structure across 
sectors (wage structure effect), and     is the fraction that can be explained by differences on 
the characteristics across groups (composition effect).  
Although neither the counterfactual wage distribution nor the associate statistic    can be 
directly observed, under the assumptions of ignorability (conditional on measured covariates) 
and overlapping support of the covariates (see Imbens & Wooldridge (2009) and Firpo, et al. 
(2007) for further discussion), the counterfactual distribution can be identified so that     and 
                                                 
17
 Details on the procedure used in the detailed decomposition can be found in Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007; 
2009) 
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    reflect the true wage structure and decomposition effects.  Under the assumption of 
ignorability, it is required that after controlling for observed characteristics    the distribution of 
the unobserved explanatory factors in the wage determination    is the same across the union 
and nonunion sector.  Consequences of violating this assumption are discussed in sections 4.3 
and 5.4.  The assumption of overlapping support requires that there needs to be an overlapping in 
the characteristics across sectors, and that no single characteristic can be observed only within 
one sector. Under these two assumptions, the counterfactual distribution statistic    can be 
estimated using all observations in the nonunion sector and the estimated weight  : 
 ̂           (3) 
Where    is the weight each observation in the nonunion sector is given for the 
estimation of the counterfactual statistic   . This weight is defined as: 
 ̂     
 ̂   
   ̂   
 (4)  
where  ̂    is the estimated conditional probability (propensity score) of being a worker in the 
union sector.  Although this propensity score can be estimated using parametric and semi-
parametric methods, as suggested in Firpo, et al. (2007), it will be estimated using a logit model 
where the dependent variable is union status, conditioned on observed characteristics  .  This 
vector of characteristics   corresponds to the set of wage determinants, as described in equation 
1.  Once  ̂  is estimated, the overall wage decomposition is estimated using equation 2. 
4.2. Detailed decomposition 
Once the counterfactual distributions have been identified, one can further decompose the 
wage structure and composition effects identifying the contribution of each observed 
characteristic to each component.  This can be done using Recentered Influence Functions 
regression (RIF-regressions), as proposed in Firpo, et al. (2009).   
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A RIF-regression is similar to a standard regression, except that instead of using the 
dependent variable, in this case log(wages), it uses the recentered influence function of the 
statistic of interest associated to that observation    (       ).  The RIF function is technically 
defined as: 
   (       )       (       )   (5) 
where the influence function   (       ) can be understood as the change the observation      
has on the empirical estimation of the statistic   .
18
  In other words, the RIF function can be 
intuitively understood as a first order approximation of the overall contribution that each 
observation has on the estimation of the statistic  .  Once this RIF variable for each observation 
is estimated, it can be used to obtain a linear estimation on the average marginal effect that each 
observed characteristic   has on the distributional statistic   .  In the framework of wage 
decomposition and considering a linear approximation for the conditional expectation of the RIF 
in the form of: 
                  , 
three set of parameters are required to be estimated: 
 ̂  (∑         )
  
 ∑     
     ̂(       )               (6) 
 ̂  (∑  ̂ (   )         )
  
 ∑  ̂ (   )           ̂(      ) (7) 
Here  ̂ (   )  is defined in equation 4. Then, terms in the spirit of an Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition for any statistic   can be defined to provide a detailed decomposition of the wage 
structure and composition effects: 
      
   ̂   ̂   and         ̂     ̂     (8) 
                                                 
18
 Technically, the influence function is defined as   (      )         
     
 
, where    is the associated statistic 
when the distribution of wages experience an infinitesimal shift toward the observation    . More details on the 
definition and properties of the IF and RIF function can be found in (Firpo, et al., 2009). 
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For the four statistics of interest in this paper, the corresponding RIF functions can be 
written as follows: 
Mean:            
Quantile for        :             
         
     
 
Variance:                  
Inter-Quantile:                                      
In the next section, the main advantages and limitations of this methodology are 
discussed, and its performance compared to alternative methodologies.  
4.3. Advantages and limitations of the RIF decomposition methodology 
The methodology described in the previous section possesses several advantages as 
compared to alternative methodologies used to estimate union wage gaps. Similar to an Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition (Blinder, 1973; R. Oaxaca, 1973), the RIF decomposition methodology 
allows for a differentiated wage structure for the union and nonunion sectors, relaxing the 
assumption that unions only shift the wage profile for all workers, which is the base assumption 
for standard Mincerian OLS and conditional quintile regressions.  
As pointed out in Barsky (2002), one of the limitations of the Oaxaca-Blinder type of 
decomposition is that it depends on the linearity assumption of the conditional expectation to 
provide consistent estimates for the wage gap decomposition.  Since the methodology used here 
relies on a reweighting procedure to decompose the wage gaps, and imposes minimum 
restrictions on the wage determination function, it overcomes this limitation with the additional 
advantage that it can be extended to analyze other distributional statistics beyond the mean.  
Furthermore, the use of reweighting strategy provides an additional advantage, being that it 
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reduces or eliminates any differences in the distribution of the observed wage determinants 
between union and nonunion workers. 
Finally, although there are other methodologies in the literature that are able to estimate 
the wage decomposition for statistics beyond the mean (see Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo, 2011), 
the methodology described here is the only one that is able to provide a detailed decomposition 
to the contribution of specific variables into the wage structure and composition effect.  One 
must consider, however, that the detailed decomposition also suffers from the identification 
problem stated in Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) and Yun (2005, 2008), since the contributions of 
the variables to the wage structure effect are not invariant to the choice of a baseline in the case 
of categorical variables, or affine transformation in the case of continuous variables.
19
 
The main disadvantage of the RIF decomposition strategy is that it relies on the 
ignorability assumption to provide consistent estimates of the decomposition.  This implies that 
once observations are matched in terms of observed characteristics, unmeasured characteristics 
should be randomly distributed between union and nonunion sectors.  In other words, one would 
expect that there is no selection into the union sector, or that unionization is as good as 
exogenous, once conditioned on measurable variables.  If unionization is not random, however, 
the estimations could be biased and inconsistent, depending on the type of union selection that 
prevails.  This is a “criticism” that applies to most statistical methods in the literature. 
The literature suggests union status is not an exogenous outcome (Lewis, 1986).  In fact, 
as Abowd and Farber (1982) emphasize, the process of selection into union jobs might not be 
one-sided, but rather characterized by a two-sided selection process. In this framework, workers 
with relatively low skill sets might select themselves to be in the queue for union jobs, but firms 
choose to hire the best candidates among workers in the queue.  Two strategies have been used to 
                                                 
19
 Although this problem is present for continuous variables, it typically has less severe consequences. 
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deal with this problem.  Heckman-Lee selection approaches (Duncan & Leigh, 1980; Hirsch & 
Berger, 1984; Lee, 1978; Robinson, 1989) have been used to account for a one-sided type of 
selection into the union sector, while others have relied on the use of instrumental variables 
(Duncan & Leigh, 1985) to avoid the bias due to endogeneity.  The former studies have been 
criticized in the literature (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Lewis, 1986) because of their arbitrary 
exclusion restrictions and the volatility of their estimated results, whereas the latter strongly 
depends on finding appropriate instruments, which at best (i.e., even if a valid instrument) will 
only provide a proper union wage gap estimate for the population whose union status is affected 
by the instrument.  
In the absence of a better methodology and data sets with measures that can properly 
account for selection, this analysis proceeds under the assumption of conditional exogeneity of 
unions status.  Nevertheless, the consequences and expected bias that may result from ignoring 
unobserved heterogeneity are discussed further in section 5.4. 
 
5. Results  
5.1. Model Specification 
As described in Section 4, to correctly identify the wage structure and composition effect 
of the union wage gap, it is necessarily to create an appropriate counterfactual that simulates the 
wage distribution that union workers would have faced under the wage structure observed in the 
nonunion sector.  To construct this counterfactual wage distribution, one first estimates a 
propensity score  ̂    using a logit model.  The dependent variable in this model is union status, 
and the independent variables are the set of measured characteristics   that determines workers’ 
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hourly wage (see equation 1).  The intent is to provide an index measuring the likelihood of 
being a union member, conditioning on measured wage determinants. 
Following the literature, the vector   contains a set of standard controls, including a set 
of demographic characteristics (sex, ethnicity, years of completed education and age), a set of 
household characteristics (number of children ages 0-6 and 7-17 in the household, currently 
married, and if he/she is designated head of the household), and a set of region and year fixed 
effects to capture differences across regions and years.
20
  Since not all skill factors can be 
captured by these set of controls, broad occupation and industry fixed effects are included in the 
specification as proxies for worker skills and working conditions (Hirsch, 2004; Hirsch & 
Schumacher, 1998).
21
  
An additional issue is to explore whether or not to include establishment size as a control 
in the specification.
22
  According to Oi and Idson (1999) and Brown and Medoff (1989) there is 
strong evidence suggesting that firm size is an important determinant of wages, in part because 
they are able to pay higher wages and hire more highly skilled workers to match with higher 
levels of physical capital, as well as for other reasons not fully identified in the literature.  As 
discussed in Hirsch (2004a), firm and establishment size are typically excluded from analyses of 
union wage effects because such data are not readily available in U.S. household data sets, and 
because it is difficult to disentangle the separate effects of employer size and unions on wages 
                                                 
20
 Following Blinder (1976), instead of using potential experience and its square as wage determinants, the 
specification includes age and its square, years of education and its square, and age times education to allow for a 
more flexible specification. Ethnicity is only available for Bolivia, and is defined by the language the individuals 
spoke during their childhood. In Bolivia, the 9 departments are used to create the region fixed effects, while in Chile 
it includes the 12 regions plus the metropolitan region.  
21
 For Bolivia, 11 industry-dummies are included in the model, whereas for Chile, 7 industry-dummies are used. In 
both countries mining sector is used as base category. The difference on the number of sectors between countries is 
explained because Bolivia uses the classification established in ISIC rev3, whereas the information in Chile is 
industries are classified using ISIC rev2.  
22
 In both surveys, information on establishment size is directly provided by workers. Workers are asked how many 
people are employed in the establishment in which they are currently working. Details on the classification and 
groups of firms respect to number of workers can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. 
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since the two are highly correlated (i.e., few small firms are unionized).
23
  For the rest of the 
paper, employer size is excluded from the featured wage equation specifications in order to 
compare results to the broader literature.  In Section 5.4 establishment size fixed effects are 
included in the specification to examine how sensitive are the estimated union wage gaps. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics: Reweighted Sample 
  Bolivia Chile 
  Union Non union Diff Union Non union Diff 
Hrs. week 52.12 52.10 0.01 46.78 46.75 0.03 
 
(20.01) (19.84) [0.02] (10.55) (11.00)  [0.13] 
Sex 0.84 0.84 -0.01 0.71 0.70 0.00 
 
(0.37) (0.36) [0.49] (0.46) (0.46) [0.18] 
Indigenous 0.25 0.24 0.01 
   
 
(0.43) (0.43) [0.40] 
   Yrs. Schooling 37.34 37.38 -0.04 12.00 12.00 0.00 
 
(10.18) (10.12) [0.14] (2.78) (2.79) [0.00] 
Kids 0-6yr  19.17 19.16 0.01 0.43 0.43 0.00 
 
(10.67) (10.58) [0.02] (0.66) (0.66) [0.33] 
Kids 7-17yr 11.01 11.07 -0.05 0.83 0.82 0.00 
 
(4.59) (4.63) [0.38] (0.95) (0.95) [0.11] 
Married 0.78 0.79 0.00 0.62 0.62 0.00 
 
(0.41) (0.41) [0.13] (0.48) (0.49) [0.21] 
Head Household 0.74 0.74 0.00 0.63 0.63 0.00 
  (0.44) (0.44) [0.26] (0.48) (0.48) [0.19] 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. T-statistics in brackets. Statistics shown in this table 
are calculated using sample weights. 
Logit models of union status are estimated in order to obtain propensity scores that are 
then used to calculate the weights that identify the counterfactual union wage distributions under 
the nonunion wage structure.
24
 To verify that the weighting procedure appropriately identifies 
the counterfactual distribution of wages, Table 2 provides statistics of the reweighted sample and 
the significance of differences between observed characteristics. Recalling the information 
shown in Table 1, all differences between union and nonunion workers were statistically 
significant, while for the reweighted sample, none is significant, indicating that the 
                                                 
23
 In studies accounting for employer size, union and size effects on the wage are both substantive, but not additive, 
with union effects in the largest firms being small.  That is, both union and nonunion workers are paid more by large 
employers, with the union-nonunion gap being very modest. 
24
 The marginal effects of the main demographic variables are shown in appendix Table A2. 
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counterfactual wage distribution is appropriate for the analysis.  In the next section, the results 
with respect to the overall and detailed decompositions are discussed. 
5.2. Overall union gap decomposition 
The first results to be compared across countries are union-nonunion wage differentials. 
Table 3 shows the raw union wage gaps, and the decomposition of these gaps into a portion 
explained by the “wage structure” (coefficient differences) and explained by the “composition 
effect” (differences in endowments), both for the mean and quantile union wage gaps.  The 
estimates indicate that Bolivia has a somewhat higher average raw union wage gap than does 
Chile (0.272 versus 0.236).  This seems to be driven by the high raw wage gaps observed at the 
top of the wage distribution, and is possibly a reflection of the higher wage inequality observed 
in Bolivia (see Table 4).  One can also observe that the raw wage gaps are relatively stable 
throughout much of the wage distribution.  Such differences, although useful for reference, need 
not reflect the true impact of unions, because they combine the effects of a differentiated wage 
structure and the underlying heterogeneity in terms of endowments and job characteristics.  
According to the overall decomposition, the estimates show that the average union wage 
gap (as measured by the wage structure effect) is similar for both countries, with a slightly larger 
union premium for Chile (0.143 log points) than for Bolivia (0.114 log points).  The magnitude 
of these union premium estimates are consistent with those found in the literature for developed 
countries (Jarrell & Stanley, 1990; Lewis, 1986).  It is also informative to note that the 
composition effect explains a larger share of the raw union wage gap in Bolivia than Chile 
(.158/.272 or 58% versus .093/.236 or 39%), indicating that much of the observed union wage 
advantage in Bolivia reflects union-nonunion heterogeneity in workers’ measured attributes and 
not unusually high union bargaining power.  
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To observe the effect of unions across the wage distribution, the decompositions across 
selected quantiles are shown in Table 3 and Figure 1.  The results indicate that estimates of the 
median (Q50) union wage gaps are somewhat higher than the mean estimates, with a median 
union gap of 0.146 log points (versus 0.114 mean) in Bolivia, and 0.175 log points (versus 0.139 
mean) in Chile. For Chile, the median gap estimate is slightly lower than the mean gap reported 
in Landerretche, et al (2011).
25
  In Bolivia, unions have an increasing but relatively homogenous 
effect on union wages across much of the distribution, before falling sharply in the right tail of 
the distribution.  For the upper section of the wage distribution, the union wage gap estimate falls 
below zero in Bolivia (an insignificant -0.06 log points).  In Chile, the overall pattern is much the 
same, although the union gap gradient is somewhat flatter before falling to an insignificant 0.04 
log points in the upper tail. 
The almost zero estimates of the union wage gap in the far right tail of the wage 
distribution fall outside conventional expectations since a near-zero union premium should 
provide little or no incentive for workers to become or remain unionized. Such estimates can be 
understood, however, in a double selection framework seen in Abowd and Farber (1982) and 
Card (1996), which suggests positive selection by employers in the lower tail and negative 
selection into the applicant queue by workers in the upper tail of the skill distribution. In other 
words, because union workers in the upper tail of the wage distribution are likely to have low 
unmeasured skill characteristics as compared to their nonunion counterparts with similar 
measured attributes, they are better off working in the union sector than they would be in the 
nonunion sector. 
                                                 
25
 Landerretche, et al (2011), also using the Social Protection Survey 2004-2009 from Chile, estimates a panel model 
and reports a union wage differential of 0.193 log points.  
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Table 3. Union Wage Gaps: Overall Decomposition 
Bolivia 
Mean 
Quantiles 
  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Total change 0.272*** 0.202*** 0.213*** 0.267*** 0.355*** 0.273*** 
 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.037) (0.042) (0.034) (0.080) 
Wage structure 0.114*** 0.093** 0.122*** 0.147*** 0.159*** -0.063 
 
(0.027) (0.043) (0.038) (0.033) (0.040) (0.078) 
Composition effect 0.158*** 0.109*** 0.091*** 0.120*** 0.196*** 0.336*** 
  (0.027) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.040) (0.053) 
Chile     
Total change 0.236*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.276*** 0.309*** 0.207*** 
 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.028) (0.036) (0.042) 
Wage structure 0.143*** 0.159*** 0.168*** 0.171*** 0.204*** 0.052 
 
(0.014) (0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.028) (0.044) 
Composition effect 0.093*** 0.050*** 0.041*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.155*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.033) 
Note: * p<0.1 **p <0.05 *** p<0.01. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. Detailed decomposition are 
shown in Table A3 and A4 of the appendix. The identification of the wage structure and composition effect 
uses the preferred specification as described in section 5.1. 
 
Figure 1. Union Wage Gaps: Quantile Decomposition 
 
Inequality gaps 
In addition to increasing wages, unions typically reduce wage inequality among their 
members, in large part due to reducing wage returns with respect to observed (and possibly 
unobserved) characteristics.  The evidence shown in Table 3 suggests that unions have a 
relatively homogenous impact on wage levels over much of the distribution, which implies 
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modest effects on wage inequality.  The lower wage returns observed in the upper tail of the 
distribution, however, may well be large enough to reduce wage dispersion among union 
workers.  
The results provided in Table 4 indicate that wage inequality in Bolivia is substantially 
higher than in Chile.  The interquantile statistics show that differences between the countries are 
particularly large in comparing the medium-low (Q5010) wage gaps, whereas inequality in the 
upper tails of the distributions are rather similar across countries.  A naïve interpretation of the 
raw variance and Q9010 gaps indicate that unions are unable to reduce wage inequality in 
Bolivia, while they seem to marginally reduce wage inequality in Chile.  Because these statistics 
do not control for the degree of heterogeneity among workers, they might understate the 
equalizing effect of unions.  To analyze the magnitude and direction of the union effect, Table 4 
presents the decomposition in terms of log wage variance and interquantile wage differences into 
their wage structure and composition effects. 
As suspected, after controlling for observed characteristics, the wage structure effect has 
a significant impact, reducing wage inequality in both countries.  For instance, if union workers 
would face the wage structure of the nonunion sector, wage inequality (measured by variance) 
would be an estimated 16% (Bolivia) and 24% (Chile) higher than is currently observed.  The 
Q9010 statistic, which measures the wage gap reduction between high and low wages, is also 
consistent with a reduction of wage inequality, albeit with a more modest estimate of 7-8% 
(unlike the variance, the Q9010 measure is less sensitive to the far left and right tails of the 
distribution). 
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Table 4. Union Inequality Gaps: Overall Decomposition 
Bolivia Variance Inter Quantile 
    Q5010 Q9050 Q9010 
Nonunion 0.659 0.914 1.099 2.013 
Union 0.689 0.977 1.102 2.079 
Total change 0.030 0.065 0.005 0.07 
 
(0.034) (0.045) (0.081) (0.082) 
Wage structure -0.107*** 0.054 -0.210** -0.156* 
 
(0.041) (0.049) (0.083) (0.084) 
Composition effect 0.137*** 0.011 0.216*** 0.226*** 
  (0.029) (0.023) (0.046) (0.054) 
Chile         
Nonunion 0.397 0.515 0.968 1.483 
Union 0.349 0.576 0.902 1.478 
Total change -0.048*** 0.067** -0.070* -0.003 
 
(0.017) (0.028) (0.040) (0.047) 
Wage structure -0.078*** 0.012 -0.119** -0.107** 
 
(0.017) (0.027) (0.047) (0.051) 
Composition effect 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.049 0.104*** 
  (0.011) (0.015) (0.030) (0.034) 
Note: * p<0.1 **p <0.05 *** p<0.01. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. 
Detailed decomposition are shown in Tables A5 and A6 of the appendix. The 
identification of the wage structure and composition effect uses the preferred 
specification as described in section 5.1. 
The Q5010 and Q9050 provide useful information on where in the wage distribution 
unions are able to reduce overall inequality. Although estimates are small and insignificant, on 
average union wage effects below the median slightly increase overall wage inequality (0.054 in 
Bolivia and 0.012 in Chile).  What is perhaps surprising, particularly for Bolivia where 
inequality is higher than in Chile, is that unions do not seem to reduce inequality over the lower 
half of the distribution.  Instead, the entire equalizing effect comes from wage compression in the 
top half of the distribution (-0.210 for Bolivia and -0.119 for Chile).  In Bolivia, union wage 
compression is completely offset by the large measured heterogeneity of workers in the upper 
portions of the distribution.  In Chile, there is less worker heterogeneity in the top half of the 
distribution and it is more than offset by union compression effects on the wage structure.  In 
short, in both countries unions have a substantial wage compression effect, but this occurs 
primarily in the top half of the wage distributions and to a large extent offsets the relatively 
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greater endowment heterogeneity in the union sector that would otherwise have led to even 
higher wage inequality. 
5.3. Detailed decomposition 
This section explores in greater detail differences in specific union and nonunion wage 
equation coefficients (the wage structure) on observed union-nonunion wage differentials.
26
  
Although this analysis is informative in understanding how differences in wage structure affect 
the union and nonunion wage distributions, one must be cautious because the identification 
problems inherent in standard Oaxaca decompositions (Oaxaca and Ransom 1999) also affects 
the RIF decompositions.
27
  In addition, although most of the estimates in the detailed 
decomposition are not statistically significant, possible due to the relatively small samples, they 
still provide information on the direction and magnitudes of union-nonunion differences in the 
wage structure.  Except for age, education, gender and race, no analysis will be done for other 
wage determinants since there is no clear theory on how or why their effects differ across sectors 
(household characteristics), or because interpretation of results is difficult due to the 
identification problem (industry and occupation).  Table 5 summarizes the detailed 
decomposition for the wage levels and inequality gaps for Bolivia and Chile respectively, and 
Figure 2 presents the contribution to the wage structure effect of the main variables of interest.  
The first variables to be considered are gender and racial wage gaps.  Since one of the 
mechanisms that unions have to reduce wage inequality is the use of collective contracts, it is 
likely that for union establishments, within the same positions (given the same worker tenure), 
                                                 
26
 Although age and education interactions were used to estimate the counterfactual wage distributions, only linear 
terms of age and education are used to estimate their detailed contribution to the wage structure effect. This will 
provide a first order approximation of the overall effect these variables have on the union wage gap. This is similar 
to the strategy described in Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007), where the propensity score is estimated using a 
specification that is more flexible than the one used for the detailed wage decomposition. 
27
 See section 4.3 
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there should be no contractual wage differences associated with gender or ethnicity (there may 
be differences in access to well-paying positions).  The estimations shown in Table 5 provide 
some weak evidence of this effect.  The estimations indicate that at the mean and median the 
gender wage gaps are smaller in the union sector in Bolivia (-0.053;-0.047), but with no 
particular difference in Chile (-0.018; 0.009), although neither case is statistically significant.  
This also implies that, holding other characteristics constant, being a man in Bolivia reduces the 
average union wage premium 0.05 log points, whereas this difference is almost zero in Chile.  
Each country, however, exhibits a different profile across the wage distribution, as seen in Figure 
2.  In Bolivia, the estimates associated with gender indicate that men earn a considerably lower 
union wage premium than women (-0.21 log points) in the lower end of the wage distribution.  
Conversely, the estimated union wage gap men earn relative to women increases substantially at 
higher levels of the wage distribution, with the exception at the top quantile.  In Chile, there is 
practically no significant differences on the union wage premiums by gender for wages below 
the median; however, for the upper section of the wage distribution, men seem to earn lower 
union premiums than women.  
This contrast in the effects across the wage distribution is also seen in union effects on 
wage inequality.  In Bolivia gender increases wage inequality among union workers, by 
increasing male/female union wage differentials for lower wages, but having marginal effects in 
the upper section of the distribution. In Chile, gender is associated with lower wage inequality 
among union workers, mainly because it compresses wages from the top, reducing gender wage 
differentials in the union sector.  It has a smaller effect in the bottom of the distribution.  In terms 
of ethnicity, only available in Bolivia, the results are somewhat inconsistent with expectations.  
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Even though the estimates are small, the ethnicity penalty is larger in the union sector, but it is 
still associated with lower  
With respect to human capital, namely years of schooling and age (as a proxy for 
potential experience), one might also expect unions to flatten associated returns for both 
characteristics, this being one of the main channels through which unions might reduce wage 
inequality.  In Bolivia and Chile, the estimates at the mean and medians show that union workers 
receive slightly flatter returns to education.  The decomposition across quantiles, shown in Table 
5 and Figure 2, complements the story, indicating that workers with low wages are rewarded 
with higher returns to education in the union sector, compressing wages from the bottom, 
whereas among workers with high wages, education receives flatter returns in the union sector.  
Such effects are most likely caused by the two-sided selection process with respect to education, 
where groups with high measured skills (high education), receive lower wage premiums because 
they possess relatively lower unmeasured skills (Hirsch & Schumacher, 1998).  Although both 
countries show similar patterns, they are much stronger in Bolivia, where education is 
consistently related to lower wage inequality using the variance and the interquantile difference 
measures. In Chile, these effects are smaller, which translates into a strong inequality reducing 
effect as measured by the Q9010 interquantile gap, but a smaller reduction based on the variance 
measure. 
 
 
 
 
43 
  
T
a
b
le
 5
. 
D
et
a
il
ed
 D
ec
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
W
a
g
e 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
 E
ff
ec
ts
: 
B
o
li
v
ia
 a
n
d
 C
h
il
e
 
  
W
a
g
e 
g
a
p
 
In
eq
u
a
li
ty
 g
a
p
 
 B
o
li
v
ia
 
M
ea
n
 
Q
u
a
n
ti
le
s 
V
a
ri
a
n
ce
 
In
te
r 
q
u
a
n
ti
le
  
  
Q
1
0
 
Q
2
5
 
Q
5
0
 
Q
7
5
 
Q
9
0
 
Q
5
0
1
0
 
Q
9
0
5
0
 
Q
9
0
1
0
 
T
o
ta
l 
ch
a
n
g
e 
0
.2
7
2
*
*
*
 
0
.2
0
2
*
*
*
 
0
.2
1
3
*
*
*
 
0
.2
6
7
*
*
*
 
0
.3
5
5
*
*
*
 
0
.2
7
3
*
*
*
 
0
.0
3
0
 
0
.0
6
5
 
0
.0
0
5
 
0
.0
7
0
 
W
a
g
e 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
0
.1
1
4
*
*
*
 
0
.0
9
3
*
*
 
0
.1
2
2
*
*
*
 
0
.1
4
7
*
*
*
 
0
.1
5
9
*
*
*
 
-0
.0
6
3
 
-0
.1
0
7
*
*
*
 
0
.0
5
4
 
-0
.2
1
0
*
*
 
-0
.1
5
6
*
 
S
ex
 (
m
a
le
=
1
) 
-0
.0
5
3
 
-0
.2
1
7
*
*
 
-0
.1
9
6
*
*
 
-0
.0
4
7
 
0
.0
7
8
 
-0
.0
6
3
 
0
.2
0
5
*
*
 
0
.1
7
 
-0
.0
1
5
 
0
.1
5
4
 
In
d
ig
e
n
o
u
s(
=
1
) 
-0
.0
2
1
 
-0
.0
1
4
 
0
.0
0
5
 
-0
.0
1
7
 
-0
.0
0
3
 
-0
.0
3
7
 
-0
.0
2
 
-0
.0
0
3
 
-0
.0
2
 
-0
.0
2
4
 
Y
rs
 o
f 
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
 
-0
.0
3
3
 
0
.1
1
7
 
0
.0
4
3
 
-0
.0
1
4
 
-0
.1
1
 
-0
.1
1
2
 
-0
.1
5
6
 
-0
.1
3
 
-0
.0
9
8
 
-0
.2
2
8
 
A
g
e
 
0
.0
1
5
 
0
.0
9
 
0
.1
2
1
 
0
.2
1
4
 
0
.0
8
 
-0
.5
7
7
*
*
 
-0
.5
0
3
*
*
*
 
0
.1
2
4
 
-0
.7
9
1
*
*
*
 
-0
.6
6
6
*
*
 
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
 
0
.1
6
1
*
 
0
.0
0
3
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.0
1
8
 
0
.3
5
4
*
 
0
.2
9
2
 
0
.2
8
8
*
 
0
.0
1
6
 
0
.2
7
4
 
0
.2
8
9
 
In
d
u
st
ry
 
-0
.1
4
2
 
-0
.0
8
9
 
-0
.1
4
 
-0
.0
2
7
 
0
.2
4
7
 
-0
.2
1
8
 
-0
.1
2
2
 
0
.0
6
2
 
-0
.1
9
1
 
-0
.1
2
9
 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 c
h
ar
ac
. 
0
.0
0
8
 
-0
.0
0
4
 
-0
.0
6
9
 
-0
.1
 
0
.0
0
3
 
0
.1
5
2
 
0
.1
7
1
*
 
-0
.0
9
6
 
0
.2
5
3
 
0
.1
5
6
 
Y
ea
r 
-0
.1
0
9
 
-0
.1
1
8
 
-0
.0
9
7
 
-0
.0
9
8
 
-0
.1
0
8
 
-0
.1
3
7
 
0
.0
6
5
 
0
.0
2
 
-0
.0
4
 
-0
.0
1
9
 
R
eg
io
n
 
-0
.0
3
4
 
-0
.1
0
4
 
-0
.0
2
5
 
0
.0
7
9
 
0
.0
0
9
 
-0
.1
4
2
 
-0
.0
0
1
 
0
.1
8
3
*
*
 
-0
.2
2
1
*
*
 
-0
.0
3
8
 
C
o
n
st
an
t 
0
.3
2
 
0
.4
3
 
0
.4
2
9
 
0
.1
3
8
 
-0
.3
9
2
 
0
.7
7
8
 
-0
.0
3
4
 
-0
.2
9
1
 
0
.6
4
 
0
.3
4
9
 
  
W
a
g
e 
g
a
p
 
In
eq
u
a
li
ty
 g
a
p
 
 C
h
il
e 
M
ea
n
 
Q
u
a
n
ti
le
s 
V
a
ri
a
n
ce
 
In
te
r 
q
u
a
n
ti
le
 
  
Q
1
0
 
Q
2
5
 
Q
5
0
 
Q
7
5
 
Q
9
0
 
Q
5
0
1
0
 
Q
9
0
5
0
 
Q
9
0
1
0
 
T
o
ta
l 
ch
a
n
g
e 
0
.2
3
6
*
*
*
 
0
.2
1
0
*
*
*
 
0
.2
1
0
*
*
*
 
0
.2
7
6
*
*
*
 
0
.3
0
9
*
*
*
 
0
.2
0
7
*
*
*
 
-0
.0
4
8
*
*
*
 
0
.0
6
7
*
*
 
-0
.0
7
0
*
 
-0
.0
0
3
 
W
a
g
e 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
0
.1
4
3
*
*
*
 
0
.1
5
9
*
*
*
 
0
.1
6
8
*
*
*
 
0
.1
7
1
*
*
*
 
0
.2
0
4
*
*
*
 
0
.0
5
2
 
-0
.0
7
8
*
*
*
 
0
.0
1
2
 
-0
.1
1
9
*
*
 
-0
.1
0
7
*
*
 
S
ex
 (
m
a
le
=
1
) 
-0
.0
1
8
 
-0
.0
0
5
 
-0
.0
0
6
 
0
.0
0
9
 
-0
.0
3
6
 
-0
.1
1
5
*
 
-0
.0
4
1
 
0
.0
1
5
 
-0
.1
2
4
*
 
-0
.1
0
9
 
Y
rs
 o
f 
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
 
-0
.0
7
3
 
-0
.0
2
5
 
0
.0
7
8
 
-0
.0
2
4
 
-0
.0
0
7
 
-0
.3
7
8
 
-0
.0
4
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 
-0
.3
5
4
 
-0
.3
5
3
 
A
g
e
 
0
.1
1
4
*
*
 
0
.0
0
9
 
0
.1
1
2
*
*
 
0
.2
5
6
*
*
*
 
0
.1
9
3
*
 
0
.0
3
0
 
0
.0
3
4
 
0
.2
4
8
*
*
*
 
-0
.2
2
6
 
0
.0
2
2
 
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
 
0
.1
2
8
*
 
-0
.0
7
9
*
 
-0
.0
0
7
 
-0
.0
3
2
 
-0
.0
1
9
 
1
.0
4
8
*
*
*
 
0
.4
0
3
*
*
*
 
0
.0
4
7
 
1
.0
8
0
*
*
*
 
1
.1
2
7
*
*
*
 
In
d
u
st
ry
 
-0
.0
2
9
 
-0
.0
2
4
 
-0
.0
9
5
 
-0
.1
2
1
 
-0
.2
6
0
*
 
0
.4
0
3
*
 
0
.1
1
2
 
-0
.0
9
7
 
0
.5
2
4
*
*
 
0
.4
2
7
*
 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 c
h
ar
ac
. 
-0
.0
3
7
 
-0
.0
1
0
 
0
.0
4
4
 
-0
.0
2
0
 
-0
.0
7
4
 
-0
.1
1
2
 
-0
.0
3
6
 
-0
.0
0
9
 
-0
.0
9
3
 
-0
.1
0
2
 
Y
ea
r 
0
.0
0
2
 
-0
.0
3
7
 
0
.0
0
9
 
-0
.0
0
3
 
0
.0
1
1
 
0
.0
6
4
 
0
.0
3
1
 
0
.0
3
4
 
0
.0
6
7
 
0
.1
0
0
 
R
eg
io
n
 
0
.0
2
5
*
 
0
.0
0
8
 
0
.0
0
6
 
0
.0
1
8
 
0
.0
6
6
*
*
 
0
.0
8
6
*
*
 
0
.0
3
3
*
*
 
0
.0
1
0
 
0
.0
6
8
*
 
0
.0
7
8
*
 
C
o
n
st
an
t 
0
.0
3
1
 
0
.3
2
2
*
 
0
.0
2
8
 
0
.0
8
7
 
0
.3
3
1
 
-0
.9
7
4
*
*
 
-0
.5
7
2
*
*
*
 
-0
.2
3
5
 
-1
.0
6
1
*
*
 
-1
.2
9
6
*
*
*
 
N
o
te
: 
*
 p
<
0
.1
 *
*
p
 <
0
.0
5
 *
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
1
. 
S
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
ce
 l
e
v
e
ls
 a
re
 e
st
im
at
ed
 u
si
n
g
 b
o
o
ts
tr
ap
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
. 
D
et
ai
le
d
 d
ec
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 i
n
c
lu
d
in
g
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
ar
e 
sh
o
w
n
 i
n
 T
a
b
le
 A
3
 a
n
d
 A
5
 i
n
 t
h
e 
ap
p
e
n
d
ix
. 
 T
h
e 
id
e
n
ti
fi
c
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
w
ag
e 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 a
n
d
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 e
ff
ec
t 
u
se
s 
th
e 
p
re
fe
rr
ed
 s
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
 a
s 
d
es
c
ri
b
ed
 i
n
 
se
ct
io
n
 5
.1
. 
T
h
e 
e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
h
ea
d
 o
f 
th
e 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
, 
cu
rr
en
tl
y
 m
ar
ri
ed
 a
n
d
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
c
h
il
d
re
n
 a
re
 a
g
g
re
g
at
ed
 i
n
to
 t
h
e 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s.
 
 
  
44 
 
In terms of experience, here using age as proxy, one might also expect to observe flatter 
associated returns in the union sector, which translate into lower wage inequality.  The estimates 
shown in Table 5 indicate that wage differences by age have a positive contribution to the union 
wage premium throughout much of the distribution.  However, the contribution of experience to 
the wage structure effect in both countries has a distinctive inverse U-shape, where union 
workers near the bottom and top of the distribution receive lower returns to experience compared 
to workers in the middle of the wage distribution. Although the estimates are, for the most part, 
not statistically significant, the shape of the returns to experience suggest that unions increase 
inequality at the lower end of the wage distribution, but compress wages at the top.  The wage 
compressing effect is stronger in Bolivia, where experience reduces overall wage inequality (-
0.503 contribution to the variance).  In Chile, however, neither effect dominates the other, with a 
negligible effect on overall wage inequality (a 0.003 contribution to the variance). 
Other wage determinants (i.e. household characteristics and fixed effects for occupation, 
industry, region, and year) have similar impacts on the wage structure across the wage 
distribution in both countries.  As shown in Figure 2, the combined effects of the other wage 
determinants, including the constant, indicate a relatively homogenous and small effect on the 
union wage premium for most of the wage distribution, but an increasing impact on the wage 
premium for the upper tail, around the 70
th
 quantile.  Overall, these effects appear to increase 
wage inequality due to unionization in the top of the wage distribution, while reducing it slightly 
in the bottom. 
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Figure 2: Detailed Quantile Decomposition: Contributions to the Wage Structure Effect  
 Bolivia Chile 
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5.4. Sensitivity  
As explained in section 4.3, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity can have important 
consequences on the identification of the wage structure and composition effects.  Depending on 
the nature and characteristics of this unobserved heterogeneity, however, it could have different 
effects on the estimated decompositions.  In this section, two possible cases, one-sided selection 
and two-sided selection, are discussed, and an example to the sensitivity for one-sided selection, 
caused by omitted variable, is shown. 
The first possibility is that heterogeneity comes from a one-sided type of selection 
process, similar to the description in Lee (1978).  Under this framework, if the unobserved 
characteristic is positively correlated to wages and unionization, ignoring this variable will create 
an upwards bias on the union wage gap along the whole distribution.  This happens because 
union status would be capturing part of the explanatory power of that unmeasured characteristic. 
In terms of wage inequality, unless the wage gap bias is substantially different across the wage 
distribution, one might not expect any substantial changes on the union inequality gaps.  
To show how sensitive the decompositions can be to the presence of unmeasured 
characteristics, in the framework of one-sided selection, establishment size fixed effects are 
added to the specification.
28
  This variable is chosen because it is positively correlated to wages, 
possibly capturing some productivity measures (Brown & Medoff, 1989; Oi & Idson, 1999), but 
also because it is correlated to higher unionization (see Table A1 in appendix).
29
  These results 
are shown in Table 6.  As expected, for both countries, after including establishment size the 
estimated union effect on wage gaps fall up to 50%.  With respect to union inequality gaps, small 
                                                 
28
 Establishment size is measured using self-reported information on the number of employees working at the 
workplace. 
29
 Although firm size is an important determinant of the wage structure, as previously discussed, it was not included 
in the preferred specification because firm size is highly correlated with union status and is typically excluded from 
the wage equation when estimating union wage premiums. 
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and insignificant changes are observed.  These suggest that our previous results may overstate 
the size of union wage gaps (wage structure), but not union inequality gaps, if the unobserved 
heterogeneity would follow a one-sided selection process. 
A second and more likely type of heterogeneity is due to two-sided selection, as 
described by Abowd and Farber (1982), Card (1996) and Hirsch and Schumacher (1998).  In this 
case, the unmeasured attributes (e.g., skills) are most likely to be positively correlated with 
unionization for workers with low measured qualifications (e.g., schooling), but negatively 
correlated for workers with highly measured qualifications. This will cause an overstatement of 
the wage structure effect of unions in the lower part of the distribution and understate it at the top 
of the distribution. As pointed out earlier, this might explain the small (and negative) wage gaps 
observed in the upper section of the wage distribution in Bolivia and Chile. It also suggests that 
the estimated effects of unions in decreasing inequality are overstated. Nevertheless, under this 
type of framework, the mean and median estimates can be expected to provide reasonable 
approximations of the average union wage effect. 
Table 6. Decomposition Sensitivity: Adding Establishment Size 
  Mean 
Quantiles 
Variance 
Inter quantile 
Q10 Q50 Q90 Q5010 Q9050 
Bolivia 
       
Total change 0.272*** 0.202*** 0.267*** 0.273*** 0.030 0.065 0.005 
Wage structure 0.076*** 0.073* 0.103*** -0.111 -0.118*** 0.03 -0.214*** 
Composition 0.196*** 0.129*** 0.164*** 0.384*** 0.148*** 0.035 0.220*** 
Chile 
       Total change 0.236*** 0.210*** 0.276*** 0.207*** -0.048*** 0.067** -0.070* 
Wage structure 0.079*** 0.113*** 0.086*** -0.006 -0.069*** -0.026 -0.092** 
Composition 0.157*** 0.097*** 0.190*** 0.212*** 0.021 0.093*** 0.022 
Note: * p <0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Significance levels are estimated using bootstrap standard errors. The 
identification of the wage structure and composition effect uses the preferred specification plus establishment size 
fixed effect. Detailed decomposition including composition effects are shown in Tables A7 and A8 in the appendix. 
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5.5. Union wage gaps in the U.S.: A comparison with Bolivia and Chile. 
The analysis presented so far has been intended to provide some evidence on whether in 
different economic environments, developing Bolivia and more developed Chile, unions have 
similar estimated effects based on the use of similar data and methodology.  To help generalize 
these results further, the same methodology and similar specification are used to obtain estimates 
for the U.S., where much of the prior research on unions has been conducted.  
To this effect, data on private sector wage and salary workers from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) monthly outgoing rotation group earnings files for the years 2007 and 
2008 is used.  Based on Hirsch and Schumacher (2004), the sample excludes observations with 
imputed earnings in order to avoid substantial attenuation in estimates of union wage gaps and 
dispersion.  The real wage (in 2008 dollars) is calculated as the reported straight-time wage for 
hourly workers who do not receive tips, overtime, or commissions (TOC), and as usual weekly 
earnings (inclusive of TOC) divided by usual weekly hours for all salaried workers and hourly 
workers receiving TOC.  The CPS includes 167,443 workers, 7.4% of whom are union members, 
lower density that that seen for Bolivia or Chile.
30
  
                                                 
30
 Official union density rates for all private sector wage and salary workers in the U.S., based on the full CPS-ORG 
sample (inclusive of those with imputed earnings) and the use of CPS sample weights, were 7.5% and 7.6% in 2007 
and 2008. (Hirsch & Macpherson, 2012) 
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In Table 7, the results of reweighted RIF-regressions decompositions are shown for the 
U.S. and compared to those previously presented for Bolivia and Chile.  The estimated mean 
union wage gap for the U.S. is 0.189 log points, as compared to 0.114 for Bolivia and 0.143 for 
Chile.
31
  As seen in prior studies, union wage gaps in the U.S. tend to be higher than in most 
other developed economies.  In contrast to Bolivia and Chile, the average characteristics of union 
and nonunion workers in the U.S. are very similar, producing a composition effect with a near 
zero contribution in explaining the raw union wage gap. Across the wage distribution, the 
estimated union wage gap takes on an inverted-U shape, with estimates up to 0.259 log points at 
the median, but with a flat slope in the lower half of the distribution and falling off steeply in the 
right tail.
32
  These results are qualitatively similar to those seen for Bolivia and Chile, 
presumably due to some combination of two-sided selection and union wage compression 
effects, as discussed previously.
33
  
Turning to the union wage inequality gap estimates, results shown in the right side of 
Table 7 indicates that unions in the U.S. have remarkably similar wage structure effects on 
inequality as compared to Bolivia and Chile.  Based on the log wage variance measure, the union 
compression effect is -0.085 in the U.S., as compared to -0.107 and -0.078 in Bolivia and Chile.  
Using the inter-quantile Q9010 measure, the U.S. wage structure effect estimate is -0.155, as 
compared to an identical -0.155 for Bolivia and -0.120 for Chile.  As compared to Chile, 
American unions appear to have greater success in compressing wages from the top toward the 
                                                 
31
 Hirsch and Macpherson, who provide U.S. union gap estimates from the CPS for 1973 forward using a time-
consistent methodology (necessitating less detailed controls than used here), report private sector gap estimates of 
0.195 and 0.186 for 2007 and 2008, respectively. (Hirsch & Macpherson, 2011) 
32
 Card, Lemieux and Riddell (2004) find similar results showing that wage differentials were much larger among 
workers with lower wages after controlling for education and age. 
33
 Using comparable methodologies, Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) find similar union wage gaps for the U.S. 
with mean union wage gap of 0.179, and wage gaps of 0.103 (Q10), 0.399 (Q50) and -0.013 (Q90) across quantiles 
using CPS 2003-2005, and a log variance reduction of 0.045.  
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middle of the distribution, but with more limited effects in the lower portions of the wage 
distribution.  With the available information, it is not possible to know how much of the 
differences in estimates across countries are due to two-sided selection not captured by the set of 
measured wage covariates.  A notable (but not surprising) difference between the U.S. and the 
two Latin American countries is that the composition of the union worker pool in the U.S. is far 
more homogenous (in measured characteristics) than its nonunion pool, thus contributing to the 
far lower observed wage inequality in the union than nonunion sector.  Stated alternatively, in 
the U.S. wages are compressed both because of a union wage structure effect and because of 
compressed worker attributes.  In Bolivia and Chile, union effects on inequality are similar to 
those in the U.S., but, in contrast, worker attributes in their union sectors are more dispersed than 
in their nonunion sectors. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion  
Because of the differences in their history, legal structures, and economic and 
institutional settings, one could have expected to see substantial differences in terms of union 
wage gap and inequality effects in the two countries, along with differences with the U.S. and 
other highly developed economies.  Many of the background settings suggested that Chilean 
unions should be stronger, with a larger presence in the labor market, and more able to obtain 
higher union wage premiums for their members than Bolivian unions.  At the same time, the 
higher decentralization of the bargaining system in Chile compared to Bolivia, tied to lower 
levels of inequality, suggests that unions should have a larger role reducing wage inequality in 
Bolivia than in Chile.  The evidence presented here, however, shows that there is a remarkable 
consistency of union wage effects across the three countries, with effects that are far more 
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notable for their similarity than for any differences. The one notable difference is the higher 
mean union wage gap in the U.S. than in Bolivia and Chile. 
Using similar data and methodologies, we find considerably similar estimates of the 
average union log wage gaps for Bolivia (0.114) and Chile (0.143), which are consistent with the 
findings in the broader literature for the U.S. and elsewhere. Our estimate of the U.S. gap is 
somewhat higher, at 0.189 (this is higher than most U.S. estimates because it is restricted to the 
private sector and excludes imputed earners).  The differences in the estimates may in part be 
related to differences in union strength between developed and developing countries. With 
respect to wage inequality, no consistent differences in patterns across the countries are 
observed, unions having roughly similar and substantial impacts in reducing union relative to 
nonunion wage inequality in all three countries, mainly compressing wages from the top of the 
distribution. 
These results are not completely unexpected. In the private sector, wage premiums 
below, say, 10% may be too low for unions to create an incentive to organize workers and 
maintain members’ support over time. If the wage premium it is too high, say in excess of 25%, 
union establishments would find it difficult to survive over time, absent large offsetting union 
effects on productivity and/or a product market environment sheltered from competition, and 
such union premiums would not be consistently observed. Large union premiums would attract a 
large queue of workers wanting union jobs, but would retard the creation and sustainability of 
such jobs. 
The results in this paper do not imply that differences in countries’ history, legal 
frameworks, and institutional and economic settings have no effect on the role unions and 
bargaining systems have on wage determination. In fact, each of these individual factors may 
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play a role in how unions affect wages, but they are difficult to isolate, measure, or incorporate 
into statistical analyses. What the analysis and results in this study suggest is that the common 
economic and political forces that govern the role of unions as collective bargaining agents 
produce similar impacts on wages, largely transcending differences in these nations’ legal and 
economic backgrounds. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
UNIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
CASE STUDIES FROM LATIN AMERICA 
 
Introduction  
One of the most contentious theoretical and empirical debates in the literature on unions 
has been on how unions affect a firm’s performance, particularly in terms of productivity and 
profitability.  While most of the literature agrees that unions have mostly negative effects on an 
establishment's profitability and investment, little consensus has been reached on the effects that 
unions have on productivity (Doucouliagos & Laroche, 2003, 2009, 2013; Hirsch, 2004).
34
 To 
some extent, the uncertainty surrounding these issues reflects the limited availability of data to 
address the relationship between unions and performance, but it also reflects the underlying 
heterogeneity in union effects across establishments, industries, and countries.  
On the one hand, unions are expected to reduce productivity by creating distortions and 
frictions in the labor market, reducing managerial discretion, and limiting or distorting capital 
investment and the adoption of new technologies.  On the other hand, unions can increase 
productivity by improving communication within establishments, lowering some labor related 
costs, and possibly helping establishments and managements to adopt more efficient personnel 
and production policies (Freeman & Medoff, 1984).  Such distortions caused by unions might 
                                                 
34
 The meta- analysis in Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003) finds evidence for positive but small effects for the U.S, 
with negative effects for the U.K. Later analyses for the U.S. also find that unions have a negative and significant 
effect on profits (Doucouliagos and Laroche 2009), while also decreasing investment and innovations 
(Doucouliagos and Laroche 2013). The review of the literature of Hirsch (2004b), however, indicates that, except 
for Brown and Medoff (1978), the evidence for the U.S. suggests unions have a negative effect on productivity, 
profits and investment, with few exceptions. 
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affect productivity by improving technical efficiency, possibly through “shock effects” resulting 
from higher compensation, or by changing the mix of inputs in the production function.
35
  
This mixture of effects is also evident in the empirical literature.  In the meta-analysis of 
Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003), the evidence suggests unions are on average associated with 
slightly higher productivity.  Yet many studies find negative union productivity effects (Aidt & 
Tzannatos, 2002), with positive correlations being the exception, while authors such as Kuhn 
(1998) indicates that negative productivity effects are only observed in environments of union-
management conflict. 
Although there is a reasonably large literature for several developed economies, there is 
little evidence for “what unions do” for (firm or establishment) productivity in developing 
economies.  As Freeman (2010) indicates, the research for developing economies is limited 
because data for this type of research is typically inadequate, but also because unions in 
developing countries have been weak and unable to fulfill their role as bargaining agents in their 
economies.  Nevertheless, because businesses in developing economies face different types of 
obstacles, such as restrictions on the access of capital, unfavorable institutions, high levels of 
corruption, less competitive markets, and unstable business environments, compared to those in 
developed countries, it is not clear how unions will affect productivity.  
The purpose of this chapter is to expand the literature by analyzing the impact of unions 
on productivity and other measures of performance for six countries in Latin America, namely 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay.  These countries represent a mix of 
settings with different legal backgrounds, economic development levels, and a large enough 
presence of unionization among their manufacturing sector that permit a comparative analysis on 
                                                 
35
 In principle, one would want to obtain an estimate of union-nonunion differences in technical efficiency, 
measuring output per unit of labor (Q/L) or output across all inputs (total factor productivity), controlling for 
measurable differences in all inputs (capital, labor quality, etc.).  
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the productivity effects of unions.  In most of these countries, the unionized sectors have 
historically played important roles in the development of their political and economic systems.  
The market reforms that took place in Latin America after the debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s 
created economic environments that mostly weakened union bargaining power in the public 
sector, forcing unions toward a more active role as bargaining units in the private sector.  These 
reforms created considerable heterogeneity in the economic and labor relation environment in 
which unions currently operate, suggesting that a cross-country study may prove valuable to 
better understand the relationship between unions and performance. 
Using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, modified Cobb-Douglas production 
functions are estimated to determine the impact of unionization on establishment productivity, 
controlling for various measures of establishment characteristics, management and organization, 
labor force structure and innovation.  Due to considerable levels of non-reporting in the survey, a 
“principled” multiple imputation approach is used to improve the completeness and reliability of 
the data.  The preferred model indicates that unions have slightly positive but mostly 
insignificant effects on productivity, with Chile and Panama showing the largest union-
productivity effects, although in neither case is the result significant.  In contrast, the 
productivity estimates for Argentina are negative and statistically significant across all 
specifications.  
The analysis of profitability indicates that in most countries the small gains in 
productivity are not large enough to offset the higher wage costs faced by unionized 
establishments.  In two countries, the wage and productivity evidence are not closely aligned.  
For example, in Argentina, where large negative union effects were found for productivity, profit 
estimates indicate only small negative effects.  In addition, in Bolivia, estimates indicate the 
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presence of unions is not correlated with productivity but that there are positive impacts on 
profitability.  It is not clear whether these results reflect imprecision or bias in the estimations, or 
if they are driven by other factors reducing non-labor costs.  For most countries, unionization 
does not appear to be associated with sales growth.  Unionization, however, is negatively 
associated with measures of capital investment and innovation for most countries. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  The first section presents a review of the 
empirical literature, with emphasis on the research done for Latin America.  The second section 
presents a brief description of the history of unions in Latin America and describes the legal 
framework under which unions operate in each country.  The third and fourth sections describe 
the data and the empirical strategy. The fifth and sixth sections present the main results on 
productivity analysis and robustness checks.  Section seven presents the results for alternative 
performance measures, and section eight concludes. 
 
1. How do unions affect productivity? 
1.1. Theoretical background 
There is a large theoretical literature that has explored the potential costs and benefits of 
unions in terms of firm performance and productivity.  Examples include Brown and Medoff 
(1978), Addison (1982), Addison and Barnett (1982), Freeman and Medoff (1984), Hirsch and 
Addison (1986), Turnbull (1991) and, more recently, Hirsch (2004b) and Kaufman (2004).  This 
literature has identified various channels through which unions can have positive and negative 
effects on productivity, suggesting that the net effect of unions on productivity remains an 
empirical question.  
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According to the “two faces” approach, popularized in Freeman and Medoff (1984), a 
union’s potential effects on performance and productivity can be described using the monopoly 
face – following standard microeconomic theory – and the collective voice/institutional response 
framework – from the industrial organization literature.  The traditional approach analyzes 
unions as monopolistic agents (a monopoly face), stressing the negative aspects of unions and 
the distortions they create compared to the perfect competition model.  Within this framework, 
unions extract monopoly gains from the employers, which translate into compensations above 
competitive levels for their members.  Unions do that by constraining the labor supply, moving 
firms up their labor demand curve, either through bargaining power (e.g., the strike threat) or 
withholding of labor.  
This mechanism might cause productivity to decrease because it might temporarily 
reduce/stop firm effective production capacity.  It is also possible that through the bargaining 
process, a union might impose the adoption of inefficient contractual work rules and reductions 
in managerial discretion that may increase the cost of reacting to economic shocks in dynamic 
economic environments (Hirsch, 2008).
36
  Furthermore, union rent-seeking behavior can further 
reduce long run productivity by imposing a pseudo “union tax” on returns, limiting the adoption 
of new technology and reducing investment (Connolly, Hirsch, & Hirschey, 1986; Hirsch, 1991, 
2004).  
Constraints in labor supply caused by unions might also generate wage/prices distortions 
that could produce inefficient resource allocation, forcing firms to shift toward a suboptimal mix 
of inputs in the production function.  This may cause (small) deadweight welfare loss and 
                                                 
36
 Although there is plenty of anecdotal evidence regarding inefficient union work rules, it seems unlikely that such 
inefficiencies would be long lived, particularly in markets with high levels of competition where such practices are 
difficult to maintain. There is no systematic evidence relating the interactions between union governance, 
dynamism, and productivity.  
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potentially lower overall labor productivity.  This type of distortions might spuriously increase 
production per worker if firms shift their input mix toward higher capital intensity and/or higher 
skilled workers, without necessarily generating losses (or gains) of technical efficiency at the 
establishment level.  These types of distortions, however, are less likely to be observed to the 
extent that unions tax the quasi-rents from capital, reducing incentives to increase investment.
37
  
Besides, although high union wages opens the possibility to employ workers with higher skills, 
such outcome is unlikely, given repeated bargaining (Hirsch, 2004; Wessels, 1994).  
The “collective voice/institutional response” face of unions, as described in Freeman and 
Medoff, puts more emphasis on the positive aspects of unions and their potential roles enhancing 
operations and labor relationships within establishments.  For instance, because unions are 
legally protected, they can freely express their member preferences in the workplace, improving 
communication between employers and employees, inducing managers to alter methods of 
production and adopt more efficient personnel policies.  The improvements in communication 
provided by the presence of unions can reduce potential transaction costs associated with 
turnover, training and recruiting, as well as reduce costs of monitoring and enforcement in the 
workplace (Allen, 1984; Kuhn, 1982, 1985).  The presence of unionization and pressure for 
higher wages can also increase productivity through shock effects, reducing the so called “X-
inefficiency” through improved operations in order to offset higher wages, which could have 
persisted in the absence of unions (Addison & Hirsch, 1989; Hirsch & Addison, 1986; Kaufman, 
2004).  
As Freeman and Medoff emphasize, the positive outcomes derived from the union's 
collective voice are constrained to a positive and cooperative relationship between management 
                                                 
37
 For theory on unions and quasi-rents, see Grout (1984) and Baldwin (1983).  For the earliest empirical test, see 
Connolly, Hirsch and Hirschey (1986).  
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and organized labor.  For instance, Kleiner (2002) finds that in the Aircraft industry, overall 
productivity was considerably lower during periods of conflicts between management and union 
leaders.  Similarly, on its review of the literature, Kuhn (1998) indicates that studies with 
negative union effects are also cases characterized by having conflicts between unions and 
management.  In addition, Black and Lynch (2001) find that negative union productivity effects 
are mainly driven by unionized plants using traditional management systems, while positive 
productivity effects are found among those (few) union establishments that adopt “best-method” 
human resources practices such as incentive pay (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2011). 
1.2. Empirical evidence 
Consistent with the theoretical background, the empirical evidence shows considerable 
variability in the measured effects of unions on productivity.  Such variation, however, are 
attributed to the uniqueness of the interactions between unions, management and economic 
environments across firms, industries, countries and time periods.  As in other aspects on the 
literature of unions, the inherited endogeneity of the unionization process has made the 
identification of causal effects on productivity and profit difficult in the literature (Lewis 1963, 
Freeman and Medoff 1984, Hirsch and Addison 1986, and Hirsh 2004).  The strategy in these 
studies has been to compare unionized versus non-unionized firms, using cross-section or panel 
data, to identify the impact that unions had on productivity, profitability, and employment, 
among other characteristics.  There are, however, a handful of studies, using event study analysis 
and regression discontinuity approaches, have been able to provide estimates closer to what one 
might believe to be causal effects (see for example Lee and Mas, 2004, 2012 and Sojourner, et 
al, 2012). 
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The seminal paper on unions and productivity by Brown and Medoff (1978), which 
established the methodology subsequently used in most of the literature, is one of the few studies 
that indicates a large and positive effect on productivity (22-24%).  These results, however, were 
not supported by subsequent reviews of the literature due to serious data limitations (discussed 
by the authors) (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hirsch, 2004b; Hirsch & Addison, 1986). 
The rough consensus on U.S. studies is that union productivity effects are, on average, 
small and non-significant (a nearly zero or a small positive effect) and highly variable across 
different economic settings.  When positive, they are too small to fully offset union wage effects, 
which is reinforced by a rather consistent findings of lower profitability among union companies 
(for a survey and references, see Hirsch, 2004b; Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2003, 2009; and 
Fuchs, et al. ,1998).  Some international evidence for other developed countries corroborates the 
results indicating that that unions have negative effects on profitability, and mostly negative 
effects on productivity, except for in industries with high competition, or good relationships 
between management and unions (for example, see Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002).  
Beyond the scope of developed countries, the literature on the economic effects of unions 
is limited.  As pointed out by Freeman (2010), due to the limited data available and weak role 
that unions have had as bargaining units, little is known about how unions affect productivity in 
developing countries.  A brief summary of the relevant literature in developing Latin American 
countries is provided.
38
  
In studying unions in Mexico, and using establishment level data, Fairris (2005, 2006) 
finds that unionized establishments have higher productivity and similar profitability as their 
nonunion counterparts, which they attribute to more training in unionized establishments.  They 
report, however, that such enhancing effects on productivity have fallen, from 21% in 1992 to 
                                                 
38
 A more comprehensive review of the literature can be found in Freeman (2010) 
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only 11% in 1999.  Menezes-Filho, et al. (2005), using firm-level surveys for manufacturing 
firms in Brazil, find that unions are correlated with lower levels of profitability (returns to sales) 
and investment (investment rate), but that they have a concave relationship (inverse U shape) 
with productivity, indicating that some level of unionization can have a positive impact on 
performance, with evidence suggesting that the impact is larger in firms with profit sharing. 
Saavedra and Toledo (2005), find evidence for Peru that union firms have lower profits  
(-17.5% lower than nonunion firms).  They also find a negative union correlation with 
productivity, although such results are not robust to inclusion of firm characteristics.  They 
hypothesize that the negative effect could be explained by the history of conflicts between labor 
and management.  They also present some weak evidence that the negative effects on 
profitability seem to have declined, possibly as consequence of the 1992 Collective Bargaining 
Law that greatly reduced union density and bargaining power in the country.  
Cassoni, et al. (2005), using panel establishment level information for the manufacturing 
sector in Uruguay, find a positive effect on productivity and productivity growth, which 
disappears when indirect effects of employment changes are controlled for.  They also find that 
unions are positively related to profit levels with a negative correlation with respect to profit 
growth.  Given the economic framework after the 1990s, the authors argue that improvements in 
productivity might be explained by increased labor stability and lower turnover, and to a lesser 
extent improved cooperation and labor morale.  Finally, Urizar and Lee (2005) study the effects 
of unions on productivity among coffee producers in Guatemala using a small survey of 37 
producers for the years 1992- 2000.  Using measures of actual coffee production, they find that 
becoming unionized decreases productivity by 10-20 percent.  Such results are not observed after 
including fixed firm effects, probably because few producers became unionized in the sample. 
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This chapter will mainly analyze the effects of unions on productivity, focusing on the 
role of unions across six developing countries, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, 
Panama and Uruguay, in the private manufacturing sector.  These countries are at different levels 
of economic development and display important differences in their legal structure and 
workplace environment.  Although there are other studies that have analyzed the economic 
effects of unions for particular economies, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a 
comparable cross-country analysis that can provide further insights on the economic effects of 
unions.  Moreover, no previous study of has examined union effects on productivity for four of 
these countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Panama. 
 
2. Unions in Latin America: Background 
There is a substantial literature focused on the development of unions in Latin America, 
most of which has taken a historical and legal approach describing the evolution of the labor 
movements and changes in the legal framework in these countries.  In this section, I provide a 
brief overview of important features in the development of unions in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Mexico, Panama and Uruguay, as well as a description of the legal framework in which unions 
operate in each of these countries.  This overview does not pretend to be exhaustive; more 
comprehensive analyses can be found elsewhere (Alexander & Parker, 2005; Anner, 2008; 
Carrière, Haworth, & Roddick, 1989; Cassoni, Allen, & Labadie, 2004; Cassoni, et al., 2005; 
Hudson, 1994; Hudson & Hanratty, 1991; Hudson & Meditz, 1992; Meditz & Hanratty, 1989; 
Merrill & Miró, 1997; Murillo, 2000; Murillo & Schrank, 2005; O'Connell, 1999; OECD, 1996; 
Ulloa, 2003).  
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2.1. History 
Most countries in Latin America have been characterized as having unions play a strong 
role in the political arena, both as a principal opposition institution and principal supporter of 
political parties in power (Carrière, et al., 1989).  The economic and political development of 
unions in Latin America is to no small degree a story of union alliances with and subordination 
to various political parties.  Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay are no 
exception.  Such alliances, however, developed in different ways across these countries. 
The alliances between unions and the Peronist Party in Argentina and the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico became long-lasting relationships that benefited 
the unions for decades.  In Bolivia and Chile, alliances between government and unions were 
more fragile, with unions becoming sufficiently strong to play important roles not only as the 
main ally of a ruling party, but also their main opposition.  In Panama, unions were typically 
weak and had little political influence, but during the government of Omar Torrijos (from 1968-
1978), the president supported the establishment of alliances to empower the formation of 
stronger and more active unions, promoting reforms in favor of workers.  In Uruguay, where 
little if any coordination had existed between unions and the government, unions played a major 
role in the democratization process during the 1980s.  Countries where strong alliances 
developed between unions and government often adopted protectionist policies that reinforced 
these alliances.  As characterized by O’Connell (1999), these political alliances became the pillar 
on which unions were able to negotiate benefits for their members, but reduce their role as 
collective bargaining agents in the labor market, particularly in the private sector. 
The era of dictatorships in Latin America, between the 1970s and late 1980s, produced a 
major setback for the development of unions.  With the exception of Panama, where unions 
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become stronger during the dictatorship, unions in other countries were dissolved and their 
leaders persecuted.  Except for unions allied with the ruling government, most types of labor 
organizations were outlawed.  In Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico, although unions were 
persecuted and declared illegal, they remained active as political entities opposing the 
dictatorship.  In Chile, while unions were initially disbanded and members were persecuted, by 
the end of the 1970s, following their Plan Laboral, the right of association was reestablished, 
reforming the role of unions as a decentralized collective bargaining unit operating in a newly-
adopted neoliberal economy.  Finally, in Uruguay, the military regime outlawed union activity 
and granted rights of dismissal to employers in case of strikes, producing massive layoffs of 
workers engaged in such activities.  These actions effectively eliminated substantive union 
activities for almost a decade.  In 1981, unions were allowed to resurface, with close control 
from the government intended to reduce the politicization of their activities. 
With the return of democracy throughout the region, unions returned to their economic and 
political activities, in some cases having as much strength as in the pre-dictatorship era.  The 
debt crisis that affected Latin American countries in the 1980s, however, marked a change in the 
economic system for most of the countries in the region.  In an attempt to overcome the crisis, 
many countries attempted a series of market reforms that moved their economies from a 
centralized, protectionist market driven by large governments, to a more flexible and open 
market oriented environment with smaller governments.  These changes greatly reduced the 
leverage that unions had in influencing government policies, forcing them to rely more on their 
role as workers’ collective bargaining agents with the private sector (O'Connell, 1999).  Perhaps 
paradoxically, although many market driven policies were adopted to favor more flexible labor 
and product markets, a series of union-friendly reforms were also adopted during the 1980s and 
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1990s in an attempt to retain union support (Murillo & Schrank, 2005).  Anner (2008) observes, 
however, that such reforms seemed not able to strengthen the role of unions as bargaining agents 
but, rather, fragmented an already weakened institution.  
2.2.  Legal Background 
As described by Murillo (2000, 2001), Murillo and Schrank (2005), Anner (2008) and 
O’Connell (1999), the aftermath of the debt crisis that hit Latin America in the 1980s and the 
return to democracy transformed the role that most unions had from one of an important political 
actor toward one as a more active labor market agent.  Unions across the region had to adapt to a 
more flexible labor market, transitioning from a state-union relationship toward a firm-union 
one.  In conjunction with the market reforms, however, a series of union-friendly reforms were 
also observed across the regions as an attempt to empower and transform the new role of unions 
(Anner, 2008; Murillo & Schrank, 2005).  Such a combination of legal responses, coupled with 
the traditional background that unions had in their respective countries, brought about 
considerable heterogeneity in the way unions operated across the countries.  Table 8 summarizes 
some of the most important characteristics that describe the conditions under which unions 
operate in selected countries. 
 Similar to the experience worldwide, many Latin America countries have shown a 
decline in unionization rates, despite union-friendly reforms. This has been the case in Bolivia, 
Mexico and Panama.  In Chile and Uruguay, however, union density rose in 2000-2006 
following earlier declines.  In Argentina, union density increased substantially following their 
economy’s recovery from financial crisis in the early 2000s and labor reforms in 2004. 
Anner (2008) argues that decline of unions in the region can be explained by three 
factors.  First, the broader market-oriented reforms that were adopted not only weaken unions by 
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eliminating protectionist policies, reducing the importance of the public sector as main employer, 
but also by contributing to the growth of an informal sector that largely operates outside the 
scope of traditional unions.
39
  Second, the reforms that favor the formation of unions and 
collective bargaining were limited and unable to counteract the effect of reforms increasing the 
flexibility of employment laws.  And third, in some countries there was inadequate protection 
and enforcement systems, incapable of defending workers’ rights to organize or protect them 
from anti-union discrimination.  
With the exception of Uruguay, and to a lesser degree Chile and Panama, the bargaining 
system across these six countries is characterized by substantial state intervention.  In most of the 
countries, the state typically intervenes in the bargaining system by providing official recognition 
and authorization if unions want to engage in bargaining negotiations or want to declare a strike.  
In Argentina, while “regular” unions can be formed freely, only one union (the one with the most 
representation) in a specific industry and/or area is recognized.  In Bolivia and Mexico, unions 
can be formed freely, but need to be officially authorized by the Department of Labor in order to 
operate and negotiate with the employers.  In Bolivia, only one union per establishment is 
allowed, while in Mexico, more than one can be created, although only the largest union can 
engage in collective bargaining.  In Chile and Panama, there is little intervention of the state on 
the formation of unions other than a notification to the authorities, although in Panama only one 
union per establishment is allowed.  In Uruguay there are no formal norms regulating the 
formation and activities of unions, which provides considerable freedom on the formation of 
unions. In most countries freedom of association is guaranteed for all workers except for public 
officials or workers in public administration.  
                                                 
39
 This doesn’t imply that workers in the informal sector do not form other types of labor organizations similar to 
unions. Those organizations, also referred as unions, have characteristics that differ from the traditional role of 
unions, and are not considered in this research. 
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Table 8. Descriptive Evidence on Unions and the Bargaining System 
 Argentina Bolivia Chile 
GDP per capita 2006 (in US$) 5485.5 1230.5 8912.2 
%manufacture 22.27 14.38 13.20 
Union density    
1990-1995 28.7 30.9 13.6 
1995-2000 25.6 16.4 11.3 
2000-2006 37.6 12.9 13.8 
ILO conventions    
C87:Freedom of association 1960 1965 1999 
C98:Right to organize and 
Collective bargain 
1956 1973 1999 
Freedom of association All workers except for 
Military personnel  
All workers but 
public administration 
All workers but 
public administration 
Restrictions One union per industry 
and geographical area 
recognized. 
One union per 
establishment. 
More than one union 
per establishment 
allowed 
 Most representative 
union is recognized 
Needs government 
authorization. 
Unions are auto-
matically recognized 
Union formation Needs to represent at 
least 20% of the 
workers 
At least 20 workers 
are needed for 
professional unions. 
And 50% for firm 
unions. 
Small firms (less than 
50 wrks) need 8 
workers to form a 
union. Otherwise, at 
least 25 workers are 
needed. 
Collective bargain Allowed at regional, 
provincial or firm 
level 
Allowed for Unions, 
Federations and 
Confederations. 
Firm level bargain is 
recognized. 
National level 
bargaining is 
voluntary. 
 Contracts need to be 
approved by the 
Ministry of Labor 
 Worker associations 
(non-unionized) can 
engage into collective 
bargaining. 
Access to financial information Yes No No 
Right to strike Right to strike is 
recognized 
Right to strike is 
recognized. Requires 
3/4 support.  
Right to strike is 
recognized, except in 
public sector. 
Requires simple 
majority support. 
 Only unions that are 
registered have the 
right to strike 
Strikes in public 
sector, general strikes 
and solidary strikes 
are illegal. 
 
Protection Adequate Inadequate Adequate 
Notes: GDP per capita and Manufacture as % of GDP were obtained from the World Bank Indicators (2012). Union 
Density Information is obtained from Household surveys, Anner (2008), Hayter and Stoevska (2011), Cassoni, et al. 
(2005), and information from the OIT. Characteristics of the bargaining systems were obtained from the countries 
labor codes, O’Connell (1999), Anner (2008); Murillo and Schrank (2005), Ronconi (2012), Anner (2008b) and 
Murillo (2000, 2001). 
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Table 8. Descriptive Evidence on Unions and the Bargaining System (continued) 
 Mexico Panama Uruguay 
GDP per capita 2006 (in US$) 8830.8 5201.6 5907.3 
%manufacture 18.7 7.1 17.0 
Union density    
1990-1995 22.4 14.2 17.3 
1995-2000 21.0 11.0 14.7 
2000-2006 16.4 12.0 19.0 
ILO conventions    
C87:Freedom of association 1950 1958 1954 
C98:Right to organize and 
Collective bargain 
Not recognized 1966 1954 
Freedom of association No prior authorization 
is required to create a 
trade union.  
All workers but 
public officials 
administration 
There exist few 
regulations on unions 
Restrictions Unions require 
officially authorization.  
Only one union per 
establishment.  
No noticeable 
restrictions 
 More than one union 
per firm allowed, but 
only the most 
representative is 
recognized 
  
Union formation Unions need at least 20 
workers 
Unions require 40 
members. 
There are no minimum 
of requirements 
Collective bargain Employers have the 
obligation to engage 
into collective 
bargaining with unions 
at request. 
Worker associations 
(non-unionized) can 
engage into 
collective 
bargaining. 
Collective bargaining 
usually at industry 
level.  
    
Access to financial information No Yes No 
Right to strike Right to Strike 
recognized. Requires 
simple majority.  
Strikes in the Public 
sector requires 2/3 
support 
Right to Strike 
recognized in case 
of working 
conditions 
improvements. 
Requires simple 
majority. 
No noticeable 
restrictions 
    Protection Inadequate Mostly adequate Adequate 
Notes: GDP per capita and Manufacture as % of GDP were obtained from the World Bank Indicators (2012). Union 
Density Information is obtained from Household surveys, Anner (2008), Hayter and Stoevska (2011), Cassoni, et al. 
(2005), and information from the OIT. Characteristics of the bargaining systems were obtained from the countries 
labor codes, O’Connell (1999), Anner (2008); Murillo and Schrank (2005), Ronconi (2012), Anner (2008b) and 
Murillo (2000, 2001). 
 
The restrictions on the formation of unions have also shown significant heterogeneity in 
terms of minimum requirements of representation.  Uruguay, given its virtual absence of a legal 
framework for unions, does not have any restriction in terms of the number of workers required 
to form a union.  Panama, in contrast, requires at least 40 workers to form a union, perhaps the 
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strongest restriction for the formation of unions.  In Bolivia, Mexico and Chile the requirements 
in terms of workers is similar, with a minimum of 20-25 needed to form a union.  Chile has a 
more flexible requirement for smaller firms (less than 50 workers) where only 8 workers are 
needed to form a union.  In Argentina, a union needs 20% of the represented workforce to create 
a union, but needs to represent the majority of the workers in the industry/area to be able to 
engage into bargaining and call strikes. 
The collective bargaining system across countries is also characterized by its 
heterogeneity, from a highly centralized system as in Argentina to a decentralized system in 
Chile.  The bargaining system in Mexico is also highly centralized, not because representation is 
highly centralized as in Argentina, but because of considerable coordination between unions and 
the state (O'Connell, 1999).  Uruguay historically had a centralized bargaining system, but as 
Cassoni, et al.  (2005) describe, it has slowly been moving toward more decentralized bargaining 
at the firm level.  In Chile and Panama, a decentralized bargaining system prevails where 
nonunion organizations can also request that they collectively bargain.  In Chile, establishment 
and firm level bargaining is encouraged, while bargaining at higher levels (multiple firms) is at 
the discretion of employers.  In Bolivia, a mixed bargaining system prevails since any union, 
federation or confederation, can request collective bargaining.  Typically, confederations and 
federations are involved in the negotiation of minimum wages, wage increases and mandated 
benefits at the national level that may affect the whole workforce.  Nevertheless, as mentioned 
by Carrière, et al. (1989), Bolivian unions have never been known to be strong in terms of 
negotiations at the decentralized level.  It is worth mentioning that unions in Argentina and 
Panama are the only ones that have access to financial information before they engage in 
collective bargaining.  Mexico is the only country among the six to be studied that has not 
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ratified the International Labor Organization convention regarding collective bargaining (ILO 
convention 98). 
The right to strike is recognized for all the six countries, but with different levels of 
restrictions.  For most countries, 50% support of union members is needed to strike, with the 
exception being Bolivia where 75% is needed.  In all countries, only those unions that are 
recognized by the state can strike.  In Bolivia and Panama, coordinated work stoppages, either 
solidarity or general strikes, are prohibited.  
Bargaining systems in these countries can also be characterized by their protection of the 
rights to freedom of association.  According to the evaluation made in the report of the OECD 
(1996), Argentina, Chile and Uruguay have an adequate system to protect unions, while Bolivia 
and Mexico are considered inadequate.  Similar characterizations are also described in the 
Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights (ITUC, 2007).  In this report, Bolivia is 
described as providing inadequate protection against anti-union discrimination due to a sluggish 
and inefficient legal system.  In the case of Panama, except for the excessive requirements to 
form a union, protection is deemed adequate except in export-processing zones.  The report also 
indicates that Mexico has serious problems that undermine bargaining rights, job security, 
freedom of association and rights to strike among unions.  In terms of enforcement capacity, the 
information reported in Ronconi (2012), who analyzes evidence on enforcement of labor laws in 
Latin America, shows that in the 2000s, Bolivia and Mexico had the lowest number of inspectors 
per capita, while Chile, Panama and Uruguay, have by far the best enforcement capabilities in 
the region. 
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3. Data and imputation strategy 
The present analysis uses data from the Enterprise Survey, concentrating on six selected 
Latin American countries (see Table 9).  The information was collected during 2006 by the 
World Bank as part of the first wave of data collection for Latin American countries.  The 
Enterprise Survey provides a standardized establishment level data set, using a representative 
sample of establishments in the private sector.
40
  The survey focuses on the non-agricultural 
economy, excluding the public sector, targeting establishments with 5 or more workers.  The 
sample was constructed using stratified random sampling, based on industry, establishment size 
and region, which also depend on the size of each country’s economy.41  The survey provides 
considerable information regarding different aspects of the business environment, investment 
climate and establishment characteristics.  This information can then be used to identify different 
aspects of establishment performance, market competition, managerial characteristics and labor 
force structure, among other things. 
The six countries in this analysis were selected for having a large enough presence of 
unionized (and not unionized) establishments in the sample.
42
  Although there is information 
available for other industries, i.e., services and others, the study concentrates on manufacturing 
because only for this sector is there information on capital.  Much of the literature on unions and 
performance in developed economies has likewise focused on manufacturing. 
                                                 
40
 According to the methodological notes provided at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology, the Enterprise 
Survey is answered by business owners and top managers, and in some cases, by human resources managers. The 
regions with major economic activity in each country were selected for interview. The data can be accessed at 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.  
41
 Further details on the implementation and survey structure can be found in the implementation notes for the Latin 
America Enterprise Surveys Data Set. 
42
 Among the selected countries, Bolivia had the lowest share of unionized establishments, with 14.1% of the sample 
being unionized, while the largest share was in Argentina with 91% being unionized. In other countries in the 
region, for example, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru, less than 5% of the 
interviewed establishments were unionized. No information on unionization was available for Venezuela. 
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Table 9. Sample Size by Country and Eligibility 
Economy Size Countries 
Sample size 
(manufacture) 
Eligible  Complete 
Small  Bolivia 359 298 215 
 
Panama 238 185 112 
 
Uruguay 317 251 136 
    
 
Middle  Argentina 623 540 294 
 
Chile 627 564 409 
    
 
Large  Mexico 1,113 974 802 
    
 
 
All 3,277 2,812 1,968 
Notes: Prepared from the information of the Enterprise Survey 2006: 
Eligibility is assessed on whether or not the observation reports 
information on Sales.  Complete data refers to cases when all the basic 
information (sales, capital and labor) is available for analysis. 
 
An important limitation of the Enterprise Survey data set is a relatively high non-
response incidence, particularly regarding information that is sensitive or difficult to access.
43
 
Table 9 presents a summary of the total number of establishments available in the survey per 
country, and the potential sample size based on alternative criteria for data item completeness.  
The minimum eligibility criteria is to restrict the data to those observations with no more than 
500 permanent workers, those that reported total sales last year and those with information about 
unions.
 44
  These criteria reduce the sample by almost 14% (call this the “eligible sample”).  The 
sample is reduced by 40% when one requires that establishments have complete information not 
only on sales and union status, but also capital and production cost, which are fundamental for a 
productivity analysis. 
                                                 
43
 The absence of information for certain items in the survey could be reported as missing due to the subject’s 
refusal to answer, they did not know the information asked or the question was not applicable for the establishment. 
44
 In the whole sample, only 98 observations correspond to establishments with more than 500 permanent workers. 
These observations are excluded from the analysis because there are not enough observations for union and non-
union establishments to provide reliable comparison groups in most countries (Mexico is the exception), potentially 
biasing the estimates. In regressions not shown here, it was observed that some of the estimations were sensitive to 
the inclusion of these large establishments to the sample. 
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Even though the analysis could be conducted removing the incomplete cases, there are 
various problems that could arise from working with such a restricted sample.  As Little and 
Rubin (2002) indicate, case-wise deletion can provide valid inferences only if the share of 
deleted cases is small or if the data are missing completely at random (MCAR).
45
  If this is not 
the case, the missing information might be systematically different from the observed data, and 
inferences obtained from a complete set might be significantly biased.  
If the systematic differences in the data can still be captured by the rest of the observed 
characteristics, a second alternative to the case-wise deletion is to use a reweighting approach.  
Under the assumption that the information is Missing at Random (MAR), this strategy suggests 
that it is possible to find an appropriate reweighing scheme using a well specified probabilistic 
model of missingness, so that the distribution of the characteristics of the complete sample can 
be used to mimic that of the full sample.  This way, estimations obtained using this strategy 
should correct observed sample differences between observed and the missing data.  The 
problem with these two methodologies, in the framework of this paper, is that using the 
completed case sample implies a large average loss of information (40%).  Even with the 
reweighted strategy, the high incidence of missing data might still generate inconsistent 
estimates, if the reweighting scheme is not appropriate or if the MAR assumption is grossly 
violated. 
A third alternative, used in this paper, is to use a Multiple Imputation (MI) approach, 
which is a flexible simulation based technique used for handling missing information.  The 
imputation process is based on the assumption that all the missing information are “missing at 
                                                 
45
 In the nomenclature of Little and Rubin (2002), data are missing completely at random if the probability of being 
missing does not depend on any observed or unobserved data. A weaker condition is missing at random (MAR) or 
ignorable non-response, which means that outcomes are the same for missing and non-missing observations once 
one conditions on measureable covariates. 
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random” (MAR) in the sense of Little and Rubin (2002).  Similar to the reweighted approach, 
this implies that the probabilistic process that characterizes the missingness of information can 
be explained entirely by the observed information.  Under this assumption, this approach uses all 
information available to create multiple samples with independent imputations for the 
unobserved data.  Each imputed sample can be independently analyzed and the results across 
imputed samples combined to provide a single multiple imputation result. 
The advantage this procedure has over a simple imputation approach is that MI 
introduces new information to the system, by using the empirical distribution of the missing 
variables.  Because this strategy uses all available information, observations with partial missing 
information are still considered to characterize the missingness and imputation equations.  The 
next section describes the specification and implementation details of the MI strategy used in the 
paper, while details on the process are explained in appendix B. 
3.1. Multiple imputation: Implementation 
Since the principal analysis of the paper relies on three main variables--sales, labor and 
unionization--the working sample is restricted to those establishments with complete information 
on these three variables.  Because most large establishments in the sample are either unionized or 
non-unionized, which can cause a bias on the estimations, the sample is constrained to 
observations with at most 500 permanent workers.  Given that the interest is to characterize 
establishments in the private sector, establishments owned by the public sector (more than 50%) 
are excluded of the analysis.  To avoid any bias caused by establishments that recently started 
their economic activities, the sample is restricted to establishments with at least 3 years of 
operation in the market.  Finally, in order to avoid biases due to errors and inconsistencies within 
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the data set itself, some minor edits of the data set are implemented.
46
  This reduces the working 
sample from 3,277 to 2,812 enterprises across the 6 countries.  
In order to maintain a minimum level of consistency on the imputations across the 
countries, the specification of the missing information process is kept constant across countries, 
except for characteristics of region and industry.
47
  Regarding other characteristics, the 
imputation model includes variables, such as market competition, establishment ownership 
structure, infrastructure characteristics, production policies, investment in research and 
development (R&D) and physical capital, labor force characteristics and level of unionization at 
the establishment level.  All imputation models are estimated using weights provided in the 
survey to obtain results representative at the national level.  Given that the missingness across the 
variables of interest is assumed to follow an arbitrary pattern, iterative chained equations (ICE) 
are used to obtain imputed values given the observed data.  While some of the literature 
recommends that 5-10 imputed samples are enough to obtain appropriate inferences (Rubin, 
1987), there are arguments that some applications may need more imputations to obtain stable 
results (Horton & Lipsitz, 2001).  Given the incidence of missing information, 50 imputed 
samples are used to provide the main results.  Results using fewer imputations are also provided 
to show the stability of results.  Finally, following the literature an examination of the imputed 
data suggests that 20 iterations for the burn-in period are sufficient to achieve convergence on 
the system (van Buuren, 2007).
48
 
                                                 
46
 In some instances, information such as wages, sales or costs are either too high or too low, compared to other 
information within the establishment and compared to other similar establishments that can be interpreted as typos 
on transcription. Depending on each case, the values were inflated or deflated (reducing the excess of zeroes), or 
change the value to missing data. 
47
 The regions with major economic activity are selected for interviews in each region. The industry fixed effects 
correspond to the ISIC codes 15-37 (ISIC Rev.3.1). A complete list of the variables that are used in the imputation 
process can be found in the appendix C. 
48
 Appendix D provides a plot of the means and standard deviations of the main imputed variables used to analyze 
the stability of the processes. 
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One cannot rule out the possibility that part of the information in the dataset is “missing 
not at random” (MNAR), depending in part on unobserved and unmeasured characteristics, 
potentially introducing non-ignorable response bias.  Graham, et al. (1997) show that the 
sensitivity of results to the observed missing process is frequently small in the multiple 
imputation framework.  Moreover, they indicate that even under such circumstances, the MI 
approach might provide better inferences than working with samples with complete reported 
data.  
Table 10. Multiple Imputation Summary 
Variable 
Metho
d 
Complet
e 
Impute
d 
% 
Imputed 
Tota
l 
Nr of workers in t-1 PMM 2623 189 6.7% 2812 
Cost of labor as share of sales PMM 2563 249 8.9% 2812 
Cost of electricity as share of sales PMM 2572 240 8.5% 2812 
Cost of communications as share of sales PMM 2570 242 8.6% 2812 
Cost of materials and inputs as share of 
sales 
PMM 2479 333 11.8% 2812 
Cost of fuel  as share of sales PMM 2441 371 13.2% 2812 
Cost of transportation as share of sales PMM 2460 352 12.5% 2812 
Cost of water as share of sales PMM 2408 404 14.4% 2812 
Cost of rentals as share of sales PMM 2453 359 12.8% 2812 
Log Nr of workers in t-1 OLS 2623 189 6.7% 2812 
Log sales in t-1 OLS 2288 524 18.6% 2812 
Log wages production workers OLS 2721 91 3.2% 2812 
Log wages non production workers OLS 2589 223 7.9% 2812 
Log capital (book value) OLS 1961 851 30.3% 2812 
Log capital (market value) OLS 2346 466 16.6% 2812 
Log materials and Inputs OLS 2441 371 13.2% 2812 
Log salaries OLS 2574 238 8.5% 2812 
Note: the complete set of the variables and imputations are shown in appendix C. OLS imputation uses 
linear predictions to obtain the imputed values. PMM is a predictive mean matching algorithm that 
uses the value of the closest observation (using predicted means) to impute missing information. 
 
Table 10 presents a summary of the imputations for some of the most important variables 
in the study.  As one can observe, information regarding capital, a fundamental variable in the 
analysis, has one of the largest incidence of missing information, with 30.3% of missing 
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information in the case of book value of capital, and 16.6% in the case of hypothetical or market 
value. Among production costs, the costs of electricity and communication have the lowest 
missing rates (8.5% and 8.6%), while costs of fuel and water have the highest rates of missing 
information (13.2% and 14.4%). 
3.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 11 presents the summary statistics combining imputed samples and using weights 
provided in the sample.  There are a total of 2,812 individual establishment observations 
distributed across the 6 selected countries.  Most of the countries have an incidence of 
unionization across establishments of between 20-30%.
49
  The exceptions are Bolivia, that has 
one of the lowest shares of unionized establishments in the sample (13.4% or 7.0% weighted), 
and Argentina, that has more than 90% of establishments reporting some level of unionization.   
Across all countries, there are some consistent characteristics that distinguish union from 
non-union establishments.  Unionized establishments are larger (in terms of number of workers) 
than their counterparts and operate for longer hours per week.  With the exception of Chile, 
unionized establishments show a more intensive use of their installed capital.  It is possible that 
longer hours of operation and more intensive use of capital are attributed to the desire to increase 
utilization of the fixed-cost capital in industries with high capital intensity.  
Except for Argentina, unionized establishments have higher levels of sales per capita than 
their counterparts, and with the exception of Argentina and Mexico, unionized establishments 
have higher levels of capital intensity.
50,51
 Unionized establishments are on average older as 
                                                 
49
 An establishment is classified as unionized if any share of their workforce is considered to be part of a union. 
50
 Per capita measures are calculated dividing the variables of interested by the total number of permanent workers 
plus equivalent temporary workers in the establishment.  
51
 Capital per capita is calculated using hypothetical or “market value” of capital. It represents the value that the 
establishment estimates they could receive for the machinery and equipment, considering its productivity and 
compared to similar equipment in the market. Following the directions from the questionnaire manual 
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compared to their non-union counterparts.
52
 With the exception of Argentina, companies owned 
by foreign capital are more likely to be unionized, but establishments where the main 
shareholder owns more than 50% of the company are less likely to be unionized.  In all countries 
but Panama, unionized establishments are more likely to have some type of certification for 
production quality.  Similarly, unionized establishments are on average more likely to invest in 
physical capital and research and development. 
In terms of workforce characteristics, unionized establishments are more likely to have an 
ongoing training program, with larger shares of the workforce trained.  Apart from Chile, 
unionized establishments are characterized by larger shares of productive workers but, at the 
same time, such establishments are also less likely to employ workers with more than 7 years of 
education.  With respect to temporary workers, there is little pattern across countries, although 
the shares of this type of workers are generally low, except in Bolivia and Panama.
53
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
(http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Methodology/Questionnaire-
Manual.pdf), hypothetical capital is the preferred measure for capital intensity. 
52
 There is no information available on when unions formed within the establishment. 
53
 Full-time temporary or seasonal employees are defined as all paid short-term (i.e. for less than a fiscal year) 
employees with no guarantee of renewal of employment contract) and work 40 hours or more per week for the term 
of their contract.  
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Table 11. Summary Statistics 
 
Argentina Bolivia Chile 
 
Non union Union Non union Union Non union Union 
Nr of establishments 46 494 258 40 415 149 
Share 8.5 91.5 86.6 13.4 73.6 26.4 
Share weighted 11.0 89.0 93.0 7.0 71.9 28.1 
Union density (% unionized) 
 
68.50% 
 
5.80% 
 
13.00% 
Log sales per capita 10.58 10.46 8.79 9.66 10.41 10.77 
Nr of equivalent permanent workers 22.73 58.27 28.07 143.03 40.69 115.24 
Log capital (market value)  per worker 9.13 8.99 7.75 8.83 8.84 9.22 
Cost of labor as share of sales 19.1% 24.3% 23.1% 19.9% 24.7% 21.9% 
Cost of inputs as share of sales 37.3% 42.7% 39.0% 37.1% 42.5% 42.1% 
% Level of utilization of facilities 66.6% 70.2% 62.5% 63.7% 72.3% 68.5% 
Avg hrs. of operation per Week 70.03 62.33 59.12 82.05 64.23 81.51 
%Sales coming from manufacture 93.5% 93.4% 97.4% 98.7% 95.1% 98.1% 
%Sales subcontracted 17.4% 8.7% 12.1% 13.5% 6.9% 4.9% 
Age of firm 25.01 35.19 21.76 29.60 25.94 41.30 
Exp. top manager 30.39 27.65 21.15 19.73 26.53 24.14 
Owned by foreign capital 5.5% 5.0% 3.9% 28.7% 2.1% 7.1% 
>50% own by largest shareholder 93.8% 75.2% 84.8% 65.2% 90.1% 80.6% 
Quality certification 16.5% 24.8% 8.6% 38.4% 19.8% 37.1% 
New production or process 79.4% 80.1% 83.7% 93.7% 78.3% 74.9% 
Investment in R&D or capital 75.2% 75.4% 62.0% 79.4% 77.9% 82.6% 
% with no training program 72.4% 47.3% 42.2% 30.8% 60.7% 41.4% 
% with 1-33% trained wf 0.9% 13.5% 20.6% 11.1% 21.0% 20.4% 
% with 34-66% trained wf 0.2% 8.6% 17.0% 22.3% 8.2% 17.8% 
% with 67-100% trained wf 26.5% 30.5% 20.1% 35.7% 10.1% 20.5% 
Share prod Workers 63.2% 73.7% 65.0% 72.3% 70.7% 65.8% 
Share skill Workers 53.6% 55.7% 68.6% 61.2% 54.7% 64.1% 
% with 7+ yrs avg worker education 99.7% 97.6% 81.6% 70.0% 98.5% 94.0% 
Share temporary workers 10.5% 5.6% 28.3% 14.9% 9.0% 5.8% 
Note: The averages are calculated using survey weights and all imputed data. 
a
The Share of seasonal workers is 
defined as number of total temporal workers divided by total number of permanent and temporal workers. 
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Table 11. Summary Statistics (Continued) 
 
  Mexico Panama  Uruguay 
  Non union Union Non union Union Non union Union 
Nr of Establishments 639 335 148 37 181 70 
Share 65.6 34.4 80.0 20.0 72.1 27.9 
Share weighted 72.6 27.4 78.9 21.1 79.4 20.6 
Union Density (% unionized)   21.00%   12.30%   10.80% 
Log sales per capita 9.69 9.95 10.15 10.53 9.94 10.30 
Nr of equivalent permanent workers 24.72 69.59 32.94 80.79 21.90 45.88 
Log capital (market value)  per worker 8.31 8.27 8.90 10.36 8.64 8.91 
Cost of labor as share of sales 25.6% 24.5% 20.8% 23.5% 21.3% 19.0% 
Cost of inputs as share of sales 26.9% 26.7% 34.3% 39.9% 47.4% 46.4% 
% Level of utilization of facilities 73.9% 73.8% 71.8% 79.6% 65.9% 64.9% 
Avg hrs. of operation per Week 60.69 67.45 55.81 67.79 70.35 88.36 
%Sales coming from manufacture 96.4% 99.0% 93.4% 91.0% 96.8% 96.5% 
%Sales subcontracted 8.5% 13.2% 5.6% 10.1% 9.4% 8.0% 
Age of firm 17.61 22.71 23.30 35.52 27.41 33.70 
Exp. top manager 16.90 19.02 22.08 26.14 25.29 26.70 
Owned by foreign capital 1.6% 6.6% 8.0% 9.2% 2.7% 13.1% 
>50% own by largest shareholder 84.5% 73.2% 89.2% 76.4% 82.7% 64.6% 
Quality certification 9.8% 25.9% 11.2% 7.7% 6.6% 14.5% 
New production or process 26.3% 57.0% 73.8% 65.9% 70.9% 82.0% 
Investment in R&D or capital 22.6% 48.9% 63.9% 78.8% 56.0% 64.6% 
% with no training program 87.2% 49.5% 58.3% 38.9% 76.8% 47.5% 
% with 1-33% trained wf 1.9% 5.1% 15.2% 14.6% 10.1% 24.7% 
% with 34-66% trained wf 4.4% 14.3% 10.7% 23.7% 4.9% 6.7% 
% with 67-100% trained wf 6.5% 31.2% 15.7% 22.8% 8.3% 21.1% 
Share prod Workers 72.8% 74.4% 66.2% 71.1% 72.8% 74.0% 
Share skill Workers 85.3% 78.1% 74.4% 78.7% 56.4% 57.7% 
% with 7+ yrs avg worker education 13.3% 10.6% 94.8% 93.7% 64.9% 58.2% 
Share temporary workers 4.1% 6.0% 16.6% 18.9% 7.8% 7.0% 
Note: The averages are calculated using survey weights and all imputed data.
a 
The share of seasonal workers is 
defined as number of total temporal workers divided by total number of permanent and temporal workers. 
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4. Econometric strategy 
To determine the effects of unions on productivity, the starting point is the basic model 
developed by Brown and Medoff (1978).  This is a variant of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function that distinguishes between two types of workers (non-union and union).  Assuming 
constant returns to scale, the production function can be written as follows: 
       
 (        )
   
 (   
where Q represents a measure of output or productivity, K is the level of capital, Ln and Lu are 
nonunion and union workers respectively, all measured at the establishment level i; A is the 
constant of proportionality that depends on the measurement units of capital, labor and output, 
and accounts for other characteristics that determine productivity; and “α” and “1-α” are the 
output elasticities with respect to capital and labor, assuming constant returns to scale.  In this 
framework, ‘c’ reflects the productivity differences between union and non-union labor.  After 
some manipulation, equation (1) can be linearized and written as: 
                           (2) 
where   
 
 
 and   
 
 
 are measures of labor productivity and capital per capita,   
  
      
 is 
the share of unionized workers in the establishment, and L is total number of workers in the firm 
        .  Here   represents the overall impact that unions have on establishment labor 
productivity, once we control for capital intensity. 
Since equation (2) is rather restrictive since it assumes constant returns of scale, a more 
flexible specification is used, following a general form of a translog specification for the 
production function (Christensen, Jorgenson, & Lau, 1973).  Thus, after including an error term, 
and additional controls for productivity, the specification to be estimated can be written as 
follows: 
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           (3) 
Although specifications similar to this have been widely used in the literature, there are 
important limitations that need to be considered (for details on the discussion see Brown and 
Medoff 1978 and Hirsch and Addison 1986).  First, the measurement used as proxy for labor 
productivity can affect the estimations on the productivity impacts.  While physical units of 
production per capita are preferable, this paper, as in most of the literature, uses value added, 
which is defined as annual sales minus production costs on materials, electricity and water, 
divided by total labor force.  The potential problem with this measure is that the estimated 
impact of unions on productivity might confound effects on both prices and quantity.  In 
relatively non-competitive product markets or in industries that are highly unionized (i.e., most 
firms pay wages close to or at union levels), higher union wages can be shifted to consumers in 
the form of higher prices and hence higher value added.  According to Hirsch (2004b), such a 
problem might not be severe for firm or establishment level studies, since price effects can be 
mitigated by controlling for industry fixed effects and measures of market competition. 
A second problem of this specification is that it assumes union and nonunion 
establishments share the same production function, except for the productivity parameter 
associated to unions.  This ignores the possibility that the sectors have different production 
functions and factor elasticities.  Although this problem could be solved by introducing a full set 
of interactions in the model, the identification of the parameters might require richer information 
(in particular larger sample sizes) than what is available.  While this problem could be more 
serious when using a restrictive functional form, the flexibility one obtains using a translog 
production function (equation 3) would help reduce the severity of the problem.  Furthermore, in 
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order to increase the flexibility of the production function, additional controls for infrastructure 
use, labor characteristics and investments are included in the specification. 
Perhaps the most vexing problem is the potential endogeneity of establishment 
unionization.  This can be caused either by omitted information or reverse causality.  
Establishments with and without unionized workers might differ systematically in other 
unmeasured aspects, such as management quality, workers attributes, or performance history, 
among other things, and not controlling for these specific factors would create inconsistent 
estimations.  According to Clark (1984), however, one might not expect unionization and sales to 
be simultaneously determined, since unionization should have happened long before the 
interview of the survey, and current sales should not determine unionization status.  
Nevertheless, concerns with respect to the inter-temporal effects of unionization remain.  If 
union productivity effects do not fully offset union wage effects, profits will be lower and 
businesses will be less likely to survive.  This survivor bias should lead to overstate union 
productivity effects since businesses with detrimental union effects on performance are least 
likely to remain in the sample (Addison and Hirsch 1989).  Although concerns related to inter-
temporal effects cannot be addressed, since the analysis uses cross sectional data, the preferred 
specifications include variables such as age of the firm, manager experience and ownership 
characteristics, that would help capture some aspects of managerial quality in the firm, as well 
variables correlated with investment policies, and workforce structure, that would ameliorate the 
estimates. 
Although there are alternative methodologies that could be used to better identify the 
effects of unions on productivity, available data do not provide enough information to exploit 
time variation, or adopt an instrumental variable approach.  The rich information the data set 
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used in this paper, however, allows for a very flexible and detailed specification of the 
production function that can mitigate the bias of otherwise unobserved characteristics.  
Nevertheless, because some unobserved factors related to productivity might remain, the 
estimations and inferences must be considered with care, and should not be interpreted as causal 
effects.  To test how sensitive are productivity estimates to the controls, different specifications 
are used to control for aspects related to market competition, establishment characteristics and 
organization, and innovation policies.  Though the estimates here presented are “descriptive” in 
nature, the evidence is informative, as they are the first step to identify how unions affect 
productivity in developing countries. 
 
5. Results  
The estimated model follows the specification shown in equation (3).  The natural 
logarithm of value added per worker is used as the productivity measure, where value added is 
measured as total sales in the last fiscal year minus production costs in water, electricity, fuel, 
materials and intermediate inputs.  Value added taxes are included in the sales measurement.  For 
observations where production costs exceed the value of total sales, total cost is constrained and 
controlled for using a dummy.
54
  For the production factors, employment is measured as the total 
number of permanent workers plus the equivalent number of seasonal workers, while capital is 
measured as log of the market value (hypothetical capital) of machinery and equipment 
(including vehicles).
55
 In addition, the basic model includes controls for region and (1 digit) 
industry fixed effects.  The main variable of interest, union density, is included as a share 
                                                 
54
 Overall, only 1.3% of the observations fall within these characteristics. 
55
 Equivalent seasonal workers are measured as the total number of temporary workers multiplied by the average 
time a temporal worker participates in the establishment in a year. As described in the survey manual, information 
collected on the market value (hypothetical value) of capital is recommended to be used as the best approximation 
for capital intensity in the establishment. 
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between 0 and 1, which indicates what share of the permanent labor force in the establishment is 
unionized.  
Table 12. Effect of Unions on Establishment Productivity, by Country 
  Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay 
Avg. % unionization in union 
establishments 77.0% 82.5% 46.2% 76.8% 58.2% 52.2% 
%Workforce unionized -0.389+ 0.160 0.167 0.095 0.256 0.178 
 
 (0.026)  (0.695)  (0.353)  (0.555)  (0.467)  (0.448) 
Log capital pc -0.777 0.316 -0.45 -0.086 -0.248 -0.114 
 
 (0.306)  (0.421)  (0.194)  (0.650)  (0.490)  (0.717) 
Log total labor force -0.427 -0.792 -0.443 0.19 0.045 0.522 
 
 (0.425)  (0.150)  (0.357)  (0.548)  (0.951)  (0.549) 
Log K log L -0.012 0.161* -0.005 -0.015 -0.001 -0.034 
 
 (0.878)  (0.004)  (0.914)  (0.595)  (0.986)  (0.520) 
Log K
2
 0.033 -0.027 0.027 0.017 0.012 0.008 
 
 (0.380)  (0.250)  (0.122)  (0.115)  (0.546)  (0.606) 
Log L
2
 -0.001 -0.124 0.000 -0.031 -0.031 0.029 
 
 (0.983)  (0.162)  (0.998)  (0.395)  (0.646)  (0.813) 
Constant 13.648* 6.917* 11.143* 7.987* 10.390* 8.291* 
 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
       , at means -0.006 0.207 0.203 0.250 0.043 -0.026 
        , at means 0.196 -0.104 -0.055 -0.068 0.093 0.409 
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251 
Note:  ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01.  P-values in parentheses.  All models are estimated using sample weights.  All 
models include region and broad industry fixed effects. 
5.1. Basic Model 
Table 12 presents the results of the basic specification which controls only for production 
factors, and region and industry fixed effects.  These basic results show that for most countries in 
our sample, unions have a positive but weak correlation with productivity.  In the absence of 
endogeneity, the point estimates indicate that, on average, if a nonunion establishment unionizes 
it could increase productivity per worker between 0.077 log points (approximately 8%) to up to 
0.149 log points (15%).
56
 Although the point estimates are economically sizable, the results also 
                                                 
56
 The average marginal effect is obtained by multiplying the union coefficient estimate by the average unionization 
rate among union establishments (i.e. Marginal effect in Bolivia: 82.5%*0.16=0.132 log points). 
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indicate that there is considerably large heterogeneity on the effects of unions across 
establishments, producing estimates of the effect that are not significant at conventional levels 
(p-values are high).  The only exception corresponds to Argentina; this estimate not only shows 
that unions have a large negative impact on productivity (-0.389*77%=0.299 log points), but 
also that the results are statistically significant.  It should be kept in mind that different from 
other countries in the sample, most of Argentina’s manufacture establishments are unionized.57  
Given the type of production function used here, the coefficients for capital and labor are 
more difficult to interpret than in the standard Brown and Medoff model.  To ease interpretation, 
at the bottom of Table 12, the derivatives with respect to labor and capital are obtained and 
evaluated at the mean.  The parameters are consistent with respect to the expectations for 
Bolivia, Chile and Mexico.  In Argentina, Panama and Uruguay, however, the estimates are 
somewhat inconsistent with the expectations as the marginal effect of capital is almost zero, with 
a positive marginal effect from Labor.  Although these results are worrisome, they remain 
consistent across different specification, and should not to be crucial for the main focus of the 
analysis.  
5.2.  Sensitivity to Additional Controls 
As mentioned earlier, the model estimated in Table 12 has many shortcomings as it does 
not take into account other characteristics that can explain productivity or that can differ between 
unionized or non-unionized establishments.  In Tables 13 and 14, estimations using richer 
specifications are provided.   In Table 13 presents results of the union productivity effect only, to 
show how sensitive the estimates are to additional controls, while Table 14 presents the results of 
the full specification model. 
                                                 
57
 The estimates of the basic specification using the basic Brown and Medoff (1978) model are shown in appendix 
E.  The results are comparable to the estimations of Table 5, except for Bolivia, where the Brown and Medoff basic 
model predicts a much larger (and not plausible) productivity relationship. 
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The first factor to be considered is the effect of market competition on union effects.   
Controlling for the level of competition should improve the estimates by accounting in part for 
differences in prices caused by union effects on labor costs.  The second row of parameters 
shown in Table 13 provides the estimates after adjusting for the level of competition the 
establishment faces, defined by the number of competitors in the market.  It shows that while in 
Chile and Uruguay, adjusting for market competition greatly reduces the effect that unions have 
on productivity, with the estimates for Uruguay becoming negative.  In Chile, these results seem 
to be driven by the impact that some competition (2-5 competitors in the market) has on sales 
and productivity (see Table 14).  In Uruguay, although the same characteristics can be observed 
for the partial model (not shown here), after controlling for other factors, competition seems to 
have a small and not significant impact on productivity.  
The next factors to be considered are adjustments to the production function.  While one 
of the assumptions is that all of last year sales come from manufactured goods produced using 
full capacity of the resources during the last year, such an assumption might not be accurate.  On 
the one hand, some establishments could show higher (lower) productivity because they operate 
longer (shorter) hours per week.  In a similar manner, given the specific conditions of the market, 
establishments could have different use of the production capacity of their infrastructure.  On the 
other hand, although the assumption is that all sales are self-produced, some establishments 
might subcontract production to smaller units, while others might generate sales via services.  In 
both cases, they might overstate productivity in the establishment, as these sales structures might 
not be reflected in their cost structure in materials.  In order to control for these factors, variables 
for the level of utilization of capital, log hours of operation per week, share of sales not from 
manufacture and share of sales sub-contracted are included in the specification. 
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Results in line 3 of Table 13 show that the union coefficients increases (in absolute value) 
following these productivity adjustments.  Chile and Uruguay show the most drastic changes on 
productivity, to the extent that using these controls revert the negative impact observed when 
competition controls were included in the specification.  Modest positive changes are observed 
for all other countries.  The results in Table 14 show that the parameters for these controls are 
consistent with the expected signs, as all parameters have either positive or negative and non-
significant coefficients, with the exception of Uruguay and Log hours of operation. 
A third set of factors that could be correlated with union status, as well as production 
capacity, are the experience, management quality and organization within the establishment.  
The summary statistics show that unionized establishments are “older,” more likely to be part of 
larger firms, and more likely to be owned by foreign capital.  Controlling for these factors has a 
strong impact on the union estimates, reducing the productivity relationship in Bolivia, and 
increasing it in Chile, to almost significant levels (p=12.5%).  According to the results shown in 
Table 14, the main reason that might explain this fall in the union-productivity relationship in 
Bolivia is that most of the positive effect was driven by foreign owned companies, which is 
positively related with union status.  For Chile, on the other hand, it seems that the source of 
productivity trade-off comes from the returns to establishment age.  According to the results in 
Table 14, Chile is the only country for which younger establishments, which are less likely to be 
unionized, are more productive than older ones, thus helping to explain the observed changes in 
estimates.  For the rest of the countries, the results in Table 14 are consistent with the 
expectations.  Being part of a larger firm and being owned by foreign capital have a positive 
impact on productivity, which can be traced to better managerial policies among multinational 
companies compared to among local establishments in Aitken, et al. (1996). 
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In terms of management quality and organization, these characteristics are controlled for 
by including variables describing of ownership and managerial experience.  Argentina and 
Panama show the largest positive change on estimates of the union-productivity relationship 
when these controls are included to the specification.  These results could be indicating that, in 
Argentina and Panama, unionized establishments have relatively more inefficient management 
(compared to non-union establishments), which was previously putting downward pressure on 
productivity.  This can be directly observed in the results of Table 14 which suggest that the 
strong relationship between productivity and decision strength of the largest shareholder (i.e. if a 
single shareholder owes more than 50% of the company) is the main factor explaining the impact 
on the union-productivity relationship.  Although not reflected in the union-productivity 
relationship, the results in Table 14 also suggest that female owned establishments are less 
productive, similar to the results obtained in Bruhn (2009). 
Although some of the previously discussed controls could arguably be described to be 
unaffected by the presence of unions, aspects such as investment policies, training and workforce 
structure are more likely to be affected by unions presence in the establishment.  In the interest of 
disentangle the direct effect that unions may have on productivity, different variables that control 
for these characteristics.  As seen in Table 14, most controls have the expected positive impact 
on productivity, with the exception of Bolivia, where the introduction of new technological 
procedure or product has a negative and significant impact on productivity.  Under the 
assumption that unions have a negative impact on investment (rent seeking behavior), controlling 
for investment should have a positive impact on the union-productivity relationship.  The results 
on Table 13, however, indicate that controlling for these factors have no significant impact on 
the union estimates, despite the differences that were observed in the summary statistics. 
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Because unions are often associated with lower turnover due to some combination of 
higher wages and collective voice, unionized establishments might be more likely to provide 
more training, since they can receive some of the returns of such investment through higher 
productivity.  Although human capital upgrades, due to higher training, are legitimate sources of 
productivity enhancements, such improvement might not necessary generate improvements in 
technical efficiency.  In general, union establishments are more likely to have an active training 
program with larger coverage among their employees.  Including training as a control variable in 
the estimations (see Table 14) shows that, on average, training has a positive, mostly not 
significant, impact on productivity, with the exception of Bolivia that shows a negative but non-
significant effect on productivity.  Adding these controls to the specification (see Table 13) has 
the expected negative effect on the union-productivity relationship in Bolivia and Panama, 
indicating it is an important channel through which unions operate in these countries.  For the 
rest of the countries, negative, but small, changes on the estimates are also observed. 
One last aspect that unions can influence within the establishment is the structure of the 
labor force and differences in workforce composition and characteristics within union versus 
nonunion establishment.  As shown in the last row of Table 13, these controls have little impact 
on the productivity estimates, with the most substantial change being the productivity increase in 
Bolivia (from a negative 10% to an almost zero effect), and decrease in the coefficients in Chile.   
Table 14 provides more comprehensive results (i.e., coefficients on the controls) for the 
full specification shown in the last line of Table 13.  The coefficients on control variables, as 
seen in Table 14, are somewhat consistent across countries and expectations, despite the 
reasonably high collinearity between some measures such as workforce education, share of skill 
workers, and workers training.  Along these lines, higher worker education and larger share of 
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skill workers has a positive impact on productivity, and when negative, it is not significant.  The 
results also show that seasonal workers are less productive than full time workers, except in 
Argentina, where is positive but not significant.  The coefficients on the share of production 
workers might be regarded as puzzling, but it seems likely that such estimates reflect the positive 
impact of non-production workers on productivity, as seen from similar results in Black and 
Lynch (2001).  Finally larger shares of female workers in the establishment are negatively 
correlated with productivity for most of the countries.  
Although there is limited evidence on union’s productivity effects for these countries in 
the literature, those which exist appear consistent with the results found here.  Using information 
from a national survey of manufacturing in Mexico in 1999, Fairris (2006) finds that unionized 
establishments are about 11% more productive than their counterparts (compared to the 9% 
estimate here).  In the case of Uruguay, Cassoni, et al. (2005) finds a modest 5.7% effect, 
qualitatively similar to the 12% (0.12 log points) found here.  These similarities increase the 
confidence in the results shown in Table 13. 
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Table 13. Effect of Unions on Establishment Productivity, Sensitivity to Specifications 
  Argentina Bolivia Chile  Mexico Panama Uruguay 
%Workforce unionized -0.389+ 0.160 0.167 0.095 0.256 0.178 
Basic model  (0.026)  (0.695)  (0.353)  (0.555)  (0.467)  (0.448) 
       %Workforce unionized -0.388^ 0.190 0.038 0.114 0.286 -0.083 
+Competition  (0.054)  (0.662)  (0.832)  (0.447)  (0.401)  (0.763) 
       %Workforce unionized -0.328+ 0.232 0.156 0.145 0.280 0.117 
+Productivity adjustments  (0.028)  (0.609)  (0.316)  (0.382)  (0.419)  (0.578) 
       %Workforce unionized -0.322+ -0.013 0.251 0.101 0.305 0.072 
+Firm characteristics and ownership  (0.034)  (0.976)  (0.125)  (0.535)  (0.393)  (0.755) 
       %Workforce unionized -0.264^ -0.034 0.219 0.073 0.407 0.114 
+ Management and organization  (0.058)  (0.930)  (0.170)  (0.620)  (0.242)  (0.570) 
       %Workforce unionized -0.273^ -0.05 0.254 0.049 0.461 0.092 
+Investment policy and technology  (0.090)  (0.891)  (0.117)  (0.732)  (0.178)  (0.683) 
       %Workforce unionized -0.279^ -0.101 0.251 0.026 0.378 0.073 
+Training  (0.097)  (0.797)  (0.118)  (0.863)  (0.272)  (0.787) 
       
%Workforce unionized -0.257+ -0.009 0.173 0.093 0.349 0.117 
+Labor force structure  (0.049)  (0.981)  (0.281)  (0.539)  (0.295)  (0.558) 
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251 
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01.  P-values in parentheses.  All models are calculated using all controls specified in 
the previous model.  All models are estimated using the sample weights, and include region and broad 
industry fixed effects. 
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Table 14. Effect of Unions on Establishment Productivity, Full Specification 
  Argentina Bolivia Chile  Mexico Panama Uruguay 
%Workforce unionized -0.257+ -0.009 0.173 0.093 0.349 0.117 
 
 (0.049)  (0.981)  (0.281)  (0.539)  (0.295)  (0.558) 
Competition       
Establishment has 2-5 competitors 0.044 -0.342 0.443+ -0.359* -0.009 -0.425 
 
 (0.850)  (0.331)  (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.970)  (0.268) 
Establishment has 5 or more -0.105 -0.209 0.154 -0.287+ 0.138 -0.368 
competitors  (0.718)  (0.509)  (0.323)  (0.016)  (0.645)  (0.217) 
Establishment faces international  -0.047 -0.206 0.029 0.341 0.127 0.046 
market  (0.822)  (0.510)  (0.908)  (0.261)  (0.765)  (0.876) 
Capacity and Utilization       
Level of utilization of capital 0.008* 0.006^ 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.016* 
 
 (0.004)  (0.060)  (0.236)  (0.210)  (0.890)  (0.003) 
Log hours of operation per week -0.245 0.148 -0.128 0.062 0.152 -0.239^ 
 
 (0.230)  (0.454)  (0.165)  (0.643)  (0.569)  (0.086) 
%Sales not from manufacture -0.014 1.203 0.927+ 0.796 1.326^ -1.012 
 
 (0.972)  (0.288)  (0.041)  (0.240)  (0.058)  (0.418) 
%Sales that are subcontracted -0.246 0.275 0.190 0.116 0.206 -0.430 
 
 (0.224)  (0.408)  (0.357)  (0.619)  (0.614)  (0.201) 
Firm Characteristics       
Owned by foreign capital (>50%) 0.227 0.727+ 0.239 -0.117 0.335 0.182 
 
 (0.472)  (0.013)  (0.274)  (0.540)  (0.280)  (0.734) 
Establishment part of larger firm 0.150 -0.311 0.073 0.084 0.107 0.220 
 
 (0.343)  (0.307)  (0.541)  (0.440)  (0.750)  (0.620) 
Age of the establishment 0.009 0.028 -0.010 0.027* 0.002 0.006 
 (Years since beginning of operation)  (0.236)  (0.107)  (0.111)  (0.000)  (0.896)  (0.524) 
Age
2
/100 -0.006 -0.009 0.007 -0.029* -0.007 -0.0004 
 
 (0.101)  (0.587)  (0.173)  (0.000)  (0.711)  (0.960) 
Management and Organization       
>50% own by largest shareholder 0.128 -0.234 0.031 -0.036 0.541^ -0.034 
 
 (0.439)  (0.378)  (0.751)  (0.653)  (0.051)  (0.845) 
Any of the main owners female -0.043 -0.331^ 0.052 -0.214* 0.366^ -0.264 
 
 (0.683)  (0.066)  (0.615)  (0.004)  (0.071)  (0.223) 
Experience top manager 0.018 0.028^ 0.007 0.000 -0.039 -0.009 
 
 (0.254)  (0.069)  (0.456)  (0.982)  (0.253)  (0.780) 
Experience
2
/100 -0.042+ -0.097* -0.023 -0.005 0.076 -0.002 
 
 (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.170)  (0.760)  (0.246)  (0.965) 
Public or private -0.057 0.303 0.150 0.173^ 0.283 0.311 
Share holding company=1  (0.686)  (0.280)  (0.160)  (0.080)  (0.263)  (0.138) 
Investment and Innovation       
Uses foreign company technology 0.312+ -0.064 0.162 0.180 0.422 0.005 
 
 (0.044)  (0.829)  (0.255)  (0.308)  (0.233)  (0.989) 
Product quality certification 0.027 0.165 0.150 0.356* 0.514 0.567+ 
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 (0.877)  (0.578)  (0.114)  (0.001)  (0.110)  (0.022) 
Introduced new process or product 0.366+ -0.409+ 0.211+ 0.055 0.130 0.137 
 
 (0.018)  (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.510)  (0.545)  (0.436) 
Invested in capital or R&D 0.144 0.053 -0.027 0.156^ -0.003 -0.038 
  (0.216)  (0.755)  (0.821)  (0.088)  (0.989)  (0.811) 
Training       
1-33% workforce trained -0.006 -0.275 0.070 0.137 0.472 0.201 
 
 (0.982)  (0.308)  (0.519)  (0.471)  (0.123)  (0.472) 
34-66% workforce trained 0.588* -0.249 0.191 -0.008 0.043 0.322 
 
 (0.001)  (0.284)  (0.293)  (0.960)  (0.873)  (0.409) 
67-100% workforce trained 0.200 -0.219 0.121 0.067 -0.174 -0.280 
 
 (0.127)  (0.109)  (0.375)  (0.597)  (0.543)  (0.143) 
LF characteristics       
Avg education 4-6 yrs -0.088 0.174 0.055 
 
-0.271 
 
 
 (0.385)  (0.631)  (0.689) 
 
 (0.199) 
 Avg education 7-12 yrs 
 
0.126 
 
0.167^ 
  
  
 (0.614) 
 
 (0.094) 
  Avg education 13+ yrs 
 
0.006 
 
0.365+ 
 
0.341 
  
 (0.984) 
 
 (0.045) 
 
 (0.169) 
Share of production workers -0.882+ -0.448 -0.179 -0.291 0.377 -1.518* 
 
 (0.016)  (0.161)  (0.632)  (0.261)  (0.503)  (0.000) 
Share of skill workers -0.088 -0.148 0.098 0.340+ -0.146 -0.118 
 
 (0.461)  (0.536)  (0.449)  (0.022)  (0.675)  (0.604) 
Share of seasonal workers 0.868 -0.843+ -0.499 -1.240 -0.257 -0.831 
 
 (0.419)  (0.017)  (0.335)  (0.119)  (0.826)  (0.477) 
Share of female workers -0.670+ -0.601+ -0.483+ 0.182 0.090 -0.313 
 
 (0.037)  (0.020)  (0.035)  (0.320)  (0.796)  (0.569) 
Constant 13.614* 7.422* 11.527* 7.361* 7.495* 10.519* 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251 
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01. P-values in parentheses.  The base categories for competition are those firms 
facing none or 1 other establishment in the market. For training, the base category corresponds to establishments 
with no training programs. For education, the base category corresponds to workers with 3 or fewer years of 
education for Bolivia and Mexico, 7 to 12 years for Argentina, Chile and Panama, and 4-6 years of education for 
Uruguay. All model are estimated using sample weights, and include region and broad industry fixed 
effects. 
 
5.3. Interpretation 
Taken as a whole, Table 13 results suggest that unions are associated with positive union 
productivity effects in four of these six Latin American economies, but that there is a lot of 
heterogeneity in the relationship both within and across countries (the former seen by the low 
significance levels of results).  The results also provide some evidence that the union-
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productivity estimates are reasonably robust to richer specifications that take into account 
typically unobserved establishment characteristics.  Using the most complete model as the 
preferred specification (last row), the most negative results indicate that unions have no effect on 
productivity in Bolivia (practically zero), a negative and significant estimate in Argentina (-
0.284), and a large positive, but insignificant, effects in Chile and Panama, while estimates for 
Mexico and Uruguay are positive and consistent across specifications, but not highly significant. 
Taken at face value, the estimate found for Argentina indicates that output per worker 
among a fully unionized establishment is 25 log points lower than a nonunion establishment.  
Were we to obtain such a result in any of the other countries, the obvious question would be how 
union establishments could survive in the marketplace given lower productivity and 
(presumably) higher compensation.  Argentina, however, is a special case compared to other 
countries in the region.  As seen previously in summary statistics, there are very few 
establishments in the sample that are not unionized, and those non-union establishments that 
exist tend to be rather different (relatively younger and smaller).  From the results presented in 
Table 13, in Argentina, productivity adjustments and the management and organization 
characteristics are the main factors affecting union-productivity relationship, generating a 
negative bias on the estimations.  
As Kuhn (1998) and others have argued, negative effects on productivity have been 
typically found in cases where unions and management are known for a high degree of conflict, 
which might explain the results observed in Argentina.  In Table 15, two aspects of labor 
regulations and the perception of management are presented.  About 44% of establishments in 
Argentina consider that labor regulations are serious or very serious obstacles for the operation 
of the establishment, compared to 21% (Uruguay) or lower in other countries in the sample.  
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Similarly, 60% of establishments declare that labor regulations have affected their hiring and 
firing decisions; 44% believe they have affected both aspects, which is almost twice as high as in 
other countries.
 58
  
Table 15. Perception of Labor Regulations 
  Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay 
Labor regulations and H/F decisions 
      Hire decision affected 8.4 2.2 5.4 0.7 4.3 13.6 
Fire decision affected 7.2 3.3 12.6 1.9 6.9 2.1 
Hire and Fire affected 44.5 9.3 19.4 3.5 6.1 17.3 
Labor regulation as obstacles       
No obstacle 8.1 52.3 29.8 49.6 56.8 38.7 
Minor obstacle 12.6 13.8 24.0 25.4 15.9 9.1 
Moderate obstacle 34.4 20.2 26.2 19.1 18.8 30.4 
Serious obstacle 26.9 7.5 15.6 3.8 7.5 14.0 
Very serious obstacle 17.9 3.7 4.4 0.7 0.7 7.0 
Note: All information reflects the weighted share of establishments within each category for each country.  
Another possible explanation for the negative association between productivity and 
unionization is the operating structure of unions in Argentina.  As described in O’Connell 
(1999), Argentinian unions are highly centralized and protected by the government, which 
provides unions fewer incentives to achieve optimal and efficient bargaining deals, potentially 
harming productivity of firms.  As noted in Anner (2008), unions in Argentina also have access 
to financial information of the employers, which can be used during bargaining.  On the one 
hand, access to financial information can have negative effects on productivity by reducing 
establishment’s flexibility to arbitrarily transfer resources to investment or other types of 
production purchases, increasing the negative effects of union rent seeking behavior (Connolly, 
Hirsch, & Hirschey, 1986; Hirsch, 1991).  On the other hand, having access to the financial 
information may also allow unions to better internalize the cost of increasing wages, providing 
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 For more details on establishment perceived obstacles, taxes, regulations, and other topics, including comparisons 
to countries in the region can be found in the Country Profiles, and accessed at 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Reports. 
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an incentive to engage in collective contracts with productivity premium clauses.  In an 
environment of conflict, it is less likely that unions use this information to internalize the effects 
of higher costs, but, rather, to reduce long term investment as they redirect establishment 
resources toward higher wages. This eventually leads to the observed negative productivity 
effects.  Nevertheless, given the unique situation of Argentina, there is little reason to suspect 
that unionized establishments will be highly disadvantaged in the domestic market, since non-
union establishments are the exception and union establishments compete primarily with other 
union establishments.  
The positive impact of unions seen in Chile can be associated with the decentralized 
collective bargaining system that exists between unions and establishments.  As Campero (2001) 
and Vergara (1998) describe, the decentralized bargaining system in Chile has allowed 
establishments to negotiated wage increases and benefits linked to specific productivity targets, a 
possible mechanism that could produce the estimated productivity effects.  This evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis of O’Connell (1999), who indicates that a decentralized collective 
bargained system can increase productivity by allowing unions to internalize the effects they 
may have on establishments and facilitating their input in production process decisions.  That 
said, it should be noted that once labor force structure characteristics are taken into account, the 
union-productivity relationship falls considerably and becomes insignificant. 
As seen in Table 13, in the remaining countries, unions appear to have a positive but 
insignificant effect on productivity (Bolivia is an exception).  All these countries indicate that 
labor regulations are less of a problem than in Argentina.  To some extent, this may account for 
the positive union-productivity effects found in the rest of the economies.  It can be argued that 
the decentralized bargaining system in Panama, as in Chile, explains its large positive union 
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productivity estimates, but large heterogeneity within Panama makes these estimates 
insignificant.  In Bolivia, Mexico and Uruguay, where union productivity estimates are smaller, 
there are no specific reasons that might lead one to expect a highly positive or negative union 
effect.  Uruguay has transitioned from a highly centralized bargaining system to one favoring 
firm-level negotiations that try to incorporate productivity clauses in their contracts (Cassoni, et 
al., 2005; O'Connell, 1999).  These changes, however, do not seem to produce strong positive 
productivity estimates (of course we cannot observe what productivity differences would be in 
the absence of this transition).  
Estimates for Mexico are consistent with findings in Fairris (2005, 2006), yet the 
combination of a centralized bargaining system, and conflict between employers and unions 
reflected in the violation of unions rights, might suggest we could expect unions to have a 
negative productivity impact.  Although Fairris indicates that the union productivity effect in 
Mexico can be explained by better training, the results presented here show that even after 
controlling for training, union’s productivity relationship remains positive. 59  Finally, in the case 
of Bolivia, where a combination of centralized and decentralized bargaining system is used, the 
results of the full specification show that unions have no net effect on productivity.  The results 
also shown that much of the positive union productivity effects is driven by establishment 
characteristics, in particular the type of ownership; its inclusion as a control has a substantial 
effect on estimates of union productivity.  It could also be the case that the presence of unionized 
establishments might be too limited (as compared to the other countries analyzed) to generate 
substantive pressure for productivity enhancements. 
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 Although Fairris (2006) acknowledges that there are other possible explanations for the higher productivity effects 
observed among unionized establishments, they do not elaborate further on alternative explanations. 
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6. Robustness  
6.1. Unionization measurements 
One concern with respect to estimates of the union productivity effects is that union 
density might be measured with error because employers may not have complete information on 
union membership within their workforce and report instead a “guestimate” of density.  This 
implies that a categorical union measure of some coverage, or an approximate density rate (say 
from 1 to 50; 51 to 100 percent, with zero unionization the omitted base group), may contain less 
measurement error than does a continuous measure of union density.  
Table 16 presents estimates using alternatives measures of unionization within 
establishments, using the same controls as in the full specification (Table 14).  Although these 
results are very informative regarding nonlinear effects of unions, one must keep in mind for 
countries like Bolivia and Panama there are not enough observations for some of the cells, 
making the interpretation of their coefficients difficult.  
Table 16. Effect of Unions on Establishment Productivity: Alternative Union Measures 
  Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama  Uruguay 
 (1)  
%Workforce unionized -0.257+ -0.009 0.173 0.093 0.349 0.117 
 
 (0.049)  (0.981)  (0.281)  (0.539)  (0.295)  (0.558) 
% unionization 77.0% 82.5% 46.2% 76.8% 58.2% 52.2% 
Avg effect on productivity -0.194 -0.007 0.082 0.071 0.198 0.066 
 (2) 
      Union dummy -0.347* 0.0331 0.017 0.094 0.138 0.138 
 
 (0.008)  (0.922)  (0.851)  (0.423)  (0.585)  (0.465) 
             
 (3)       
Less than 50% unionized -0.205 0.213 -0.055 0.156 0.010 0.226 
 
 (0.232)  (0.773)  (0.609)  (0.374)  (0.978)  (0.362) 
More than 50% unionized -0.379* 0.003 0.177 0.074 0.290 0.032 
   (0.005)  (0.994)  (0.153)  (0.558)  (0.391)  (0.873) 
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01. P-values in parentheses.  All models are estimated using the full specification 
shown in Table 14. 
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In the first part of Table 16, the results from the full specification model are used as 
reference point for the estimated effects, it also includes information on the average unionization 
rate within establishments that are unionized, in order to estimate the average union effect on 
productivity (assuming the true union effect is linear in density), which can be compared to the 
results with the alternative measurements.  The first alternative measure uses a dummy for 
unionization, and its coefficient can be directly interpreted as an average union productivity 
effect comparing union and nonunion establishments.  Some of the estimates are consistent with 
the estimated average union impact observed in row 1, but not all.  In Argentina, the average 
productivity effects using dummies is larger, in absolute value, than in the preferred 
specification.  In Chile, on the other hand, while the previous estimate was showing a large and 
positive impact on productivity, the estimates using a dummy indicate that the effect is 
practically zero.  This shows that there is some heterogeneity (nonlinearity) in the effects of 
unions across different levels of unionization, an outcome resulting in part from the small 
number of establishments over some ranges of union density.  
An alternative strategy, shown in the third section of Table 16, is to estimate the union 
effects using dummies for different levels of unionization density in the establishment.  In 
Argentina, regardless of the level of unionization, the estimates on the unionization are strongly 
negative.  The negative impact, however, is larger for establishments with higher unionization 
rates.  In Bolivia, establishments with more than 50% of unionization do not show any difference 
in productivity compared to nonunionized establishments.  Although the dummy for 
establishments with less than 50% of unionization shows a positive estimate, it should be 
interpreted with care, since there are very few observations in this category. 
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In Chile, using dummies to identify different levels of unionization shows that the union-
productivity relationship is not linear.  Establishments with low rates of unionization show 
negative (although not significant) impacts on productivity, while unions with high levels of 
unionization show positive estimates of productivity, similar to the ones found using the 
unionization rate index.  Similar results are found for Panama, where establishments with low 
unionization levels are just as productive as their counterparts, while establishments with high 
unionization rates are more productive, although the estimates are not significant.  Finally, 
Uruguay and Mexico show patterns that are similar to those observed for Bolivia, where 
establishments with low unionization rates have higher productivity than those with high 
unionization rates.  Although for Bolivia, Mexico and Uruguay, all results are not significant, 
they are indicating that low levels of unionization can have a positive impact on productivity. 
6.2. Sensitivity to Imputations 
An important concern regarding the multiple imputation methodology used here is that if 
the “missing function” is incorrectly specified, the estimated results might be biased or 
inconsistent, and will not show the true relationship between unions and productivity.  It could 
also be the case that the number of iterations and choice of numbers of imputed samples are not 
sufficiently large to draw consistent inferences from the data.  To test the sensitivity of the 
results, three procedures are used to provide alternative estimates of productivity.  These are 
presented in Table 17.  
The first row shows estimates using the preferred full specification that includes all 
imputed samples.  The second and third rows show results using the first and last 25 imputed 
samples.  As expected, the results are quite consistent across different number of imputations, 
which indicates that the imputation models and specifications are internally consistent. 
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In the fourth and fifth rows, estimations using the complete sample are presented.  The 
fourth row corresponds to a simple case-wise deletion, while the fifth row uses a reweighted 
scheme, where observations are weighted using the inverse probability of have a complete 
response.  For the first inverse probability weighting strategy, all the information (i.e., all 
exogenous variables) used in the MI procedure is used, while the logit model is estimated using a 
stepwise deletion strategy, to prevent over specification of the model.
60
 Although these methods 
of case-wise deletion can generate substantial bias on the estimations due to the large losses of 
information (Rubin, 1987), if their estimations are similar to the ones obtained using the multiple 
imputation technique, one can be more confident of the robustness of the results.  
Table 17. Effect of Unions on Establishment Productivity: Alternative Imputation Methods 
  Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama  Uruguay 
%Workforce unionized -0.257+ -0.009 0.173 0.093 0.349 0.117 
 
 (0.049)  (0.981)  (0.281)  (0.539)  (0.295)  (0.558) 
First 25 imputations 
      
%Workforce unionized -0.261+ 0.0112 0.174 0.0993 0.362 0.119 
 
 (0.048)  (0.978)  (0.273)  (0.511)  (0.310)  (0.520) 
Last 25 imputations 
      %Workforce unionized -0.252^ -0.0294 0.172 0.0875 0.336 0.115 
 
 (0.051)  (0.938)  (0.291)  (0.567)  (0.283)  (0.594) 
List-wise deletion 
      
%Workforce unionized -0.359+ -0.284 0.211 -0.003 0.266 -0.123 
 
 (0.023)  (0.431)  (0.367)  (0.980)  (0.547)  (0.655) 
Reweighted scheme (IPW) 
      
%Workforce unionized -0.468+ -0.39 0.315 -0.027 0.486 -0.0681 
 
 (0.022)  (0.219)  (0.106)  (0.811)  (0.217)  (0.747) 
Obs. complete cases 294 215 409 802 112 136 
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251 
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01.  P-values in parentheses.  The regression here uses the same specification 
as in regressions in Table 14, after deleting observations with incomplete information. 
As observed in Table 17, for most of the countries there are not important differences 
between the results using the completed data without weights and those using the inverse 
probability weights.  All else the same, the IPW results are preferred since they take into account 
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probability weights, putting too much weight for specific observations. 
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information from missing establishments.  For Argentina, Chile, Panama, the results are similar 
in magnitude, with IPW results being somewhat larger than the MI results.  For Bolivia, Mexico 
and Uruguay, however, the list-wise deletion and IPW present estimates that indicate negative 
effects on productivity.  
Although some results using list-wise deletion and IPW strategies differ substantially 
from the MI strategy, they are not statistically significant.  Furthermore, given that the MI 
estimations are consistent with productivity estimates found elsewhere for Mexico and Uruguay, 
they remain as the preferred results.  Nevertheless, given that we expect, and appear to find, 
heterogeneity in the impact of unions across industries and establishments, coupled with the 
small sample sizes of establishments providing complete information, it is not surprising that the 
estimates are sensitive to variation in the estimation sample.  
 
7. Profitability, profit growth and investment 
The evidence provided so far indicates that unions have, on average, positive effects on 
productivity for most the countries in the sample, with the exceptions being Argentina and 
Bolivia.  It is possible that these productivity enhancements are insufficient to compensate the 
higher costs imposed by unions (mainly wage costs), which could translate into lower 
profitability, lower sales growth, and/or lower investment.  To provide some empirical evidence 
on how unions affect performance outcomes beyond productivity, additional models are 
estimated using different measurements of economic performance, controlling for the same 
variables as in the productivity equations.  While the results cannot be interpreted as causal 
effects, they can be considered partial effects (correlations) from unions, after accounting for 
other measurable covariates.  The results are presented in Table 18. 
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The first aspect of interests is to analyze the effect unions have on profitability.  For this 
analysis, a price-cost margin index is used as measurement of profitability, and measures the 
percent of profit obtain per dollar in sales.  Following Hirsch and Connolly (1987), along with 
other studies in the broader industrial organization literature, in addition to the controls used in 
the full specification productivity model, the profits equation also controls for the log of the 
capital-sales ratio.  According to the results, in Argentina and Chile unionization is negatively 
related to profitability, with similar impacts in the two countries (-5.4% Chile and -9.1% in 
Argentina).  Considering how different the union impacts on productivity are in these two 
countries (Chile being positive and Argentina negative), one might not have expected similar 
impacts on profitability.  Chile’s estimated positive productivity effect, coupled with the 
estimated union wage premium seen in Rios-Avila and Hirsch (forthcoming), should lead to a 
positive association between union density and the price-cost margin.  We do not have an 
estimate of the union wage gap in Argentina, but the large negative productivity effect should be 
more than sufficient to guarantee lower profitability.  
In Chile, although unions are able to increase productivity, it seems that unionized 
establishments face larger production costs, apart from those associated with higher labor costs, 
thus reducing profitability.  The profitability results for Argentina suggest that unionized 
establishments are able to limit their costs.   Bolivia is an interesting case, since the estimates 
show that unionized establishments make about 8 cents more per dollar of sales (this result is not 
significant).  Alternative regressions (not shown here) indicate that while union seem to have no 
effect on productivity (value added), they are negatively associated with sales, which implies that 
unionized establishments face lower costs structures.  It is also possible that is reflecting the fact 
that unionized establishments in Bolivia are substantially larger than their counterparts, and as 
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such enjoy economies of scale that the specification is not able to control for.  Evidence from 
Rios-Avila and Hirsch (forthcoming) shows that union workers in Bolivia earn modest wage 
premiums.  A positive productivity effect strongly suggests that non-labor costs are relatively 
lower for union than nonunion establishments.  For Mexico, Panama and Uruguay, unionized 
establishments seem to be doing, on average, about the same as their nonunion counterparts, with 
no important differences in profitability.  Based on the evidence presented by Fairris (2003), 
Falaris (2008) and Cassoni, et al. (2005), unions in these countries generate modest wage gaps 
(0.07 in Uruguay, 0.15 in Mexico and about 0.20 in Panama), which are plausibly offset by the 
union productivity effects.
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A second measure of interest that can be used to analyze performance is sales growth.  
For this specification, sales growth is calculated using a three year sales growth between last 
fiscal year sales, and sales 3 years ago.  While this measurement will not reflect the trend of 
profits in the firm, it can provide an approximation for the long term effects unions have on 
profits.  The results in Table 18 show, however, that there is no clear relationship between sales 
growth and unionization, with all estimates being non-significant.  Since this measure of sales 
growth relies on self-declared information of past performances, the imprecision of these 
estimates is not surprising. 
Finally, the third measure of performance of interest is related to investment and 
innovation.  On the one hand, the literature indicates that unionized establishments tend to reduce 
investment, by reducing investment returns in the market (i.e. rent seeking behavior) or by 
increasing managerial frictions (monopoly face of unions). On the other hand, other authors 
argue that unions might not reduce and even increase investment, as it reduces “X-inefficiencies” 
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(Machin & Wadhwani, 1991), improving the returns to investment (their evidence of a positive 
union effect is for the U.K.).  More recently, in an analysis of studies for the U.S., U.K., Canada 
and Germany, Doucouliagos and Laroche (2013) have found that unions are negatively 
correlated with investment, consistent with unions taxing quasi-rents of capital reducing the 
incentives to invest in long term investment.  The relationship however seems to be related to the 
level of labor regulations in the country. 
To empirically assess the impact of unions on investment and innovation, three variables 
are used as proxies.  The first one indicates if the establishment has introduced a new product or 
production process in the last three years, the second one indicates if the establishment had any 
investment on physical capital, while the third one captures if there has been any investment on 
Research and Development.
62
 Although the full specification is used for the estimation, all 
variables regarding innovation (see Table 14) are excluded from the model.  In addition, given 
that innovation can be a function of the profits trend, controls for whether sales have gone up 
during the last year is included in the specification. 
According to the results obtain in Table 18, unionized establishments in Argentina and 
Mexico, countries with the most centralized bargaining systems in the sample, are significantly 
more likely to introduce a new or better production process/product in the market.  As seen in 
Table 14, these types of innovation had a large positive and important effect on productivity.  
This implies that, to some extent, unionized establishments in Argentina are able to maintain 
modest losses in profitability, compared to their counterparts, because the indirect gains on 
productivity (via innovation) offset some of the effects of being unionized.  For other countries, 
only the results for Chile seem consistent with the expectations, with a negative relationship 
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have substantial missing information. In contrast, variables indicating whether or not establishments invested have 
minimal missing information, thus more adequate for the analysis. 
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between unions and innovation.  For Bolivia, Panama and Uruguay, the estimates are small and 
not significant. 
In terms of investment, both physical capital and R&D, most of the estimates show the 
expected signs.  Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay show that unions are negatively related 
to capital investment, in particular in Uruguay.  At the same time, the estimates in Chile and 
Uruguay show that unions have a negative but sizable effect on the probability of investing in 
R&D.  For the rest of the countries, the estimated parameters are marginal.  The results 
corresponding to Panama are the exception, as both investments on capital and on R&D are 
positively related to unionization. 
Table 18. Effect of Unions on Establishment Performance 
  Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama  Uruguay 
Profitability             
%Workforce unionized -0.118 0.0826 -0.119+ -0.0191 0.0118 0.0282 
 
 (0.104)  (0.266)  (0.026)  (0.620)  (0.894)  (0.601) 
Sales Growth (last 3 years) 
      %Workforce unionized -0.00658 0.023 0.001 -0.0032 -0.0182 0.016 
 
 (0.642)  (0.698)  (0.887)  (0.396)  (0.331)  (0.451) 
Introduced new process or product 
      %Workforce unionized 0.120+ -0.0108 -0.059 0.136+ 0.0206 0.00995 
 
 (0.022)  (0.894)  (0.440)  (0.042)  (0.885)  (0.971) 
Investment in capital 
      %Workforce Unionized -0.0286 -0.0423 -0.083 0.0224 0.255 -0.171 
 
 (0.472)  (0.718)  (0.194)  (0.676)  (0.114)  (0.519) 
Investment in R&D 
      %Workforce Unionized 0.0005 0.0042 -0.068 0.0103 0.0768 -0.0706 
   (0.994)  (0.980)  (0.546)  (0.740)  (0.605)  (0.548) 
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251 
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01.  P-values in parentheses.  All models are estimated using the full specification 
model presented in Table 14.  For the models with innovation and investment, those variables are excluded from the 
model.  
 
8. Conclusions 
The effect unions have on productivity is one of the most important and controversial 
debates in the union literature.  Despite the large literature on the topic, little consensus has been 
found with respect to the precise magnitude or even direction of these effects, although those 
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summarizing the literature have tended to characterize the union productivity effects, on average, 
as positive, but small, and highly variable across firms and industries.  There is even less 
information available on what unions do in terms of productivity and performance in developing 
countries.  
This essay has aimed to fill gaps in the literature, studying the effects that unions have on 
productivity and performance at the establishment level in selected countries in Latin America.  
These Latin American countries have been historically known for the strong role unions have 
played in their political and economic histories.  Following periods of dictatorships, debt crises 
and economic recovery, however, these countries developed in ways that have produced 
substantial heterogeneity in their collective bargaining systems and the roles that unions play in 
their economies.  
According to the results presented here, unions appear to have small but positive effects 
on productivity across all countries in the sample, with the notable exception of Argentina, where 
a strong negative productivity effect is found, and Bolivia, where no effect is found.  Argentina 
is clearly a special case, having a unique economic structure in which union establishments are 
the dominant norm.  In contrast, Bolivia has the lowest share of unionized establishments among 
the six Latin American economies in the sample.  The weak positive relationships between 
unions and productivity observed for Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay appear to be sufficient to 
offset higher labor costs, with there being no significant effect on profitability.  The union-
productivity estimates, however, also reveal that there is a large heterogeneity within each 
country, helping explain the low significance levels of the results.  
While some of the observed effects can be linked to explanations related to labor 
regulations, unions and managements conflicts, economic structure, or unionization 
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organizations, no single narrative can readily explain all results presented here.  Even at the 
establishment level, a precisely estimated union productivity effect of zero is difficult to 
interpret, being consistent with unions having either no effects or having offsetting positive and 
negative effects (say, productivity enhancing voice and/or shock effects offset by decreased 
managerial discretion).  The empirical analyses presented here, however, provide an important 
step toward a better understanding of the role of unions in developing countries in Latin 
America, an area where there has been little prior evidence.  Given the nature of the data and the 
limitations they place on modeling, the results presented here cannot be strictly represented as 
causal effects.  Instead, they represent the best estimates of partial correlations that capture a 
portrait of the net outcomes resulting from unions and collective bargaining in these Latin 
American economies.  With the development of new data, similar analysis can be extended to 
different regions and time frames, and can open the opportunity for future research that provides 
a more detailed analysis of the effects and channels through which unions affect establishment 
performance. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1. Union Density and Percentage Share by Occupation Industry and Establishment Size 
Bolivia Unionization 
Rate 
%Share Chile Unionization 
Rate 
%Share 
Occupation 
  
Occupation 
  Professionals 19.9% 10.2% Professionals 12.6% 8.0% 
Technicians  14.7% 12.8% Technicians  14.8% 10.4% 
Office workers 8.2% 9.4% Office workers 14.5% 17.8% 
Service and retail 4.8% 12.8% Service and retail 11.5% 18.6% 
Mine and construction 7.2% 31.3% Mine and construction 13.1% 18.4% 
Machinery operators 30.5% 13.8% Machinery operators 21.7% 12.9% 
Unqualified workers 11.8% 9.8% Unqualified workers 10.0% 13.9% 
      Industry 
  
Industry 
  Mining 29.0% 3.2% Mining 41.8% 2.4% 
Manufacture 11.9% 22.3% Manufacture 17.8% 17.6% 
Electricity, gas and water 36.5% 1.1% Electricity gas and water 31.7% 1.0% 
Construction 7.5% 17.3% Construction 7.0% 12.9% 
Trade and repair 4.9% 14.2% 
Retail, food industry, 
accommodation 12.2% 25.0% 
Accommodation and food 2.7% 5.2% 
Transport, storage and 
communication 16.8% 10.5% 
Transportation 28.0% 13.3% Financial services 11.6% 13.1% 
Finance and insurance 
services 14.0% 2.6% Communitarian services 12.4% 17.6% 
Real estate 6.0% 7.1% 
   Educational services 20.4% 4.6% 
   Health care and social 
security 16.2% 3.6% 
   Communitarian services 13.7% 5.7% 
   
      Establishment size (nr workers) Establishment size (nr workers) 
1-9  9.2% 50.2% 1-9  2.4% 20.7% 
10-19 9.7% 13.7% 10-19 4.3% 9.7% 
20-49 15.2% 13.9% 20-49 7.4% 14.2% 
50-99 16.1% 7.6% 50-99 12.0% 10.2% 
100-more 25.1% 13.8% 100-more 25.3% 40.3% 
don’t know 16.9% 0.9% don’t know 10.4% 5.0% 
Note: Estimations corresponds to the weighted pooled average sample used in the analysis. 
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Table A2. Marginal Effects Logit Model 
P(union=1) Bolivia Chile 
Sex (male=1) 0.034*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) 
Indigenous(=1) 0.0198 
 
 
(0.011) 
 Yrs of schooling 0.004*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Exp (=age-yrs school-6) 0.006*** 0.003**  
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Exp^2/100 -0.008*** -0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Currently married 0.018* 0.013*   
 
(0.011) (0.008) 
Head of houshold 0.026** 0.014 
 
(0.010) (0.009) 
# Children 0-6 years Old 0.009* -0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
# Children 7-17 years Old 0.000 0.010**  
 
(0.003) (0.005) 
N 9614 17182 
LL -1871529.9       -4502758 
Pseudo R2 0.1474 0.0568 
Note: * p <0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Note included are the coefficients 
corresponding to occupation, industry, region and year fixed effects.   
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Table A3. Detailed Decomposition of Union Wage Gaps Using Preferred Model: Bolivia 
 Bolivia 
Mean 
Quantiles 
  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Total change 0.272*** 0.202*** 0.213*** 0.267*** 0.355*** 0.273*** 
 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.037) (0.042) (0.034) (0.080) 
Wage structure 0.114*** 0.093** 0.122*** 0.147*** 0.159*** -0.063 
 
(0.027) (0.043) (0.038) (0.033) (0.040) (0.078) 
Composition effect 0.158*** 0.109*** 0.091*** 0.120*** 0.196*** 0.336*** 
  (0.027) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.040) (0.053) 
Wage Structure 
      
Sex (male=1) -0.053 -0.217** -0.196** -0.047 0.078 -0.063 
 
(0.065) (0.098) (0.088) (0.103) (0.107) (0.185) 
Indigenous(=1) -0.021 -0.014 0.005 -0.017 -0.003 -0.037 
 
(0.016) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.042) 
Yrs of schooling -0.033 0.117 0.043 -0.014 -0.110 -0.112 
 
(0.087) (0.170) (0.139) (0.134) (0.162) (0.219) 
Age 0.015 0.090 0.121 0.214 0.080 -0.577** 
 
(0.109) (0.145) (0.168) (0.150) (0.185) (0.274) 
Household characteristics 0.008 -0.004 -0.069 -0.100 0.003 0.152 
 
(0.061) (0.111) (0.092) (0.089) (0.113) (0.159) 
Year -0.109 -0.118 -0.097 -0.098 -0.108 -0.137 
 
(0.070) (0.119) (0.111) (0.080) (0.099) (0.166) 
Region -0.034 -0.104 -0.025 0.079 0.009 -0.142 
 
(0.039) (0.072) (0.055) (0.049) (0.063) (0.098) 
Occupation 0.161* 0.003 0.050 0.018 0.354* 0.292 
 
(0.087) (0.094) (0.084) (0.102) (0.210) (0.392) 
Industry -0.142 -0.089 -0.140 -0.027 0.247 -0.218 
 
(0.133) (0.165) (0.159) (0.166) (0.181) (0.296) 
Constant 0.320 0.430 0.429 0.138 -0.392 0.778 
 
(0.262) (0.358) (0.346) (0.329) (0.489) (0.783) 
Composition effect 
 
          
Sex (male=1) 0.018*** 0.019** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.016** 
 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Indigenous(=1) -0.002 -0.009** -0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Yrs of schooling 0.013* 0.012* 0.012* 0.011* 0.014* 0.015* 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Age 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.037*** 0.072*** 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) 
Household characteristics 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
Year -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.012 -0.007 
 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) 
Region -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.040*** 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) 
Occupation 0.075*** 0.063*** 0.054*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.116*** 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.036) 
Industry 0.021** -0.012 -0.012 0.011 0.043*** 0.083*** 
 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.024) 
Residual 0.024*** 0.035** 0.024* 0.024* 0.045* 0.047 
  (0.009) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.040) 
Note: * p <0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Significance levels are estimated using bootstrap standard errors 
which are in parenthesis. The effects of head of the household, currently married and number of children 
are aggregated into the Household characteristics. Year, region, occupation and industry also group their 
respective fixed effects.   
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Table A4. Detailed Decomposition of Union Wage Gaps Using Preferred Model: Chile 
  
Mean 
Quantiles 
  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Total change 0.236*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.276*** 0.309*** 0.207*** 
 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.028) (0.036) (0.042) 
Wage structure 0.143*** 0.159*** 0.168*** 0.171*** 0.204*** 0.052 
 
(0.014) (0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.028) (0.044) 
Composition effect 0.093*** 0.050*** 0.041*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.155*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.033) 
Wage Structure 
      Sex (male=1) -0.018 -0.005 -0.006 0.009 -0.036 -0.115* 
 
(0.026) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.069) 
Yrs of schooling -0.073 -0.025 0.078 -0.024 -0.007 -0.378 
 
(0.085) (0.102) (0.093) (0.130) (0.157) (0.241) 
Age 0.114** 0.009 0.112** 0.256*** 0.193* 0.030 
 
(0.054) (0.068) (0.053) (0.073) (0.114) (0.166) 
Household characteristics -0.037 -0.010 0.044 -0.020 -0.074 -0.112 
 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.038) (0.056) (0.071) 
Year 0.002 -0.037 0.009 -0.003 0.011 0.064 
 
(0.023) (0.041) (0.026) (0.038) (0.056) (0.056) 
Region 0.025* 0.008 0.006 0.018 0.066** 0.086** 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.037) 
Occupation 0.128* -0.079* -0.007 -0.032 -0.019 1.048*** 
 
(0.067) (0.041) (0.071) (0.094) (0.135) (0.277) 
Industry -0.029 -0.024 -0.095 -0.121 -0.260* 0.403* 
 
(0.066) (0.050) (0.061) (0.099) (0.154) (0.243) 
Constant 0.031 0.322* 0.028 0.087 0.331 -0.974** 
 
(0.186) (0.171) (0.162) (0.284) (0.362) (0.473) 
Composition effect 
      Sex (male=1) -0.018 -0.005 -0.006 0.009 -0.036 -0.115* 
 
(0.026) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.069) 
Yrs of schooling 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Age 0.016*** 0.003 0.004** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) 
Household characteristics 0.015*** 0.006** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
Year 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Region 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.007** 0.008** 0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Occupation 0.005 0.008 0.012*** 0.014* 0.004 -0.018 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.012) (0.021) 
Industry 0.011** -0.008* -0.003 0.004 0.024*** 0.038** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) 
Residual 0.000 0.004 -0.016** 0.015 -0.017 0.009 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) 
Note: * p <0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Significance levels are estimated using bootstrap standard errors 
which are in parenthesis. The effects of head of the household, currently married and number of 
children are aggregated into the Household characteristics. Year, region, occupation and industry also 
group their respective fixed effects.   
 
  
 115 
 
Table A5. Detailed Decomposition of Union Wage Gaps Using Preferred Model: Bolivia 
  Variance Inter quantile 
    Q5010 Q9050 Q9010 
Total change 0.030 0.065 0.005 0.070 
 
(0.034) (0.045) (0.081) (0.082) 
Wage structure -0.107*** 0.054 -0.210** -0.156* 
 
(0.041) (0.049) (0.083) (0.084) 
Composition effect 0.137*** 0.011 0.216*** 0.226*** 
  (0.029) (0.023) (0.046) (0.054) 
Wage Structure 
    
Sex (male=1) 0.205** 0.170 -0.015 0.154 
 
(0.087) (0.115) (0.195) (0.220) 
Indigenous(=1) -0.020 -0.003 -0.020 -0.024 
 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.044) (0.056) 
Yrs of schooling -0.156 -0.130 -0.098 -0.228 
 
(0.159) (0.227) (0.232) (0.289) 
Age -0.503*** 0.124 -0.791*** -0.666** 
 
(0.177) (0.204) (0.293) (0.311) 
Household characteristics 0.171* -0.096 0.253 0.156 
 
(0.095) (0.133) (0.170) (0.218) 
Year 0.065 0.020 -0.040 -0.019 
 
(0.137) (0.139) (0.178) (0.200) 
Region -0.001 0.183** -0.221** -0.038 
 
(0.061) (0.079) (0.096) (0.114) 
Occupation 0.288* 0.016 0.274 0.289 
 
(0.165) (0.132) (0.392) (0.413) 
Industry -0.122 0.062 -0.191 -0.129 
 
(0.315) (0.219) (0.332) (0.334) 
Constant -0.034 -0.291 0.640 0.349 
 
(0.533) (0.530) (0.748) (0.901) 
Composition effect         
Sex (male=1) 0.000 -0.006 0.004 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Indigenous(=1) 0.006* 0.006 0.005 0.012* 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Yrs of schooling 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.028*** -0.001 0.050*** 0.049*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) 
Household characteristics -0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) 
Year -0.003 -0.005 0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) 
Region 0.000 0.011 0.003 0.014 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) 
Occupation 0.040* 0.001 0.052 0.053 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.041) 
Industry 0.058*** 0.024 0.072*** 0.095*** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) 
Residual 0.008 -0.011 0.023 0.012 
  (0.015) (0.021) (0.040) (0.046) 
Note: * p <0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Significance levels are estimated using 
bootstrap standard errors which are in parenthesis. The effects of head of the 
household, currently married and number of children are aggregated into the 
Household characteristics. Year, region, occupation and industry also group their 
respective fixed effects.   
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Table A6. Detailed Decomposition of Union Wage Gaps Using Preferred Model: Chile 
  Variance Inter quantile 
    Q5010 Q9050 Q9010 
Total change -0.048*** 0.067** -0.070* -0.003 
 
(0.017) (0.028) (0.040) (0.047) 
Wage structure -0.078*** 0.012 -0.119** -0.107** 
 
(0.017) (0.027) (0.047) (0.051) 
Composition effect 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.049 0.104*** 
  (0.011) (0.015) (0.030) (0.034) 
Wage Structure 
    Sex (male=1) -0.041 0.015 -0.124* -0.109 
 
(0.026) (0.050) (0.071) (0.079) 
Yrs of schooling -0.041 0.000 -0.354 -0.353 
 
(0.089) (0.137) (0.258) (0.252) 
Age 0.034 0.248*** -0.226 0.022 
 
(0.061) (0.084) (0.158) (0.161) 
Household characteristics -0.036 -0.009 -0.093 -0.102 
 
(0.029) (0.043) (0.076) (0.079) 
Year 0.031 0.034 0.067 0.100 
 
(0.027) (0.049) (0.070) (0.067) 
Region 0.033** 0.010 0.068* 0.078* 
 
(0.016) (0.023) (0.040) (0.040) 
Occupation 0.403*** 0.047 1.080*** 1.127*** 
 
(0.089) (0.097) (0.277) (0.276) 
Industry 0.112 -0.097 0.524** 0.427* 
 
(0.093) (0.099) (0.266) (0.249) 
Constant -0.572*** -0.235 -1.061** -1.296*** 
 
(0.205) (0.299) (0.482) (0.488) 
Composition effect 
    Sex (male=1) -0.041 0.015 -0.124* -0.109 
 
(0.026) (0.050) (0.071) (0.079) 
Yrs of schooling 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.030*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) 
Household characteristics 0.010*** 0.008** 0.016*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) 
Year -0.005* -0.006** -0.004 -0.010* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Region 0.000 0.008*** -0.003 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Occupation -0.013 0.006 -0.032* -0.026 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.018) (0.022) 
Industry 0.024*** 0.012** 0.034** 0.046*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) 
Residual -0.008** 0.011 -0.006 0.005 
  (0.003) (0.013) (0.020) (0.021) 
Note: * p <0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Significance levels are estimated using 
bootstrap standard errors which are in parenthesis. The effects of head of the 
household, currently married and number of children are aggregated into the 
Household characteristics. Year, region, occupation and industry also group their 
respective fixed effects.   
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Table A7. Detailed Decomposition of Union Wage and Inequality Gaps Includes Establishment Size 
Effect: Bolivia 
  
Mean 
Quantiles Variance Inter quantile 
  Q10 Q50 Q90   Q5010 Q9050 
Total change 0.272*** 0.202*** 0.267*** 0.273*** 0.030 0.065 0.005 
 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.042) (0.080) (0.034) (0.045) (0.081) 
Wage structure 0.076*** 0.073* 0.103*** -0.111 -0.118*** 0.030 -0.214*** 
 
(0.027) (0.042) (0.034) (0.074) (0.041) (0.049) (0.078) 
Composition effect 0.196*** 0.129*** 0.164*** 0.384*** 0.148*** 0.035 0.220*** 
  (0.027) (0.032) (0.028) (0.044) (0.028) (0.026) (0.041) 
Wage Structure 
     
  Sex (male=1) -0.043 -0.220** -0.027 0.028 0.204** 0.193 0.055 
Indigenous(=1) -0.019 -0.014 -0.014 -0.021 -0.008 0.001 -0.007 
Yrs of schooling -0.034 0.118 -0.030 -0.053 -0.121 -0.148 -0.022 
Age -0.009 0.069 0.189 -0.649** -0.433*** 0.120 -0.838*** 
Household characteristics 0.009 -0.009 -0.080 0.195 0.165* -0.071 0.276 
Year -0.132* -0.069 -0.153* -0.130 0.024 -0.084 0.023 
Region -0.029 -0.084 0.070 -0.100 0.012 0.155* -0.170* 
Occupation 0.167** 0.000 0.093 0.172 0.258 0.093 0.079 
Industry -0.096 -0.127 0.079 -0.190 -0.120 0.207 -0.270 
Establishment size -0.023 -0.076 -0.034 -0.020 0.031 0.042 0.015 
Constant 0.285 0.486 0.010 0.656 -0.129 -0.476 0.646 
Composition effect 
     
  Sex (male=1) 0.017*** 0.017** 0.011** 0.014* 0.000 -0.007 0.004 
Indigenous(=1) -0.002 -0.008** -0.002 0.003 0.006* 0.006 0.005 
Yrs of schooling 0.012* 0.012* 0.010* 0.014* 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
Age 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.070*** 0.028*** -0.001 0.050*** 
Household characteristics 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.030*** -0.002 -0.006 0.000 
Year -0.008 -0.004 -0.010 -0.008 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 
Region -0.043*** -0.051*** -0.040*** -0.036*** 0.001 0.011 0.005 
Occupation 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.096*** 0.036* -0.001 0.044 
Industry 0.016* -0.015 0.007 0.073*** 0.055*** 0.022 0.066*** 
Establishment size 0.050*** 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.088*** 0.024*** 0.011 0.040** 
Residual 0.032*** 0.033* 0.039*** 0.040 0.003 0.006 0.001 
Note: * p <0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Significance levels are estimated using bootstrap standard errors. The effects 
of head of the household, currently married and number of children are aggregated into the Household 
characteristics. Year, region, occupation and industry also group their respective fixed effects.  
 
  
 118 
 
Table A8: Detailed Decomposition of Union Wage And Inequality Gaps Includes Establishment 
Size effect: Chile 
  
Mean 
Quantiles Variance Inter quantile 
  Q10 Q50 Q90   Q5010 Q9050 
Total change 0.236*** 0.210*** 0.276*** 0.207*** -0.048*** 0.067** -0.070* 
 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.042) (0.017) (0.028) (0.040) 
Wage structure 0.143*** 0.159*** 0.171*** 0.052 -0.078*** 0.012 -0.119** 
 
(0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.044) (0.017) (0.027) (0.047) 
Composition effect 0.093*** 0.050*** 0.105*** 0.155*** 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.049 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.033) (0.011) (0.015) (0.030) 
Wage Structure   
    
  Sex (male=1) -0.019 -0.032 0.010 -0.097 0.002 0.042 -0.107 
Yrs of schooling -0.094 -0.041 0.005 -0.402* -0.008 0.046 -0.407 
Age 0.088 -0.021 0.224*** -0.011 0.029 0.245*** -0.235 
Household characteristics -0.051* 0.001 -0.037 -0.120* -0.065** -0.038 -0.082 
Year 0.004 -0.018 -0.019 0.063 0.020 -0.001 0.082 
Region 0.023 0.016 0.010 0.097** 0.028 -0.006 0.087** 
Occupation 0.119* -0.059 -0.026 1.078*** 0.363*** 0.033 1.104*** 
Industry -0.086 -0.039 -0.157 0.293 0.032 -0.118 0.450* 
Establishment size -0.074 0.007 -0.048 -0.054 0.026 -0.055 -0.006 
Constant 0.168 0.299 0.125 -0.853* -0.495** -0.174 -0.978** 
Composition effect   
    
  Sex (male=1) -0.019 -0.032 0.010 -0.097 0.002 0.042 -0.107 
Yrs of schooling 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.036*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.016*** 
Age 0.017*** 0.004 0.012*** 0.042*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.030*** 
Household characteristics 0.014*** 0.005** 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.016*** 
Year 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.002 -0.005* -0.006** -0.003 
Region 0.005* 0.000 0.008** 0.005 0.001 0.008*** -0.003 
Occupation 0.005 0.007 0.014** -0.018 -0.013 0.006 -0.032* 
Industry 0.008 -0.010*** 0.001 0.034** 0.023*** 0.011** 0.033** 
Establishment size 0.071*** 0.053*** 0.074*** 0.094*** 0.008 0.021** 0.020 
Residual -0.001 0.003 0.032** -0.021 -0.025*** 0.029* -0.053* 
Note: * p <0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Significance levels are estimated using bootstrap standard errors. The 
effects of head of the household, currently married and number of children are aggregated into the Household 
characteristics. Year, region, occupation and industry also group their respective fixed effects.  
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APPENDIX B 
Multiple Imputation using Chain Equations 
In cases when the missing data structure follows an arbitrary missing pattern and 
simultaneous imputations of multiple variables are required, two standard imputation approaches 
can be used: multivariate normal imputation and imputations using chained equations (ICE). 
While the first approach estimates a model that tries to identify the underlying multivariate 
distribution, it imposes restrictions on the estimation, assuming the system follows a normal 
multivariate distribution. The ICE approach, by contrast, lacks a formal theoretical justification, 
but provides more flexibility in the specification of the imputation models, being consistent with 
different types of underlying distributional assumptions.  
The idea of the ICE approach is to construct univariate imputation models for each 
variable with missing information, using a fully conditional specification where all variables, 
other than the one being imputed, are used as independent variables. These conditional models 
are used to obtain predictions for the missing information, and can be used in subsequent 
iterations. In cases where the missing data structure follows an arbitrary pattern, an iterative 
imputation process is needed to account for possible dependence of the estimated parameters to 
the imputed data. Formally, the procedure can be described as follows. 
Let            be a set of variables with missing information (imputed variables), and 
let   be a set of complete predictors. For each imputed variable, it is possible to construct a 
univariate imputation models   , where each model can be a different distribution function 
(normal, logistic, etc), that best identifies the specific underlying distribution of the variable   :  
  
      (     
      
      ) 
  
      (     
      
      ) 
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Once the imputation models are specified for the first iteration, only complete 
observations are used for each individual model. Based on the imputation models, random draws 
using the empirical distribution of the imputed variables are obtained and used in the next 
iteration of the imputation until convergence is obtained. Although there is no specific rule on 
the number of imputations needed to obtain convergence of the system, the literature suggests 
that 10 iterations are typically sufficient to achieve convergence (van Buuren, 2007). However, 
depending on the complexity of the imputation system, more iterations may be needed. Once 
convergence is achieved, a random draw of the empirical process is obtained and used to create 
an imputed sample. This process is repeated for each additional set of imputed samples needed 
until M different imputed samples are created.  
Although the validity of the MI approach relies on the asymptotic properties of the 
imputation procedure with M approaching infinity, in practice fewer imputations are needed to 
obtain consistent and stables results. According to Rubin (1987), M=5 imputations should be 
sufficient to obtain valid inferences for most procedures, but depending on the amount of 
information missing and the type of analysis required, a larger set of imputed samples could be 
required.  
Once M completed samples are obtained, each of them can be used to obtain M 
independent estimations for the desired model. Assume the model to be estimated can be written 
as: 
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such that we have a set of parameters    and a variance covariance matrix    for each imputed 
sample m. Following Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1987) the results for the parameters and variance 
covariance matrices can be combined as follows: 
 ̃  
 
 
∑ ̃      
 ̃  
 
 
∑ ̃  (  
 
 
)  ∑
( ̃   ̃ )( ̃   ̃ ) 
   
 
Here,  ̃  and  ̃  are the parameters and variance covariance matrix corresponding to the 
combination of models across the M imputed samples. See Rubin (1987) for more details. 
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APPENDIX C 
Specification Of Imputation Model 
Table C1. Variables with Complete Information:  
Variable Definition 
Part larger Indicates if the establishment if part of a larger firm 
Public or private 
shareholding 
Indicates if the establishment has stocks in private hands or public stock exchange. 
Foreign owned Indicates if more than 50% of the establishment is owned by foreign capital 
% largest 
shareholder 
Indicates if the largest shareholder owns more than 50% of the establishment 
Age Number of years since the establishment began operations 
Manager 
experience 
Number of years of experience of top manager 
Quality 
certification 
Indicates if establishments have an ISO quality certification 
Electric problems Indicates if establishments have suffered 2 or more outages 
Has a generator Indicates if establishments possess a generator 
Electricity request Indicates if establishments have submitted a request for electricity connection 
Water request Indicates if establishments have submitted a request for water connection 
Water obstacle Indicates if establishments consider access to water as a major obstacle of production 
Electricity 
obstacle 
Indicates if establishments consider access to electricity as a major obstacle of production 
Mono production Indicates if all production comes from the main product 
Sales export % of sales that come from export 
Inputs from small 
Firms 
%Inputs bought from smaller firms 
Foreign input %Inputs imported 
Principal buyer Indicates if consumers are main buyers from production 
Customs and 
trades 
Indicates if Customs and trades regulations are an obstacle for operations 
Own transport Indicates if establishment possess its own transportation system 
Transport problem Indicates if transportation is considered a major obstacle for operation 
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Subcontract 
production 
%Sales that are subcontracted to other firms 
Competition Indicates the level of competition the establishment faces: None or one competitor (no 
competition), 2-5 competitors (medium competition), 5 or more competitors (high 
competition), operates on international market 
Sales change Indicates if sales of main product have gone up or down in the last year 
Prices change Indicates if prices of main product have gone up or down in the last years 
Domestic 
Competition 
Pressure from domestic competitors on production costs is important 
International 
Competition 
Pressure from international competitors on production costs is important 
Foreign 
Technology 
Establishment uses foreign technology for their production 
New product or 
New process 
Indicates if the establishment introduced a new or significantly improved product/service or 
production process 
Informality  Indicates if informal markets are a consider a major obstacle for establishment operations 
Share of 
Production 
Workers 
Share of Production workers as % of total permanent workers 
Share of skill 
workers 
Share of Skill workers as % of total permanent workers 
Share of seasonal 
workers 
Share of seasonal workers as % of total permanent equivalent workers 
Share of female 
workers 
Share of Production workers as % of total permanent workers 
Level of 
utilization of 
capital 
%of current output compared to maximum output possible under normal circumstances 
Hours of 
operation per 
week 
Normal weekly hours of operations of the establishment, Includes the variable in levels and 
logs 
New buildings Indicates if establishment submitted an application to obtain a construction-related permit in 
last 2 years 
Land problem Indicates if access to land is considered a major obstacle for operation 
Government 
problem 
Indicates if government regulations are considered major obstacles for operation 
Investment  Indicates if establishment has investment any resources on machinery or vehicles during last 
fiscal year 
 124 
 
Hires seasonal 
workers 
Indicates if establishment hires seasonal workers at all. 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Includes industry fixed effects using ISIC Rev.3.1 classification to 2 digits. 
Nr of permanent 
workers 
Total number of permanent workers, including its logarithm, logarith squared and 
interaction with a union Dummy 
Nr workers on t-1 Total number of permanent workers 3 years ago 
Nr production 
workers 
Total number of workers directly engaged in the production process. Includes its log 
Nr non production 
Workers 
Total number of workers not engaged in the production process. Includes its log 
Zero production 
workers 
Indicates if there are no production workers in the establishment 
Nr of seasonal 
workers 
Nr of workers that are hired for a short-term (i.e. for less than a fiscal year), with no 
guarantee of renewal of employment contract. Includes its log and interaction with union 
dummy 
Labor regulations Indicates if establishments consider labor regulations as major obstacles for operations 
Inadequate 
Education 
Indicates if establishments consider inadequate education as major obstacles for operations 
Manufacture 
production 
% of sales that come from manufacture 
Refusal capital Indicate if the establishment refused to provide information on book or market capital values 
Refusal land Indicate if the establishment refused to provide information on book or market land value 
Log sales Logarithm of total sales in last fiscal year. Includes its square. 
Sales in t-1 
dummy 
Indicates if the establishment didn’t provide information on sales 3 years ago. 
Union Variables indicating if the establishment is unionized, the union density within the 
establishment and a dummy if more than 50% of the establishment is unionized.  
Information 
quality flags 
Two dummies indicating if the interviewer perceives the information provided is true, or if 
the data was taken from administrative records. 
Workers avg 
education 
Average education attainment of typical worker. 0-3 yrs of education, 4-6 yrs of education, 
7-12 yrs of education and 13+ yrs of education 
Training Indicators of training among permanent workers: No active training program in the 
establishment, 0-33% of workers trained, 34-66% of workers trained and 67-100% workers 
trained. 
Owner female Indicates if any of the main owners of the establishment is female. 
Region Fixed effects using region dummies survey in each country. Varies across countries. 
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Table C2. Imputed Variables:  
Variable Method Definition 
Nr of workers in t-1 PMM Total number of permanent workers 3 years ago 
Cost of labor  PMM Total annual cost of labor as share of sales 
Cost of electricity  PMM Total annual cost of electricity as share of sales 
Cost of communications  PMM Total annual cost of communications as share of sales 
Cost of materials and inputs  PMM Total annual cost of materials and inputs as share of sales 
Cost of fuel   PMM Total annual cost of fuel as share of sales 
Cost of transportation  PMM Total annual cost of transportation as share of sales 
Cost of water  PMM Total annual cost of water as share of sales 
Cost of rentals  PMM 
Total annual cost of rent of equipment, building and land as share 
of sales 
Log Nr of workers in t-1 OLS Log Total number of permanent workers 3 years ago 
Log Sales in t-1 OLS Log Sales 3 years ago 
Log wages production workers OLS Log average wage of production workers 
Log wages non production 
workers 
OLS Log average wage of non-production workers 
Log capital (book value) OLS Log of net book value of machinery 
Log capital (market value) OLS Log of hypothetical cost of purchase of machinery 
Log materials and inputs OLS Log of total cost of material and inputs 
Log salaries OLS Log of total cost of salaries 
OLS: This method uses linear predictions (plus the empirical standard error) to impute the values 
of the missing values. 
PMM: This method uses linear predictions to match observations with missing values to those 
with complete information. The observed values are then used for the imputation. 
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Table C3. Other Measurements: 
Variable Definition 
Log value added pc Value added is defined as sales minus costs on materials and inputs, electricity, fuel and 
water. It is divided by total equivalent permanent workers. 
Log total equivalent 
permanent workers 
Total equivalent workers are estimated as total permanent workers plus equivalent 
seasonal workers. Equivalent seasonal workers are estimated as total number of 
temporary/seasonal workers multiplied by the average time (in months) a temporal 
worker participates in the establishment in a year.  
Log capital per capita Log of hypothetical value of capital divided by total number of equivalent workers. 
Hypothetical value captures the market value of capital, or how much the establishment 
would pay for it in current state.  
Profit Price cost margin, defined as total sales minus total production costs, divided by total 
costs. 
Sales growth Defined as the difference between current log sales, and log sales three years ago 
Investment in R&D  Indicates if the establishment has spent on research and development 
Investment in capital Indicates if the establishment has bought any fixed assets in the previous period 
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APPENDIX D 
Plot of Mean and Standard Deviation Main Imputed Variables by Country 
Argentina 
s
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Bolivia
 
  
 129 
 
Chile
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Mexico
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Panama
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APPENDIX E 
Effect of Unions on Establishment Productivity, by Country. Basic Brown and Medoff 
Specification 
  Argentina Bolivia Chile  Mexico Panama Uruguay 
              
%Workforce unionized -0.377^ 0.488 0.227 0.061 0.304 0.188 
 
 (0.057)  (0.166)  (0.212)  (0.675)  (0.367)  (0.409) 
Log capital pc -0.009 0.260* 0.232* 0.249* 0.017 -0.03 
 
 (0.914)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.814)  (0.678) 
Log total labor force 0.201* 0.077 0.172* 0.164* 0.126 0.396* 
 
 (0.000)  (0.426)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.101)  (0.000) 
Constant 9.308* 5.668* 6.949* 6.680* 9.188* 8.166* 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251 
Notes:  ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01. P-values in parentheses. Models include region and broad industry fixed effects 
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